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APPENDIX A – DISCREPANT ORGANISMS: PROBLEMS IN THE 
CLASSIFICATION OF ORGANISMS IN PRE-DARWINIAN TIMES 
In this Appendix the focus is on the role of analogy in pre-Darwinian natural science. It will 
be argued that convergent organisms (in form of “epistemological discrepant organisms”, see 
below) and analogical reasoning led to fruitful insights with enormous impact in 18th century 
natural history. As argued in Appendix B, this development resulted in the first extensive 
hypothesis on the evolution of organisms in that period.  
A.1 Epistemological discrepant organisms: Definition 
I proposed the term “epistemological discrepant organisms” (or simply “discrepant 
organisms”)1 to designate taxa or species difficult to place in a single logical category in pre-
Darwinian zoological treatises due to their ambivalent anatomy or behaviour. Naturalists in 
pre-Darwinian times encountered important difficulties in understanding and distinguishing 
two kinds of similarities between living organisms. On the one hand, since several species 
share innumerable evident similarities, it was possible to infer intuitively that, for instance, 
mammals are closely related to each other. On the other hand, humans could not ignore that 
organisms could be also linked to each other by other criteria, such as the environment in 
which organisms live (e.g., reflected in the traditional division of aquatic, flying and terrestrial 
animals) or by stressing the functional similarity in certain features (e.g., the “wings” of 
insects, birds and bats). Puzzling to the same degree in pre-Darwinian times was the almost 
identical inner anatomy of animals living in completely different environments (e.g., dolphins 
and pigs), or the question as to why the inner anatomy of tuna fishes and dolphins is so 
radically different, although these organisms resemble each other strongly in their external 
anatomy and their ways of life. These different ways how to categorize organisms were not 
compatible to each other due to the absence of a sophisticated theory on the evolution of 
organisms. These epistemological discrepancies played a crucial role both in early static 
                                                          
1 This expression was first used in a supplemental volume to an unpublished diploma thesis by the present 
author (Bender 1999b). In German, the expression “epistemologische Dissonanz” has an apparent similarity to 
the term “cognitive dissonance” used in psychology (Festinger et al. 1956). Both terms share some similar ideas 
but are not identic. Leon Festinger and colleagues used the term “cognitive dissonance” to describe the 
discomfort experienced by people when simultaneously holding two or more conflicting cognitions. The 
expression “epistemological discrepant organisms”, on the other hand, refers to the specific problems caused 
by convergent organisms (whole taxa or single species) in early attempts to build up a coherent system to 
classify organisms. In retrospect (I did not know Festinger’s concept in the 1990’s), I think that the issues 
related to epistemological discrepant organisms can be regarded as a specific case of cognitive dissonance, in 
which problems produced by conflicting information are widely ignored. In a recently published work, the 
expression “incidents” (German Störfälle) was used in a very similar sense as epistemological discrepant 
organisms (Bühler 2011). 
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hierarchic views of nature (scala naturae) and in the first attempts to formulate a scientific 
evolutionary hypothesis in 18th century (see Appendix B).   
A.2 The polarity induced by discrepant organisms 
Generally, discrepant organisms were perceived as paradoxical because they exhibit features 
atypical for closely related species; rather, they were perceived as functionally related to 
distantly related creatures (see Table A.1). The polarity induced by discrepant organisms is an 
important factor to understand pre-Darwinian efforts to categorize organisms. If a naturalist 
grouped organisms by focusing on aspects of functionality or life-form, as in the example 
above on dolphins and tuna, a closer investigation of affinities between the organisms tended 
to split them, often lumping together organisms with strong divergent life-forms or body 
shape. There are uncountable examples for these conflicting perspectives. In zoological 
treatises of the Middle Age bats were often described together with birds (see references in 
Wegmann 2005). Since the expression “flying creatures” (analogous to the terms “aquatic 
creatures” and “terrestrial creatures”) was a common one both in colloquial and scientific 
language, naturalists in pre-Darwinian times explicitly had to point out the divergent affinity 
between distantly related flying organisms. For instance, in a popular book on science first 
published in 1670, the author investigated the question: “Are the bats birds or not?” (Sind die 
Fleder-Mäuse Vögel oder nicht?) (Voigt 1980, 56). The author reasoned that besides the 
fundamental anatomical divergencies between bats and birds, the ability to fly can be found in 
other organisms like insects and even some fishes, and he went on to ask the question ”Who 
wants to categorise them as birds?” (Wer will sie aber mit unter die Vögel rechnen?) (Voigt 
1980, 57). A similar reasoning is implied in a statement by the Swiss naturalist Conrad Gesner 
(1516-1565). In a booklet published in 1541 – probably the first comprehensive review of 
milk and milk products – he explained that among the birds only the bat produces milk 
(Gesner 1996, 89).  
A further example is related to the discovery of the monotreme platypus. This semi-aquatic, 
egg-laying mammal with its webbed feet and a “beak like a duck” was first categorized as a 
hoax at the end of the 18th century, when a dried specimen initially reached England (Moyal 
2001). In this case, the perceived anomaly was generated not only through convergent 
similarities between ducks and the platypus, but also through the distinction between 
viviparous and oviparous animals, which was radically challenged by the new species. For 
these reasons, platypus and other monotremes were regularly classified as intermediary forms. 
For instance, Johann Wagler (1830) classified platypus along with other aquatic vertebrates 
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(including the flying reptile Pterodactylus, which was sometimes regarded as aquatic; see Fig. 
A.1 below) in the bizarre class Gryphi (in German Greife). He described them as organisms 
with the combined features of mammals, birds, reptiles, and fishes (Wagler 1830, e.g., 66).  
 
 
Figure A.1: Gryphi as a bizarre taxon in pre-Darwinian zoology. Wagler’s reconstruction of 
Pterodactylus as an aquatic animal as depicted in his book Natürliches System der Amphibien (1830) 
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Table A.1 Examples of epistemological discrepancies (for references see text) 
General perception of 
characteristic features of certain 
organisms in opposition to other 
taxa 
Discrepant 
organisms … 
… and the specific source of epistemological 
discrepancies 
In opposition to mammals, birds are 
able to fly and do not exceed a 
certain body size 
Ostriches… … do not fly and exceed the body size of other 
birds  
In opposition to fishes, mammals 
are terrestrial 
Several aquatic 
mammals… 
… are exclusively aquatic and have an external 
appearance of fishes 
In opposition to birds, mammals are 
quadruped and are not able to fly 
Bats… … have wings and are able to fly 
In opposition to mammals, fishes 
lay eggs 
Most sharks… … are ovoviviparous, and like most mammals, give 
birth to fully alive and functional young 
In opposition to birds, mammals do 
not have a beak and do not lay eggs  
Platypus… … has a beak-like organ and lay eggs  
In opposition to plants, animals are 
mobile 
Sea anemones 
and corals 
(Anthozoa)… 
… live attached to a substrate and resemble flowers 
(Anthozoa: “flower animals”); see discussion and 
references in Bühler (2011)  
In opposition to animals, plants do 
not hunt and consume animals 
Carnivorous 
plants… 
… trap and consume animals  
In opposition to non-mammals, 
mammals have a fur to protect them 
against the cold and are quadrupeds 
Humans… 
 
Cetaceans… 
… do not have a thermoregulatory efficient fur and 
are bipedal 
… do not have a thermoregulatory efficient fur; 
their forelimbs are modified into flippers and they 
hindlimbs are vestigial and externally not visible 
In opposition to birds, fishes do not 
have wings and are not able to fly  
Flying fishes… 
 
… have wings and are able to “fly” 
 
In opposition to terrestrial animals, 
fishes live in water and are not able 
climb 
Climbing 
fishes… 
 
… like the climbing gouramies (Anabantidae) are 
able to breathe atmospheric oxygen and “climb” out 
of water 
In opposition to “worms”, 
vertebrates have legs 
Snakes, eels and 
blindworms… 
… do not have legs 
 
A.3 The role of secondary aquatic organisms  
Secondary aquatic animals were among the greatest challenges in pre-Darwinian zoology.2 
Aristotle (384 BC-322 BC) was the first naturalist to explicitly recognize that the cetaceans 
are distantly related to fishes (see Bäumer 1988), giving very specific reasons for the 
                                                          
2 For a review of the scientific journey of cetaceans from fish to mammals in the history of science see Romero 
(2012); I found this excellent historical investigation only few days before the final submission deadline of the 
present thesis, so that the review could not be considered here. 
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differentiation: (a) dolphins have bones, and not fish-spines3; (b) they do not have gills4 but 
lungs5; when caught in a net, a dolphin quickly suffocates for lack of air6; (c) dolphins and 
whales breastfeed their young7 and (d) are live-bearing8. Although he established that 
terrestrial mammals breathe air and are live-bearing organisms, he was seemingly confused by 
the fact that some animals did not fit into a simple classificatory schema (see Fig. A.2), as 
evident in following sentence: “For it is not easy to class each of these either as solely water 
animal or as land animal, if one is to class those that take in air as land animals and those that 
take in water as water animals by nature”. 9  The “fish-like” dolphins, for instance, were an 
exception under most aquatic vertebrates, since they had the physiology and inner anatomy of 
terrestrial mammals. On the other hand, several “live-bearing” sharks seemed to be an 
exception to most aquatic vertebrates, which usually lay eggs. 
  
                                                          
3 (Hist. anim. III 7, 516 b 12). 
4 (Hist. anim. I 5, 489 b 3; Hist. anim. VI 12, 566 b 3). 
5 (Hist. anim. II 15, 506 b 1-3; Hist. anim. VI 12, 566 b 14-15). 
6 (Hist. anim. VIII 1 589 b 7-8). 
7 (Hist. anim. II 13, 504 b 21; Hist. anim. III 29, 521 b 23-24). 
8 (Hist. anim. I 5, 489 a 35-b 2; Hist. anim. II 13, 504 b 21-22; Hist. anim. VI 12, 566b 2). 
9 (Hist. anim. VIII 2, 589 b 7-9). 
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(a) 
„fishlike“ dolphins with features of  
 
 
                                     
(b) 
live-bearing, air breathing mammals (mostly land 
animals) 
 
                                  
(c) 
„live-bearing“ sharks with features of  
 
                            
(d) 
in water breathing organisms with a fish form (mostly 
egg laying water animals) 
Figure A.2: Examples of problems in Aristotelian zoology caused by epistemological discrepancies. 
(b) after a photo of a bottle-nose dolphin (Tursiops) by D. K. Caldwell (in Bateson 1988); (d) from 
Müller (1842); (a) and (c) from Bender and Oser (1997). 
It is interesting to see what Aristotle understood by “analogy” [ἀνάλογον]10: “[S]ome animals 
have a lung, others have no lung but something else to correspond instead of it, again, some 
animals have blood, while others have its counterpart, which in them has the same value as 
blood in the former” (De part. anim. I 5, 645 b 6-10). From this sentence is evident that 
Aristotle used the term “analogy” to characterize non-homologous features which share a 
similar function. Yet another passage of the same work shows that he was not able to discern 
clearly between similarities in the sense of convergences and similarities in the sense of 
homology. He argued that while one bird differs from another bird by variation of the same 
features (e.g., one has longer, the other has shorter feathers), the difference between a bird and 
a fish is more substantial, “and their correspondence is only by analogy: a fish has no feathers 
                                                          
10 The use of the concept of analogy by Aristotle was investigated by other authors (Fiedler 1978; Lloyd 1971). 
Another important aspect in ancient classification of living beings is the principle of “same to same” (in 
German: Gleiches zu Gleichem), as investigated by Müller (1965). 
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at all, but scales, which correspond to them” (De part. anim. I 4, 644 a 21). Problems in 
Aristotelian zoology caused by the apparent anomaly raised by dolphins and whales (see 
Balmer in Aristotle 1993, 66-69) are related to the notion that his biological views were 
developed without any concept of species mutability (Cole 1944, 36; Mayr 1982, 305-307).  
The problems caused by discrepant organisms in the classification of aquatic mammals had a 
longstanding effect on the work of pre-Darwinian naturalists. For instance, in his book De 
aquatilibus (1553), the French physician and botanist Pierre Belon (1517-1564) denominated 
the cetaceans as pisces, even after he recognized that the inner organs of a dolphin are similar 
to those of a porci terrestris (terrestrial pig) (Belon 1553, 12). In his anatomical description of 
dolphins, the London physician Edward Tyson (1651-1708) was astonished by the 
discrepancy between the external similarity between dolphins and fishes and their inner “pig-
anatomy” (Tyson 1680, 26). A similar astonishment was expressed by the French missionary 
and traveller Jean de Léry (1534-1613). In his Histoire d'un voyage fait en la terre du Brésil 
he pointed out that a slashed dolphin had a curious similarity with an “ordinary terrestrial pig” 
(un naturel porc terrestre)  (De Léry 1972, 49 (first ed. 1578)). In the 16th century the 
Caribbean manatee (Trichechus manatus) was occasionally described as a fish and a 
terrestrial animal as well  (e.g., Garcia et al. 1973, 257), obviously pointing to its mammalian 
nature with the term “terrestrial”, as most mammals are terrestrial. In a very influential book 
first published 1692, the druggist Pierre Pomet used frequently the term “fish” 
undifferentiated to describe fishes, crabs and aquatic mammals, as for instance a manatee (pp. 
591-596), cetaceans (pp. 579-584) and seal (pp. 603-604) (Pomet 1987).  
As an aside it should be mentioned that although the convergence in body shape between 
cetaceans and fishes played an important role in the early denomination of “fishes” for several 
aquatic mammals, this umbrella term was not exclusively the product of an early 
misinterpretation of zoological diversity. To a certain degree, the misinterpretation was also 
purposefully created, as in the case of the “fish-nature” of birds, a concept defended until the 
18th century. With the inclusion of rigid fasting rules in the Christian tradition in the Middle 
Ages, lay people were not allowed to eat meat on fast days, with the exception of fish. Since 
these rules had a permanent character in some monasteries and convents, some scholars tried 
to circumvent them through a free interpretation of the Genesis. This led to a “culinary 
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advantageous” but zoologically absurd classification of organisms in which birds11 and other 
animals became closely related to fishes.  
A.4 Discrepant organisms as “bridges” in scala naturae 
Organisms were often depicted in scala naturae, an ancient concept which became very 
popular in the 18th century and was used to establish a hierarchic organization of inanimate 
and animate objects in a continuous and mostly static scale of perfection (Anderson 1976; 
Appel 1980; Fabian 1964; Lovejoy 1936; Thienemann 1909). It is interesting to see how 
discrepant organisms were often used as “bridges” between distantly related taxa (see Figure 
A.4). Aristotle, among others, saw (a) the bats as intermediary between birds and 
quadrupeds12, (b) the seal as a link between quadrupeds and fishes13, (c) the ape as an 
intermediate form between man and quadrupeds14; additionally, (d) he also mentioned bats 
and ostriches as organisms sharing features from different groups15. The Aristotelian tradition 
of listing discrepant organisms as intermediary forms was maintained in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, for example, in early evolutionary ideas (see below), in naive zoology expressed in  
religious (Martinet 1780, 10) or mystical works (Schubert 1808, 279, 207-208, 282), and in 
zoological works written in the Aristotelian tradition (Meyer 1855). Even after 1859, some 
authors felt encouraged to recycle uncritically elements of ancient zoological treatises. The 
German Orientalist Friedrich H. Dieterici, for instance, used his deep knowledge of ancient 
Arabic treatises in his attempt to criticize and replace Darwin’s ideas. Ignoring largely the 
zoological knowledge available in his time and inspired by superficial analogies among 
organisms organized in an all-embracing scala naturae, he formulated erroneous ideas of 
distantly related organisms [as] evolving from each other.16 Another example of naive 
evolutionary ideas in which convergent organisms were envisaged as closely related is 
                                                          
11 Interesting in this context is the myth in which the barnacle goose (Branta leucopsis) was depicted as growing 
inside shells hanging down by their beaks on trees, falling after a certain time in water, where they could 
complete the transition to adult animals (Krause 1880, 181-182; Riedl-Dorn 1989, 89-99). For an early text on 
this topic see Sorel (1637, vol. 1, 330-331); as we will see in Appendix B, Sorel was an important author for de 
Maillet’s evolutionary and pluralistic views. A similar medieval story of vertebrate developing ontogenetically 
from a completely unrelated taxon concerns the fable of the zoophyte Tartar lamb, which described a sheep 
springing from the seeds of a fruit (Appleby 1997; Lee 1887). Both myths were probably motivated by naive 
analogical connections between parts of plants and animal features (in the case of the Tartar lamb: an analogy 
between cotton and sheep wool). 
12 (De part. anim. IV 13, 697 b 8-11). 
13 (Hist. anim. II 1, 501 a 20-25; De part. anim. IV 13, 697 b 8-11). 
14 (Hist. anim. II 8, 502 a 16-18). 
15 (De part. anim. IV 14, 697 b 15-24). 
16 He believed for instance that camels descended from giraffes. Haunted by lions, a group of giraffes arrived in 
an arid region covered by undergrowth and brushwood. There they were forced to eat at the ground, and so 
their neck became bent and a hump was formed (Dieterici 1878, 59-62). 
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supplied by Gustav Steinmann’s statements on dolphins evolving from Ichthyiosaurus (see 
Appendix D). See also the books by the German Edgar Dacqué, who was a respectable 
palaeontologist until he began to publish evolutionary ideas from a natural philosophical and 
religious perspective (Dacqué 1924; 1952). 
Ancient thinkers and pre-Darwinian naturalists often were attracted by analogies between the 
development of an individual (ontogeny) and the evolutionary history of a lineage; this topic 
was reviewed by Stephen J. Gould (1977) and J. A. Kleinsorge (1900) and will not be 
repeated here. A yet ignored and remarkable example of speculations proposed by the 
German naturalist and natural philosopher Lorenz Oken (1779-1851) was published in the 
paper Entstehung des ersten Menschen (Descent of first humans) (Oken 1819). Beginning 
from an analogy between the amniotic fluid (in which the human foetus is immersed, see Fig. 
A.3) and a temperate primordial ocean, he described a surrealistic scenario of legions of 
babies, each floating encapsulated in an individual uterus in a primordial ocean, some arriving 
at a beach, coming out of the uterus and crawling onto the shore, eating shells or drinking the 
milk of goats and eventually surviving at the seaside.  
 
Figure A.3 An aquatic baby as depicted in Oken’s paper on the “descent of first humans” (Oken 1819) 
Oken’s vision evokes ideas expressed by Anaximander17 and by De Maillet, but also 
anticipates some concepts later expressed by depth psychologists; see Bender (1999a, 84-85). 
Oken’s natural philosophical speculations illustrate to what extent an early 19th century18 
                                                          
17 Oken’s ideas are very close to Anaximander’s (see Appendix B). Although Oken replaced the spiny bark of 
Anaximander’s scenario by an amniotic sac, his speculations on babies surviving by themselves after reaching 
the coast are basically the same as Anaximander’s views. 
18 Similar bizarre ideas implying an analogy between a primordial ocean and the amniotic fluid can be found in 
the works of early (Steiner 1979, 20ff) and modern (König 1981, 9ff) anthroposophists and in the still popular 
concept promoted by depth psychologists; see explanations in Bender (1999a, 84-85). A remarkable example of 
radical natural philosophic ideas expressed by a trained zoologist can be found in the works by the German 
cryptozoologist François de Sarre (1992; 1994a; 1994b). He merged the concept of the aquatic hypothesis with 
elements of Max Westenhöfer’s Primitivitäts-Hypothese and de Maillet’s ideas on hommes marins; the result of 
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naturalist was ready to sacrifice rationality in attempt to describe uncritically visions based on 
naive analogies.  
  
Figure A.4: The use of discrepant organisms in scala naturae. Charles Bonnet and other early 
naturalists frequently used discrepant organisms to bridge distantly related taxa within linear and 
hierarchical schemes in the Aristotelian chain of beings. In this case, the discrepant organisms are: 
flying squirrels, bats, ostriches, amphibian fishes, amphibian and aquatic birds, flying fishes, climbing 
fishes, eels, aquatic snakes, snakes, and polyps; from Bonnet’s Oevres d’histoire naturelle et de 
philosophie (Bonnet 1779, vol. 1, xliv) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
this interesting eclecticism can be guessed from the title of one of his works, Sirènes et hommes-marins : Du 
mythe à l'évidence scientifique (Cazottes & de Sarre 2006).  
 It is interesting to see that Westenhöfer himself kept his Aquatile Hypothese rather disconnected from his 
main ideas, probably aware of the problems of merging incompatible concepts (see Appendix F). 
Discrepant organisms 
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The problems related to a linear (or multi-linear) scala naturae and the use of discrepant 
organisms to fill gaps between what is today recognized as distantly related taxa became 
evident with the definitive dissemination of evolutionary ideas in the decades following the 
publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859.  
A typical analogy carried out by early naturalists was the comparison between plants and 
animals. For instance, the Greek Theophrastus (c. 371- c. 287 BC) wrote in his Enquiry into 
Plants that “we must not assume that in all respects there is complete correspondence between 
plants and animals” (Theophrastus 1916, 7), and continued:  
Again many plants shed their parts every year, even a stags shed their horns, birds which 
hibernate their feathers, four-footed beasts their hair: so that it is not strange that the parts of 
plants should not be permanent, especially as what thus occurs in animals and the shedding of 
leaves in plants are analogous processes. In like manner the parts concerned with reproduction 
are not permanent in plants; for even in animals there are things which are separated from the 
parent when the young is born, and there are other things which are cleansed away, as though 
neither of these belonged to the animal’s essential nature. And so too it appears to be with the 
growth of plants; for of course growth leads up to reproduction as the completion of the 
process. (Theophrastus 1916, 7) 
Naturalists had different ideas about the reason for such “analogies” between plants and 
animals. When discussing the topic in his Horae Entomologicae or Essays on the Annulose 
Animals, 1819-21, the Anglo-Australian naturalist William Sharp Macleay (1792-1865) used 
discrepant organisms as bridge between plants and animals:  
On the whole however it appears that animals are to be distinguished by the existence of an 
absorbent intestinal cavity, and of a nervous system, and that both these marks become 
indistinct in the infusoria and polypes19. It follows therefore that the infusoria and polypes, 
which are the most simple of all animals in structure, approach nearest to the vegetable nature. 
(Macleay 1821, 198) 
                                                          
19 In the discussion of the analogy between plants and animals, early naturalists often refer to the zoophytes. 
The term was used by medieval and renaissance texts on the one hand to explain animals emerging developing 
ontogenetically from plants (see footnote 11 on Tartar lamb), or on the other hand to describe animals which 
superficially resembled plants, like a sea anemone (Actiniaria). Not all scholars in this time accepted this term. 
For instance, after listing the features which he considered unique to animals and plants (Lamarck 2006, 195-
197), Lamarck rejected the term zoophyte by arguing that a class of animals should not receive a name “which 
embodies a false notion of the objects indicated” (Lamarck 2006, 200). 
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In pre-Darwinian times, bridging plants to animals did not necessarily imply evolutionary 
thoughts, but were often justified by the existence of a divine plan in nature. In his An 
Inaugural Dissertation on the Analogy between Plants and Animals (1806), William F. Selby 
wrote: “With what order and uniformity do the laws of nature exist, through the vast fabric of 
creation, every part thereof plainly demonstrating that we are all the offspring of the same 
parent” (Selby 1806, 24). Early naturalists had different ways to accommodate the difficulties 
caused by epistemological discrepancies. Macleay presented his own hypothesis on 
classification of organisms – the quinary or circular system.20 In his view, organisms could 
not be classified in a linear, but rather in a flexible schema in which two kinds of organismic 
relationships - affinities and analogies – were taken into account. In pre-Darwinian times, 
affinity denoted a genealogic relationship and was therefore used in a similar way as the 
modern term homology.21 However, because of the lack of a concept of relationship due to 
common ancestry, affinity referred to an abstract relationship between organisms, often 
implying an idealistic similarity between taxa. Analogies, on the other hand, as they were 
used by Macleay, consisted in a “correspondence between certain insulated parts of the 
organization of two animals which differ in their general structure” (Macleay 1821, 363). In 
this sense, it was similar to the concept of convergence. Macleay tried to link distantly related 
groups of organisms by referring to different degrees of perfection in discrepant species. He 
used among others the superficial similarity between fishes and cetaceans to illustrate his 
ideas:  
Be this however in general as it may, there is one thing very certain, that the Cetacea lead us 
by a very distinct and natural transition from the Mammalia to the Fishes; and that if their 
warm blood, their lungs, their viviparous generation and mammae prove their affinity to the 
former group, their skeleton and external covering, the imperfection of their olfactory and 
auditory organs, all show that they approach near to the fishes. (Macleay 1821, 272) 
Following the same logic, Macleay tried to identify fishes having some traits approximating 
those of mammals. He believed he found them in the form of viviparous sharks, “with their 
ear more perfectly organized than that of other fishes, and their body destitute of scales, the 
                                                          
20 Maclean’s and other classifying systems in this time were investigated by different authors (Di Gregorio 
1982; Endersby 2005; O'Hara 1991; Ritvo 1997; Winsor 1976). 
21 The plurality of terms concerning homology in pre-Darwinian discussion was aptly described by Stevens with 
following words: "In the early part of the nineteenth century there was a complex semantic web around words 
signifying relationships and resemblances - words such as 'primitive',  'type',  'essence',  'organization',  
'symmetry', and 'analogy'. From this web emerged the term 'homology' [.]" (Stevens 1984, 78); see also Stevens 
(1994, 185-198) for the complex interconnections between pre-Darwinian concepts such as analogy, affinity, 
parallelism and design, especially in botany. 
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particular disposition of their fins, and their closed branchiae, all indicate at what place we are 
to enter among the fishes” (Macleay 1821, 272). 
It ought to be expected that the lack of a clear distinction between closely related and 
functionally related organisms would have been a strong obstacle for an early naturalist to 
gain a first insight of living organisms as a product of an evolutionary process. However, as 
argued here, quite the opposite is true. Modern historians of science hold a popular belief that 
the first evolutionary ideas22 arose through the awareness of great time dimensions offered by 
geological works. Although certainly true, the arguments put forward here are that some 
important concepts of great time dimensions defended in early geological works are the direct 
consequence of developments which took place in cosmological discussions; specifically 
through the increasing conviction that the universe was immense, which in turn instigated an 
intensive debate on the existence of extra-terrestrial life. This awareness was the direct 
product of the Copernican revolution. The link between the Copernican revolution and the 
origin of evolutionary ideas is evident in the views proposed by the French diplomat Benoît 
de Maillet, as follows in Appendix B. 
  
                                                          
22 To avoid anachronism, historians of science have proposed several terms to replace the word „evolution“ in 
discussions of pre-Darwinian ideas on the succession of life forms which strongly resemble the evolutionary 
process. In the present work, the term evolution is used in connection with several pre-Darwinian evolutionary 
concepts. This terminology does not imply any preconceived idea on similarities in arguments between pre-
Darwinian and Darwinian concepts.   
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APPENDIX B – THE USE OF ANALOGIES WITHIN THE PLURALITY OF 
WORLDS-DISCUSSION LEADING TO AN EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM 
B.1 Introduction 
Biological research in 18th and early 19th century experienced extraordinary developments. 
Starting in the period of “enlightenment” of science, which corresponds broadly on a temporal 
scale to the “rational infiltration” [rationale Durchdringung] in biology in the 17th century 
(Ziswiler 1982), the increasing impetus of biology was directly related to data supplied by (a) 
the voyages of discovery; (b) by the new methods of taxidermy (Belozerskaya 2006; Rácek 
1990)); (c) by the invention of the microscope; and (d) by the inventories made by menageries 
and zoos (Baratay & Hardouin-Fugier 1998), botanic gardens, curiosity cabinets (Daston & 
Park 1998; Mauriès 2002), and later by museums (Alexander 1983). However, all these data 
gave rise to new problems. The specimens avidly collected had to be described, identified, 
and catalogued according to a certain system. Although the Linnaean classification, the most 
influential system since the publication of different editions of Linnaeus’ Systema Naturae 
(first edition 1735) was certainly as an immense improvement in the establishment of 
taxonomy, it was – as well known – not based on an evolutionary concept and was rather 
arbitrary in certain aspects.23 Furthermore, the number of organisms collected was immense, 
and the conditions in the storage areas of the leading museums were absolutely catastrophic - 
a situation diametrically opposed to the picture of a harmonic and orderly nature (Voss 2011). 
The book Telliamed written by the French diplomat and naturalist Benoît de Maillet (1656-
1738) - first circulated as a manuscript and was printed in Amsterdam (De Maillet 1748) ten 
years after de Maillet’s death – played a crucial role in the early attempts to interpret 
organismic diversity within a transformist framework.  
However, historians have expressed very contradictory opinions on the importance of de 
Maillet’s work. On the one hand, some early authors regarded it has essential in the history of 
evolutionary thinking and of geology24; on the other, there has been a long tradition in 
biology to classify de Maillet’s ideas as a curious echo of Middle Age superstition in the 18th 
century, or to list different arguments in an attempt to demonstrate that the de Mailletian 
system lacked any evolutionary concept.25 For this and other reasons, modern biological 
                                                          
23 For example, concerning the invertebrates, the Linnaean system “was a backward step from that of Aristotle” 
(Mayr 1982, 182). 
24 See chapter B.4.3 on the positive evaluation of Telliamed by early authors.  
25 See chapter B.4.3 on the negative reception of Telliamed. 
15 
 
textbooks presenting an outline of the emergence and crystallization of evolutionary ideas 
usually ignore de Maillet’s crucial contribution.26 
After outlining de Maillet’s biography and the content of Telliamed, this investigation will 
focus on three aspects of de Maillet’s work which have not been fully appreciated. First, I will 
argue that the common evaluation of de Maillet’s hypotheses on evolution (usually considered 
naive and an indication of his lack of biological knowledge and common sense) are 
misleading in several aspects. Most negative evaluations adopt uncritically biased views 
expressed or by opponents of evolutionary ideas in 18th and 19th century or by early authors 
with only superficial knowledge on de Maillet’s work. Second, I will show that the interplay 
between de Maillet’s hypotheses and cosmogenetic ideas is essential to understand the 
emergence of evolutionary thinking in the 18th century. In the present thesis I will suggest that 
de Maillet’s evolutionary ideas were strongly influenced by the temporal and spatial 
expansion (and the intensive discussion on the plurality of worlds27) which followed the 
Copernican revolution. In other words, the first extensive evolutionary system is a specific 
attempt to interpret geological and biological phenomena within the cosmological 
perspectives supplied by the Copernican revolution. Finally, I will argue that the specific use 
of analogies in de Maillet’s evolutionary ideas was crucial for the dissemination of the 
concept of species change. The importance of these analogies is well illustrated by their 
partial adoption by other early evolutionists, like Lamarck and Goethe. This historical 
background is essential to understand the emergence of Lamarck’s hypothesis on primeval 
man as a creature evolving on open plains (see Appendix D), an idea still influential in 
modern palaeoanthropology.  
B.2 Benoît de Maillet: his life and main work Telliamed 
Biographic information on de Maillet is supplied by Vie de M. de Maillet, written by the 
publisher of Telliamed, Abbé Jean Baptiste le Mascrier. This text appeared in the last French 
edition of Telliamed (Le Mascrier in De Maillet 1755, vol. I, 9-33); further biographical 
information comes from de Maillet’s correspondence (Benitez 1980; Rothschild 1964; 
Rothschild 1965; Rothschild 1968) and other sources.  
De Maillet was born 1656 in Lorraine, and received an excellent classical education. 
According to Le Mascrier (in De Maillet 1755, vol. I, 10-11, 32-33), de Maillet was appointed 
                                                          
26 See chapter B.4.2. 
27 The term “plurality of worlds” (in German Weltenvielheit, in French pluralité des mondes) or cosmic pluralism 
is commonly used to describe ideas in which the existence of life on other planets was a central topic; see 
chapter B.5. 
16 
 
in 1692 as the French General Consul in Egypt, a position which he held until 1708. Some of 
the data used by de Maillet in Telliamed were collected during this stay. His experiences in 
Egypt were laid down in his Description de l'Egypte (De Maillet 1735), which was also 
published by Le Mascrier. During this time de Maillet was chosen by the king of Egypt as his 
personal envoy to Ethiopia. Although he could not complete this mission, he wrote a text 
entitled Mémoires d'Éthiopie.28 Between 1708 and 1715 he was consul in Livorno, and from 
1715 to 1720 he was inspector des établissements français dans le Levant et sur les côtes de 
Barbarie. It is not known where de Maillet was and what he did between 1708 and 1712 
(Rothschild 1964, 352). He did a last trip to Egypt in 1718. During an epidemic in Marseille 
he went to Paris in 1720, where he stood until 1721. Afterward he went back to Marseille, 
where he died in 1738 at the age of eighty-two during the preparation of the prints of 
Telliamed. 
De Maillet’s book Telliamed is based on manuscripts, the first draft was probably written 
during his stay in Egypt between 1692 and 1718.29 Copies of this manuscript were distributed 
clandestinely in France for nearly twenty years (Malesherbes 1798, vol. I, 222-224).  
The printed versions of Telliamed appeared after de Maillet’s death. The first edition was 
published 174830 in Amsterdam under following title: 
 Telliamed, ou entretiens d’un philosophe indien avec un missionnaire français sur la 
diminution de la mer, la formation de la terre, l’origine de l’homme, etc.31  
The second edition was published 1749 in Basel. It has the same title and the editor’s initials 
as the first one. Apart from small orthographic variations and stylistic variations, this edition 
                                                          
28 This was added to Jerónimo Lobo’s book Relation historique d' Abissine (Lobo 1728). 
29 According to Cohen (1993, 63-64), the first draft was written in 1714. In subsequent years, the manuscript 
was substantially modified, mainly as a result of investigations and observations carried out in the years de 
Maillet spent in Marseille, in coastal areas of the Provence, and in the Paris basin (Neubert 1920). Although the 
original draft is probably lost, several copies of the manuscript are known – Cohen (1993, 59) listed 12 copies. 
According to Fritz Neubert, who meticulously compared the text of the three editions with the text of five 
manuscripts, the copies can be divided in two groups. The oldest group (two copies) were written between 
1722 and 1725; the second group (three copies) were written between 1725 and 1729. Through the 
comparison with the printed books Neubert could also reconstruct a third, extended version of the manuscript, 
which was written around 1731/1732 (Neubert 1920, 207). 
30 Isidore Geoffroy Saint Hilaire (1859, 385) stated that Telliamed was already printed in 1735, information that 
was occasionally adopted by other authors (Huxley 1878, 748; Kohlbrugge 1912, 506). As stated by Neubert 
(1920, 22-23), this claim is quite unfounded. It is possible that these authors confused Telliamed with de 
Maillet’s Description de l'Egypte, which was published in 1735. 
31 The editor’s name is not given. This sentence follows the title: Mis en ordre sur les Mémoires de seu M. de 
Maillet Par J. A. G.***. These are the initials for Jean Antoine Guer ( 1713-1764), a writer and lawyer.  
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is quite similar to the first one. The main divergence is the deletion of some parts.32  The 
third, final and most relevant edition was published in two volumes in 1755 in The Hague.33 
This final edition is relevant, because it displays many additions, references, footnotes, and 
the only available biography of de Maillet. The name of the author is finally mentioned by the 
editor, Le Mascrier.  
The first edition was probably used for the English translation published in London in 1750 
(two different imprints with different title pages are known); this work was reprinted in 
Baltimore in 1797. Contrary to early statements34, other editions are unknown. The historical-
critical edition of Telliamed is the annotated and introduced English translation by Albert V. 
Carozzi (De Maillet 1968). In this work, Carozzi used, acknowledged and complemented the 
research carried out by Fritz Neubert to reconstruct de Maillet’s original manuscript. The 
annotations to this work are based on an extensive study of the literature. Carozzi’s work 
played an important role in today’s positive evaluation of de Maillet’s geological 
investigations.  
The printed editions were altered through several modifications by de Maillet’s friend Le 
Mascrier35 in an attempt to reduce the dangerous character of the book. De Maillet himself 
tried to avoid a direct confrontation with Christian dogma. As he believed that he could not 
avoid mentioning some biblical topics, he accomplished this in a self-protecting way, 
however without making concessions to his system (Carozzi in De Maillet 1968, 10; Neubert 
1920, 154-171). When Le Mascrier edited the work, he did it with the purpose to present 
Telliamed as an inoffensive system, compromising to a high degree de Maillet’s original 
thoughts (see below). In fact, as Neubert [1920, 171] states, de Maillet’s system in the printed 
versions is characterized by a much milder style than the system originally presented in the 
manuscripts; it is doubtful that de Maillet would agree with these posthumous changes. The 
                                                          
32 At the end of the book, some text-parts that appeared in the first edition, vol. 2, pages 208 to 230 are 
missing. Also in the Préface there are some small deletions, as pointed out by Neubert (1920, 28).  
33 It has the same title as previous editions but followed by a different sentence: Nouvelle édition, revue, 
corrigée et augmentée sur les originaux de l’auteur, avec une vie de M. de Maillet. No editor is mentioned. This 
edition is known in two different imprints with different title pages and pagination (in the second imprint the 
dedication is paginated with Roman numerals, the biography of de Maillet with Arabic numerals; in the first 
imprint all pages are with Arabic numerals).  
34 For instance, Krause (1880, 108) mistakenly mentioned a Telliamed-edition published 1746 (the first edition 
was published 1748); Thienemann’s (1909, 227) mentions an edition published in 1750 in The Hague, he 
probably meant the third edition published in 1755; Kohlbrugge (1912, 510) mistakenly mentioned the Basle-
edition published 1740 instead of 1749; however, this was a typographical error, since in another place 
(Kohlbrugge 1912, 510, footnote 32) he gave the correct information. 
35 This was recognized already by Malesherbes (Malesherbes 1798, vol. 1, 224) 
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three editions of Telliamed appeared after de Maillet’s death, without his official permission 
(Neubert 1920, 27). 
As explicit in the subtitle of Telliamed, de Maillet’s system is presented as conversations 
between an Indian Philosopher and a French Missionary on the diminution of the sea, 
whereby de Maillet’s ideas are placed in the mouth of the Indian philosopher Telliamed (an 
anagram of de Maillet’s surname). De Maillet regarded the whole universe as a dynamic, 
ever-changing system. Using Descartes’ scheme of vortex (tourbillions)36, de Maillet 
envisaged the celestial bodies as imbedded in an infinite cyclic process, passing through dark 
and luminous phases. In the dark phases they may become inhabited, in the luminous phases 
they are transformed into suns. In de Maillet’s system, the earth was originally covered with 
water. When the water gradually evaporated – a process that began at least 2 billion37  years 
ago and is still in progress–, the conditions on the planet became favourable for the 
development of life. De Maillet assumed that delicate and minute “seeds” of everything which 
can live are distributed in the whole universe; these seeds rained down on our planet and 
developed to living creatures in the shallow water sediments, whereby the heat radiated from 
the sun played an important role (De Maillet 1755, vol. II, 261-274). With the further 
diminution of the ocean and the subsequent formation of mountains, some organisms 
eventually colonized the continents and adapted to the new environment. He assumed that 
every species of land organism evolved from an aquatic counterpart - for example, different 
species of terrestrial plants originated from aquatic plants (De Maillet 1755, vol. II, 161-162), 
lions originated from sea-lions, cows from sea-cows, birds from flying fishes, man from 
mermaids and mermen (De Maillet 1755, vol. II, 162-237). De Maillet’s evolutionary scheme 
implies that secondary aquatic animals (like cetaceans) did not evolve from terrestrial 
organisms, but emerged primarily in water – a concept that became outdated after the 
publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859.  
                                                          
36 The Cartesian vortices were popularized by Fontenelle in his Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes, first 
published in 1686. However, despite this use of Cartesian terminology, Marsak (1959) pointed out that 
Fontenelle was not a Cartesian, as Fontenelle  rejected Descartes’ metaphysics and method.  
37 The published versions of Telliamed diverge considerably concerning the temporal framework in which the 
earth was subjected to transformation. For instance, De Maillet’s original statements about the diminution of 
the sea in the past two billion years (De Maillet 1968, 181) respectively about the stars not existing longer than 
two billion years (De Maillet 1968, 182), as given in the manuscripts, were or deleted or reduced to “two 
million years” by Le Mascrier (De Maillet 1755, vol. 2, 134, 137) in the printed versions of Telliamed. These 
changes were a hopeless attempt to reduce the difference between de Maillet’s time scale and the belief of the 
world being created in the year 4004 B.C., as calculated from Biblical sources by the Irish scholar and 
theologian John Ussher in his Annales Veteris Testamenti, a prima mundi origine deducti published in 1650. This 
chronology was used in many editions of the Bible (see Gould 1993, 181-193). 
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We do not know which works de Maillet might have consulted during his stays in Egypt. He 
could theoretically have borrowed the idea of organismic transformation and natural selection 
expressed by Islamic scholars.38 However, I argue that de Maillet’s main inspiration came 
from two sources: on the one hand, he was influenced by ideas of classical authors, who 
formulated different concepts of species change (such as those of Anaximander and Lucretius, 
see below). On the other hand, he developed a concept for the development of the universe 
and the planets and transferred it to the realm of organismic world.39 
The Greek philosopher Anaximander (ca. 610-546 BC)40 and the Roman poet Titus Lucretius 
Carus (ca. 99-55 BC)41 are often mentioned in the traditional debate on “Darwin’s 
precursors”. Anaximander, the second of the early Ionian philosophers, envisaged a scenario 
in which first organisms emerged in the moisture and subsequently on dry land:  
The first animals were generated in the moisture, and were enclosed within spiny barks. As 
they grew older, they migrated onto the drier land; and, once their outer bark was split and 
shed, they survived for a short time in the new mode of existence. (from Toulmin & Goodfield 
1977, 36)  
The whole process described above strongly remembers an analogy of the metamorphosis a 
holometabolous insect undergoes when marked changes take place before a chrysalis is 
transformed into an imago. Moreover, he equated the pupa and the insect with a vertebrate 
appearing from a structure analogous to a sea-urchin or a chestnut (when protected by a spiny 
                                                          
38 De Maillet quoted Islamic scholars, like Abu Yahya Zakariya' ibn Muhammad al-Qazwini (De Maillet 1968, 
192-193), a Persian author (1203-1283) who wrote an influential cosmography; for an Arabic translation see el-
Cazwini (1967); see Qazwini (1986) for a partial  and  el-Cazwini (1994) for a full German translation. Several 
copies of this work survived. I recently acquired a fragment of a manuscript that might be attributed to this 
author or written in the same tradition as al-Qazwini’s cosmography (the fragment is still waiting for the 
evaluation by an expert). Ideas evoking species change can for instance be found in the ninth century Book of 
Animals by the Mu‘tazili philosopher al-Jâhiz (c. 776-869); see quotation in Zirkle (1941); see Nabielek (1998, 
110-140) for an excellent review on biology in medieval Arab-Islamic world. I am not aware of a specific aspect 
of de Maillet’s evolutionary ideas which indicates that he was influenced by al-Jâhiz; see also footnote 130. 
39 Similarly, Robert Chambers was strongly influenced by the Copernican revolution. In several parts of his 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation he discussed the topic plurality of worlds. Following passage is 
insightful concerning his views on Deism in the context of the plurality of world-discussion, which is 
characteristic for several early authors:   
More than this, the fact of the cosmical arrangements being an effect of natural law, is a powerful 
argument for the organic arrangements being so likewise, for how can we suppose that the august 
Being who brought all these countless worlds into form by the simple establishment of a natural 
principle flowing from his mind, was to interfere personally and specially on every occasion when a 
new shell-fish or reptile was to be ushered into existence on one of these worlds? Surely this idea is 
too ridiculous to be for a moment entertained. (Chambers 1844, 154) 
40 On Anaximander see Erhard (1940), Loenen (1954), Schultze  (1877)and Toulmin and Goodfield (1977). 
41 On Lucretius’ atomism and concept of “germs”, see chapter B.3. On concept of species changes in classical 
authors see also Zeller on “Greek precursors of Darwin” (the translated title) (Zeller 1879). 
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shell). In the following passage he tried to explain the origin of humans, which he envisaged 
as emerging from a fish-like animal:  
Man, to begin with, was generated from living things of another kind, since, whereas others 
can quickly hunt for their own food, men alone require prolonged nursing. If he had been like 
that in the beginning, he would never have survived. Thus men were formed within these 
[creatures, comparable with fishes] and remained within them like embryos until they had 
reached maturity. Then at last the creatures burst open, and out of them came men and women 
who were able to fend for themselves. (from Toulmin & Goodfield 1977, 36)  
There are several similarities between Anaximander’s and de Maillet’s42 scenarios describing 
the plasticity of organismic phylogenetic development. Both authors referred to water as a 
place where important phases of the development could take place, both envisaged organisms 
passing from water (or wet terrain) onto dry land to complete or continue the phylogenetic 
changes; both authors used (implicitly or explicitly) analogies between phylogeny and 
ontogeny. The last point is well illustrated in following passage, where De Maillet tried to 
convince his readers that evolutionary process was a reasonable phenomenon:  
The transformation of a silkworm or of a caterpillar into a butterfly would be a thousand times 
more difficult to believe than that of fish into birds if this metamorphosis did not occur daily 
before our own eyes, or if it were told to us in a part of the world where it was unknown. (De 
Maillet 1968, 188) 
De Maillet’s passage on the transformation of a fish into a bird (see below) was only one of 
his attempts to explain all terrestrial organisms as evolving from aquatic counterparts. He 
introduced this concept by quoting verbatim following sentences: 
“The sea contains fishes of almost all the shapes of land animals, and even of birds. It includes 
plants, flowers, and some fruits: the nettle, the rose, the carnation, the melon, the grape have 
their equivalent in there”. (De Maillet 1968, 187) 
The verbatim quotation, according to a footnote in Telliamed (De Maillet 1748, 138) is from 
“Sorel, fol. 149”, which refers to Charles Sorel (ca. 1602-1674), a French writer and historian. 
(De Maillet also refers to this author in another part of Telliamed.)43 The above passage is not 
                                                          
42 Another naturalist who was probably influenced by Anaximander is Oken (see Appendix A) with his 
speculations of aquatic human babies. 
43 After listing several arguments towards human’s origination from water, de Maillet referred to the view of 
Thales and Anaxagoras, who believed that water was the first principle of all things, and the ideas proposed by 
Anaximenes of Miletus (c. 585- c. 528 BC), who believed that not water but air was this primary substance. De 
Maillet’s argued that Anaximenes view “amounts to the same doctrine, because, according to Sorel, water is 
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really verbatim, but a summary of Sorel’s sentences from La science universelle, 4 vols, first 
published 1634.44 
However, the analogy between aquatic and terrestrial organisms can be found in earlier texts, 
and it is possible that Sorel borrowed it from Pliny the Elder45 (AD 23- AD 79), who wrote in 
his Naturalis historia: 
There are however a considerable number of these [creatures of the seas, rivers and ponds] 
that are larger even than land animals. The obvious cause of this is the lavish nature of liquid. 
Birds, which live hovering in the air, are in a different condition. But in the sea, lying so 
widely outspread and so yielding and productive of nutriment, because the element receives 
generative causes from above and is always producing offspring, a great many actual 
monstrosities are found, the seeds and first principles intertwining and interfolding with each 
other now in one way and now in another, now by the action of the wind and now by that of 
the waves, so ratifying the common opinion that everything born in any department of nature 
exists also in the sea, as well as a number of things never found elsewhere. Indeed we may 
realize that it contains likenesses of things and not of animals only, when we examine the 
grape, the sword-fish, the saw-fish, and the cucumber-fish, the last resembling a real cucumber 
both in colour and scent; which makes it less surprising that in cockle-shells that are so tiny 
there are horses' heads projecting. (Pliny 1967, book IX, 165, English translation by H. 
Rackham) 
De Maillet’s decision to mention mythological creatures (e.g., mermaids) as real organisms 
and distantly related organisms as descending from each other (birds from flying fishes, lions 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
only a condensed air and air a rarified water, since there is air in water, and water in air, and in both a 
terrestrial matter which becomes visible in the sediment” (De Maillet 1968, 220). According to Carozzi (in De 
Maillet 1968, 390, note 67), this reference is in Volume I, pp. 328-331; I could not find this topic discussed in 
these pages, but I consulted another edition (from 1637) and I still did not go through the whole work.  
44 The passage reads as follows:  
Quant à la figure des poissons, elle tire sur la longueur; mais il y en a de ronds & de plats, selon que 
leur matiere s'est ramassee ou dilatee. ll y en a presque aussi de toutes les figures des animaux 
terrestres, comme des chiens, des chevaux, des veaux, des beliers, des herissons, des Elephans & 
autres, comme aussi de plusieurs oyseaux; & mesme quelques Plantes, quelques fleurs, & quelques 
fruicts y trouvent leur ressemblance, comme l'Ortie, la Rose, l'Oeillet, le Melon, & le Raisin; dont la 
raison est à mon avis, qu'il y a de certaines reigles pour le meslange des matieres qui s'observent par 
tout, & qu'estans semblables dans les eaux comme sur la Terre, elles ont produit des animaux qui sont 
prèsque pareils, & qui n'ont autre diversité de formes que ce  qui convenoit à leur Nature aquatique, 
comme d'avoir des nageoires au lieu de pieds, d'estre aussi autrement couverts, & d'estre dans 
l'interieur d'une constitution plus humide. (Sorel 1647, vol. 2, 228-229) 
Sorel then explained that organismic diversity is greater in the sea than on land, because the movement in 
water facilitates the production of forms (Sorel 1647, vol. 2, 229).  
45 As stated above (footnote 43), I still did not investigate in detail the four volumes of Sorel’s La science 
universelle. However, in another work by Sorel - De la perfection de l'homme – he mentions Pliny the Elder 
(Sorel 1655, 14). In this book, Sorel discussed the ancient question if humans are essentially perfect – his 
opinion – or deficient creatures. 
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from sea-lions) was obviously influenced by the idea of aquatic counterparts for land 
creatures. He and other proponents of pre-Darwinian evolutionary concepts46 seemed not to 
realize that humans have the tendency to name newly discovered organisms by using vague 
similarities between these and those already known. The idea of counterparts was also 
expressed by other early authors47 and the tradition of finding aquatic counterparts to 
terrestrial mythological creatures is still cultivated in non-scientific circles.48  
B.3 De Maillet’s inclusion of mythological creatures in evolutionary ideas 
De Maillet’s view on the organismic world was highly exotic, as he was quite convinced of 
the existence of several mythological creatures and did not hesitate to integrate them into his 
system. He saw among others that the following creatures were witnessed by many credible 
people: tritons or sea men  (De Maillet 1968, 191-200, 212-221), hairy savage man (De 
Maillet 1968, 200-202), men with tails (De Maillet 1968, 202-206), and giants and dwarfs (De 
Maillet 1968, 207-211). Some early and modern historians or naturalists49 are convinced that 
this aspect of de Maillet’s evolutionary system is incompatible with a scientific discourse, and 
this opinion is partially responsible for the underreporting of de Maillet’s ideas in biological 
textbooks (see chapter B.4.3). 
At first view, de Maillet’s integration of mythological creatures seems to be a remarkable 
regression to ancient50 and medieval zoology. De Maillet did not have problems finding 
                                                          
46 See for example similar erroneous views on terrestrial animals evolving from secondary aquatic organisms by 
Chambers and Goethe (chapter B.3).  
47 See the picture of an aquatic unicorn (Jonstonus 1657, table x), also depicted in 
http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/1717/1584/1600/Johnston%20a.jpg This unicorn with webbed hind limbs 
remembers mythological hybrids, for instance the seahorse, often depicted ridden by the Roman god Neptune. 
48 The tendency to see counterparts between aquatic and terrestrial organisms can be found in the area of 
cryptozoology, a field attracting layman and – curiously enough – single trained biologists interested in bringing 
mythological creatures back into the realms of reality. It is remarkable to see how cryptozoologists react rapidly 
to data published in scientific literature. An interesting example is supplied by an aquatic counterpart of Bigfoot 
(or Sasquatch), the North American version of the medieval wild man. Only one year after Alister Hardy 
published his arguments towards the aquatic hypothesis on human evolution (Hardy 1960b), speculations on a 
semi-aquatic Bigfoot were expressed by the biologist and cryptozoologist Ivan Sanderson ( see also Krantz 
1992, 51, a palaeoanthropologist and also cryptzoologist; 1961, 141). Similarly, immediately after the 
publication of the first description of swimming apes, showing swimming leg movements not unlike those of 
the human frog-kick (Bender & Bender 2013), a statement was published online recalling that bigfoot has been 
already observed swimming on different occasions, and in at least one case using a frog-like technique while 
catching salmon underwater; see  http://bigfootevidence.blogspot.ch/2013/08/yes-bigfoot-can-swim-
scientists-prove.html   and http://bigfootevidence.blogspot.ch/2011/12/did-you-know-that-bigfoots-can-
swim.html . See also the crytozoological book by Cazottes and de Sarre (2006, 81-130). 
49 On the early and modern reception of de Maillet’s evolutionism see chapter B.4. 
50 However, this does not applies to Aristotle (384 – 322 BC). Although Aristotle mixed observations of nature 
with narrative elements in his zoological works (e.g., Historia animalium IX, 32; 619a8-619b12), he was, 
compared with Pliny (see below), rather cautiously concerning mythological creatures. Why did later authors 
not follow him on this point? Until the translation of Aristotle’s works on zoology in the 13th century, Aristotle’s 
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sources for imaginary organisms, as these stories were evidenced in several zoological works: 
(a) Physiologus (Anonymous 1992; Anonymus 1964), a text with moralized beast tales that 
were very popular in the Middle Ages (Henkel 1976; Meyer 1884; Steiger 1964); (b) the 
encyclopedia Naturalis historia by Pliny the Elder (Pliny 1967) published circa AD 77-79 
(Borst 1995a); (c) the Buch der Natur by Konrad von Megenberg  (1897), first published 
between 1348 and 1350; or (d) Sebastian Münster’s Cosmographia, first published in 1544 
(Münster 1978). Even Conrad Gessner and Ulisse Aldrovandi, both often regarded as 
founders of modern zoology, were not successful in breaking the medieval tradition of 
depicting legendary creatures in zoological works. (However, it is certainly too simple to 
regard these authors as uncritical just due to their inclusion of fantastic creatures.)51 Further 
sources for the belief of mythological creatures52 were fictive or partially fictive travel 
literature, e.g., The Voyage of Saint Brendan  (Brandan 1994), John Mandeville’s Itinerarius 
(ca. 1485) along with other mariner’s stories often had accounts of mermaids53, and 
imaginative interpretations of fossil evidence (see Abel 1939). Yet others drew illustrations of 
abnormalities in the physiological development of animals and humans (Schumacher 1995; 
Sonderegger 1927), and even more, fantastic stories of interspecific transformation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
zoology was known only from other authors, such as Pliny and Isidor von Sevilla (Ribémont 1997), who did not 
in all cases acknowledge Aristotle’s authorship (Obermaier 2009, 13). As Carl Meyer (1884) stated, Aristotle’s 
critic views and methods did not belong to the public domain of naturalism in the antiquity. In fact, Aristotle’s  
studies on animals “were not superseded until more than two thousand years after his death” (Barnes 1982). 
Ernst Mayr summarized the development of biology in the centuries after Aristotle: “As a broad generalization 
one can probably say that the level of natural history went steadily downhill after the death of Aristotle. [...] In 
the ensuing period animals were written about not for the sake of providing knowledge about them but for the 
sake of moralizing; they became symbols” (Mayr 1982, 153).  
51 In his monumental encyclopaedia Historia animalium, first published 1551-1558, Gesner has confined himself 
to few examples, which he often commented on critically [Ley, 1929;Friedrich, 1995;Bäumer, 1991, 42-
73;1996]. Some of the negative evaluation of Gessner by modern historians is related to his work Thierbuch, 
the German translation of Historia animalium published in 1563 - a summary of the two first volumes of 
Historia animalium. As Bäumer (1991, 65) pointed out, Gessner gave in this abridged version the impression 
that he was very uncritical of mythological creatures, as several of his critical statements published in the 
original edition were absent. The reader of the German abridged edition was no longer able to distinguish 
clearly between imaginary and real organisms, which had been possible in the original edition. In fact, the 
German edition followed more the traditional concept of popular works written for entertainment, for instance 
in the herbals. Similarly, Aldrovandi is sometimes considered as uncritical towards mythological creatures. 
However, as observed by different authors  (Bäumer 1991, 103; Nordenskiöld 1926, 97) this is unjustified, as 
most of Aldrovandi’s works were published after his death and he cannot be responsible for uncritical 
publications of his works. One important aspect of the parallel use of mythological and real creatures is 
proposed by William B. Ashworth Jr. For him mythological creatures are the expression of the inability of 
naturalists in 16th century to account for different aspects of human experience: Animals in ancient zoology are 
“just one aspect of an intricate language of metaphor, symbols, and emblems. This ‘emblematic world view’, as 
I choose to call it, was the single most important factor in determining the content and scope of Renaissance 
natural history” (Ashworth 1990, 305); see also Ashworth (2003). 
52 The topic “legendary creatures” were investigated by several authors (Armour 1997; Baltrusaitis 1985; Cherry 
1997; Mode 1977; Obermaier 2009; Schöpf 1988; Wunderlich 1999). 
53 The belief on legendary aquatic humanoids was topic of several investigations (Benwell & Waugh 1961; de 
Castro Pires de Lima 1952; Duchet 1995; Heinisch 1981). 
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organisms (see for example the stories about the origin of birds or mammals from plants in 
Appendix A) or on the creation of new organisms through the mating of two distantly related 
species.  
The dissemination of ideas on fictional creatures was not discouraged by works published in 
the 16th and 17th centuries that allegedly described from nature spices, medicines, plants and 
animals found by explorers during the European expansion into tropical countries. A good 
example is the book entitled l’Histoire générale des drogues, traitant des plantes, des 
animaux et des minéraux, etc., by Pierre Pomet (first published 1692) and commonly 
considered as the most complete work in this literary genre at that time. In his book, Pomet 
described and depicted not only real organisms, but also mythical creatures, such as several 
species of unicorns54 (Pomet 1987, 471-472). This information was mixed into the 
widespread superstitions of the Middle Ages and following centuries (Meyer 1884). These 
stories were gradually recognized by educated people55 as the product of imagination, 
especially after the publication of Thomas Browne’s Pseudodoxia Epidemica or Enquiries 
into very many received tenets and commonly presumed truths (1658).  
As we can see, de Maillet’s belief in mythological creatures seems to be exactly the opposite 
of what might have been expected from an enlightened author of 18th century. This point 
seems to justify the commonly56 expressed opinion that de Maillet’s system is closer to 
                                                          
54 To give credibility to such stories, early authors frequently referred to former works. In this case, Pomet 
referred to Jan Jonston’s Historiæ Naturalis de Quadrupedibus (Jonstonus 1657). This work, first published in 
1650, although not well appreciated by historians of science, is sporadically regarded as a watershed 
publication. Michel Foucault suggested that Jonston’s work symbolizes a break with earlier Renaissance natural 
history, an opinion that is endorsed by William B. Ashworth Jr (2003); Ashworth Jr discusses the role Jonston’s 
encyclopaedia played in the demise of what he called “emblematic natural history” (see footnote 51). On 
Jonston’s picture of an amphibian unicorn, see footnote 47. 
55 The belief in mythological creatures did not disappear completely from natural sciences with the 
consolidation of the scientific method in the Age of Enlightenment. Today, the belief in such creatures is mostly 
associated with a small group of “cryptozoologists”. They follow the footpaths of the zoologist Bernard 
Heuvelmans (1995) in their hopeful efforts of prove the existence of “cryptids” like Bigfoot, Yeti, the Monster 
of Loch Ness, the Saci Perere, or mermaids; see footnote 52 for some references. 
56 There are some remarkable exceptions. The criticism of de Maillet as a propagator of natural philosophical 
fantasies was doubted by Kohlbrugge (1912). This article is to my knowledge the first extensive publication on 
de Maillet’s system in which the merit of the French naturalist is fully acknowledged. Kohlbrugge is sometimes 
quoted by modern historians in a negative context in connection with his paper War Darwin ein originelles 
Genie? In this work he pointed out an astonishing number of scholars who mentioned evolutionary ideas 
before 1859 in an unfair attempt to accuse Darwin of being superficial in his acknowledgment of precursors of 
evolutionary ideas and to revile Darwin’s achievements as an evolutionist (Kohlbrugge 1915). However, 
Kohlbrugge’s work as historian of science should not be reduced to this single publication. Similarly, Tschulok, a 
specialist on Lamarck’s work (and rarely quoted by de Maillet’s experts) aptly argued that the usual evaluation 
of de Maillet’s system as is strongly biased. Most early critics of de Maillet, according to Tschulok, come from 
authors who probably never read Telliamed in the original (Tschulok 1938). See also chapter B.4.3 for other 
benevolent opinions about this book. 
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medieval superstition than to a scientific revolution. However, this evaluation failed to grasp 
the full significance of his work and its influence on other naturalists. This influence can be 
established by referring to following facts. For example, the evidence supporting the 
extraordinary dissemination of printed versions of Telliamed was provided in the early 20th 
century by Daniel Mornet,57 who investigated 500 catalogues held by French public libraries 
in the 18th century. By using the number of copies of books on natural sciences to estimate the 
popularity of these works he came to the remarkable result of Telliamed ranking number six 
[Mornet, 1911, 248-249]:  1. Buffon (220 copies), 2. Pluche’s Spectacle (206), 3. Valmont de 
Bomare’s Dictionnaire (93), 4. Dezallier d’Argenville’s Ouvrages de notre bibliographie 
(86), 5. Réamur’s Mémoires (82), and 6. de Maillet’s Telliamed (72 copies).  
Although the sixth rank is quite impressive, it still does not accurately reflect the influence of 
Telliamed on the scientific discussion of this time, as Mornet’s investigation did not make a 
distinction between the works according to the purposes for which they were written. This 
differentiation is important, as books of popular science and references books should be 
expected to be overrepresented in library catalogues. For instance, the books written by 
Buffon (first rank), de Bomare (third), d’Argenville (fourth) and Réamur (fifth) are 
encyclopaedias or dictionaries and therefore indispensable for libraries on natural sciences in 
this time. Noël-Antoine Pluche’s Spectacle de la nature [Pluche, 1752, first publ. 1732], 
ranked second, is a work on the popularization of natural sciences, a category which does not 
apply to Telliamed.  
This might sound surprising, as Telliamed is often referred to as a “work of fiction” [Mayr, 
1982, 311], possibly because its content is given in dialog form. However, the dialog form 
was not unusual in this time for the presentation of scientific ideas.58 The same form already 
had been used by de Maillet’s friend Fontenelle in his Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes 
[1780, first publ. in 1686], in which the author defend the Copernican astronomy and the 
Cartesian theory of vortices and discussed aspects of the plurality of worlds; the work was 
                                                          
57 The popularity of Telliamed in 18th and early 19th century was stressed by different authors (Kohlbrugge 
1912; Neubert 1920; Quatrefages 1870; Tschulok 1938). 
58 See Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo tolemaico, e copernicano (1970, first ed. 1632) by Galileo 
Galilei, Entretien d'un philosophe chrétien et d'un philosophe chinois sur l'existence et la nature de dieu by 
Nicolas Malebranche (1986, first ed. 1707) or Entretien d’un philosophe avec la maréchale de *** by Denis 
Diderot (1905, first ed. 1776) See Kalverkämper (in http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/humboldt-vl/172/kalverkaemper-
hartwig-15/PDF/kalverkaemper.pdf) for the dissemination of the use of the dialog form in 17th and 18th century 
science. 
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certainly written to entertain the public.59 Contrary to this, Telliamed was conceived as a 
scientific discussion on geology and the plurality of worlds, with sophisticated arguments 
against both the dogma of the immutability of species as well as James Ussher’s estimation of 
the age of world (4004 BC). A further alleged similarity between Telliamed and Fontenelle’s 
work is the division of six conversations. However, this division cannot be attributed to de 
Maillet, as it was introduced by Le Mascrier60, among others as an attempt to make Telliamed 
superficially similar to Fontenelle’s famous book and to allude to the Genesis creation 
narrative – both components used by Le Mascrier to reduce the danger of de Maillet’s system 
[see Carozzi in De Maillet, 1968b, 26-27]. Telliamed was not just used to fill gaps on French 
library shelves – the book was widely consulted. Its influence can be identified in several 
works on geology and also crucial to the emergence of transformist ideas proposed before 
1859.The early and modern discussion on the value of de Maillet’s system will not be 
reviewed in detail here.61 I will restrict myself to some still widely ignored evidence on de 
Maillet’s influence on proponents of transformist ideas in the early 19th century, and some 
typical observations expressed by modern biologists.  
Among the few early authors who mentioned de Maillet positively was the German protestant 
theologian and geologist Johann Georg Justus Ballenstedt (1756-1840). In his widely ignored 
treatise on geology and transformism, Die Urwelt oder Beweis von dem Daseyn und 
Untergange von mehr als einer Vorwelt (The primeval world or proof of the existence and 
extinction of more than one prehistoric world), Ballenstedt wrote about gradual evolutionary 
changes in living organisms, postulating that geological facts demonstrated that the earth was 
much older than commonly believed in this time (Ballenstedt 1819, vol. 1, 9). In an appendix 
entitled Ueber die Existenz der Wassermenschen (On the existence of aquatic men) he 
mentioned the possibility that aquatic men are real organisms and not fables. He quoted a long 
                                                          
59 On the relationship between de Maillet and Fontenelle / Le Mascrier see Benitez (1980; 1984); on the place 
of Fontenelle’s Entretiens in the plurality of worlds discussion see Shackleton (1955). 
60 The dedication of the book to Cyrano de Bergerac, also inserted by Le Mascrier, is certainly another aspect of 
his strategy to present Telliamed as a hybrid work situated between science fiction and science; on Bergerac 
see Dübi (1906). Voltaire’s statement on this dedication (quoted below, chapter B.4.3) shows that the strategy 
was partially successful; see also Andrés (1841, 420), who wrongly assumed  that the dialog form was proposed 
by Le Mascrier, but did not recognize that the dedication to Bergerac was inserted by Le Mascrier ; see also 
Krause in Lang (Krause in 1878, 261), who defended what he believed to be de Maillet’s mention of Bergerac in 
Telliamed. Both historians of the evolutionary thought before 1968 (see, e.g., Crocker 1959, 123) as well as 
modern authors of popular accounts on history of evolutionary thought are often not aware on the 
amendments of Telliamed by Le Mascrier (Milner 1990, 127); this problem often rises when Telliamed printings 
from 18th century are consulted without the help of textual work.  
61 Some aspects of the reception of de Maillet’s biological ideas are discussed below (chapter B.4) and several 
other investigations (Bender 1999b; Benitez 1980; 1984; 1989; 1990; 1993; Carozzi 1968; Charbonnat 2010; 
Cohen 1993; Dalrymple 2004; Carozzi in De Maillet 1968; Jordan 1914; Kohlbrugge 1912; Lang 1878; Neubert 
1920; Tschulok 1938).  
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passage from Telliamed, which he knew only from secondary literature62 (Ballenstedt 1819, 
223-228).  
De Maillet was also quoted by James Burnet (sometimes spelled Burnett), Lord Monboddo 
(1714-1799) in support of his ideas on the nature of men. Monboddo argued that a definition 
of man does not require the ability to speak, but the ability to make and use tools. In an 
attempt to blur the differences between men and other animals, he exaggerated the animal 
characteristics of humans and the human features of apes. In several works63 he developed his 
hypothesis that the “Orang Outang” is not an ape, but a human. In 18th century, this term did 
not necessarily refer to the orangutan, Pongo pygmaeus.64 Until the end of 18th century, “ape” 
was not only used indiscriminately for African great apes and Southeast-Asian orangutans, 
but also for all kind of real or mythological “wild man of the woods” (Brown 2000; Corbey 
2005; Nash 1995; Spencer 1995; see Tinland 1968, 89-129). In his Of the Origin and 
Progress of Language Monboddo argued that some ancient and modern men lived “in the 
brutish state, without arts or civility” (Monboddo 1773, vol. 1, 217).65 In a second edition of 
this work Monboddo incorporated an essay on the Orang Outang (Monboddo 1774).  
In this edition he stated that Orang Outans is “a barbarous nation, which has not yet learned 
the use of speech” (Monboddo 1774, vol. 1, 270). He saw the expression “not yet” as 
justified, since the organic pre-conditions for the development of language are given in this 
creature. Referring to Buffon’s work, he argued that the brain of Orang Outans, the tongue 
and other “organs of pronunciation” are “the same as those of man” (Monboddo 1774, vol. 1, 
                                                          
62 He quoted de Maillet from Poncelin (1801, vol. 1, 215-218).  
63 His arguments are developed in Antient Metaphysics (six volumes, 1773-1799), Of the Origin and Progress of 
Language (six volumes, 1773-1792) and several unpublished manuscripts (quoted in Barnard 1995). 
64 It was employed by the Dutch physician Nicolaas Tulp (1593-1674) in chapter 56 of his Observationes 
medicae, first published  in 1641 (Tulp 1716, 270-277). In this work, Tulp presented the first scientific 
description and the first illustration of an anthropoid ape from Angola, probably referring to a common 
chimpanzee. Tulp used the term Orang Outang as a generic name, similar to today’s term “ape”. 
65 In other parts of his work Monboddo had already given “sundry examples of solitary savages who have been 
found at different times, in different parts of Europe, without language or arts of any kind, and even without 
the erect form” (vol. 1, 237). For instance, referring to Diodorus Siculus, Monboddo gave an account of the 
“fish-eaters”,  a group who lived “near the strait which joins the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea or Arabian gulf, 
upon the Asiatic side” (vol. 1, 239). According to Diodorus (Siculus 1953, book III, 15-17), the fish-eaters or 
Ichthyophagi lived almost entirely on fishes; see full quotation in Appendix A. The classification of humans in 
categories according to their staple diet or habitat was also used by William Pownall (1722-1805), Governor of 
Massachusetts from 1757 to 1760, in a book An Antiquarian Romance, first published in 1795. In this account 
of the history of the European races based upon ancient authors, Pownall described first humans as 
“woodland-men” or “Sylvan men” who did not have the same opportunities to become as prolific as “land-
workers” (see quotation in Appendix D). He also wrote about “watermen” and “fishermen” (pp. 30-32) and 
fisher-tribes (p. 115). The strong connection between primeval men and a specific landscape is the most 
important feature of early and modern savannah hypotheses and their deviations (e.g., aquatic hypotheses, 
woodland or mosaic landscape-hypotheses) (see Bender et al. 2012). 
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271). As part of his argumentation on the apes’ potential or actual ability to speak, he quoted a 
passage from the English translation of Telliamed published in London in 1750, in which de 
Maillet reported on the existence of “savage-men” – actually orangutans.66 Monboddo wrote:  
Lastly, I say, that, in certain parts of the world, this wild man of the woods is to be found with 
some use of articulation. This is attested by Mr Maillet, the author of the Description of 
Egypt, who, in a work of his, entitled Telliamed, has collected a great many curious facts 
concerning the varieties of our species. (Monboddo 1774, vol. 1, 301-302)  
This explicit mentioning of de Maillet’s ideas by early evolutionists is rather exceptional, 
since several early passages taken out of Telliamed were rarely acknowledged by early 
naturalists. An example from the non-scientific literature is supplied by the French lawyer, 
politician and gastronome Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin (1755-1826). In his famous book 
Physiologie du goût (first publ. in 1825) he wrote in a chapter on fish and shellfish (very 
fittingly) as follows: “Some men of learning, but not very orthodox, have maintained that the 
ocean was the common cradle of every living thing, that even the human race was born in the 
sea, and that it only owes its present state to the influence of the air and to the habits which it 
has been obliged to adopt in order to dwell in this new element” (Brillat-Savarin 1884, 119).67  
Brillat-Savarin’s statement summarizes, as stated above, one of the most important and 
influential elements in the Mailletian system – the idea of aquatic organisms adapting to a 
terrestrial environment. The description of the transformation of an aquatic organism to its 
terrestrial counterpart was formulated by Immanuel Kant in § 80 of his Kritik der Urteilskraft 
(Critique of the Power of Judgment), first published in 1790 (Kant 2000). To understand this 
                                                          
66 Here is the English translation of De Maillet’s words:  
Nothing is more common than those Savage-men; in 1702, the Dutch-East India Company sent out 
two Vessels from Batavia or the Coasts of New Guinea, and the Southern countries, in order to trade 
and make Discoveries. During that Expedition, which was of no Use, the Dutch seized two Male 
Animals, which they brought to Batavia, and which, in the Language of the Country where they were 
taken, they called Orangs-outangs, that is, Men who live in the Woods. They had the whole of the 
human Form, and like us walked upon two Legs. Their Legs and Arms were very small, and thick- 
covered with Hair, some of which they also had on the whole of their Body, their Faces not excepted. 
Their Feet were flat, where they are joined to the Leg, so that they resembled a Piece of Plank with a 
Baton driven into it. These Orangs-outangs had the Nails of their Fingers and Toes very long, and 
somewhat crooked. They could only articulate Sounds very indistinctly; but were very melancholy, 
gentle, and peaceable. The one died at Batavia, and the other in the Road to Holland, whither he was 
sent as a Curiosity worthy the Admiration of all Europe. (De Maillet 1750, 245-246) 
67 „Quelques savants, d'ailleurs peu orthodoxes, ont prétendu que l'Océan avait été le berceau commun de 
tout ce qui existe; que l'espèce humaine elle-même était née dans la mer, et qu'elle ne devait son état actuel 
qu'à l'influence de l'air et aux habitudes qu'elle a été obligée de prendre pour séjourner dans ce nouvel 
élément“  (Brillat-Savarin 1848, 64). This work was translated in German by the Swiss-German Darwinist Carl 
Vogt (1817-1895) (Brillat-Savarin 1888, 70), the same author who translated Chamber’s Vestiges of the Natural 
History of Creation to German. 
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specific passage we have to consider some of Kant’s ideas on a gradual approach from one 
common prototype to another.68 Kant wrote (translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews):  
The agreement of so many genera of animals in a certain common schema, which seems to lie 
at the basis not only of their skeletal structure but also of the arrangement of their other parts, 
and by which a remarkable simplicity of basic design [Grundriss] has been able to produce 
such a great variety of species by the shortening of one part and the elongation of another,69 by 
the involution of this part and the evolution of another, allows the mind at least a weak ray of 
hope that something may be accomplished here with the principle of the mechanism of nature, 
without which there can be no natural science at all. (AA 5: 418) 
Kant was referring to what once was perceived as “analogy of forms” which is often 
synonymous with the modern concept of homology (without the concept of the evolution of a 
common ancestor). However, as evident in the following passage, the view of analogy as an 
abstract schema also could be used in what superficially resemble an evolutionary concept. 
Kant wrote:  
This analogy of forms, insofar as in spite of all the differences it seems to have been generated 
in accordance with a common prototype [Urbild], strengthens the suspicion of a real kinship 
among them in their generation from a common proto-mother [Urmutter], through the gradual 
approach [stufenartige Annäherung] of one animal genus to the other, from that in which the 
principle of ends seems best confirmed, namely human beings, down to polyps, and from this 
even further to mosses and lichens, and finally to the lowest level of nature that we can 
observe, that of raw matter: from which, and from its forces governed by mechanical laws 
(like those which are at work in its production of crystals), the entire technique of nature, 
which is so incomprehensible to us in organized beings that we believe ourselves compelled to 
conceive of another principle for them, seems to derive. (AA 5: 418-419)  
Kant continued with a text which remembers views expressed by antique thinkers, notably by 
Lucretius in his De rerum natura70:  
He [der Archäologe der Natur] can have the maternal womb of the earth, which has just 
emerged from a condition of chaos (just like a great animal), initially bear creatures of less 
                                                          
68 For an in-depth analysis of the topic “Kant as pioneer of evolutionism” see Lovejoy (1959c).  
69 This is basically the Aristotelian view of ‘the more and less’ expressed in his De partibus animalium I 4, 644 a 
12-23. 
70 The resemblance to Lucretius’ poem (Lukrez 1981) is indicated by following elements: (a) the conditions of 
chaos in the initial stages of life; (b) the creation of organisms from a mother earth; (c) the mention of nature 
stopping to produce new forms (which Lucretius presented as an analogy between mother earth and the old 
organismic mothers; and finally (d) the mentioning of a kind of natural selection and adaptive process (Müller 
2003, 305-327; Schoeck 1974). 
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purposive form, which in turn bear others that are formed more suitably for their place of 
origin and their relationships to one another, until this birth-mother itself, hardened and 
ossified, has restricted its offspring to determinate species that will degenerate no further, and 
the variety will remain as it turned out at the end of the operation of that fruitful formative 
power. – And yet ultimately he must attribute to this universal mother and organization 
purposively aimed at all these creatures, for otherwise the possibility of the purposive form 
[Zweckform] of the products of the animal and vegetable kingdoms cannot be conceived at all. 
(AA, 5: 419-420) 
Kant attached a footnote to the last sentence, where he wrote: 
One can call an hypothesis of this sort a daring adventure of reason, and there may be few, 
even among the sharpest researchers into nature, who have not occasionally entertained it. For 
it is not absurd, unlike generatio equivoca [aequivoca], by which is meant the generation of an 
organized being through the mechanism of crude, unorganized matter. It would still be 
generatio univoca in the most general sense of the term, insofar as something organic would 
be generated out of something else that is also organic, even though there would be a specific 
difference between these kinds of beings, e.g., as when certain aquatic animals are gradually 
transformed into amphibians and these, after some generations, into land animals. (AA 5: 419) 
Although Kant’s text evoking the idea of evolutionism is known among historians of 
philosophy of 18th and 19th century, this passage is, as pointed out by Lovejoy, 
“unfortunately, usually quoted with its most important part – an appended footnote –omitted”. 
It comes, therefore, not as a surprise that most experts did not see the stringent similarity 
between Kant's statement to a transition from aquatic to terrestrial organisms and the main 
arguments of the Darwinian system.71  
Another interesting and widely ignored text was written by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
(1749-1832). Goethe wrote on a hypothetical origin of sloths from a “monstrous spirit” (ein 
ungeheurer Geist), similar to a whale (Walfisch):  
                                                          
71 Also Lovejoy did not mention de Maillet in his article on Kant. However, in a recent paper, Peter McLaughlin 
pointed out this similarity in an article where he argued against the occasionally held idea that Kant should be 
regarded as a forerunner of Darwin: ”Let us first look at the brief speculation on the origin of land animals from 
sea animals, which Kant derives from [...] Telliamed” (McLaughlin 2010, 8). McLaughlin had excellent reasons to 
mention de Maillet in this context. No other pre-Darwinian naturalist was so strongly akin to the idea of all 
species of terrestrial organisms evolving from aquatic counterparts as de Maillet. As we will see, this 
association is so strong that some modern scientists even accused de Maillet as not having been a proponent of 
an evolutionary system because he put so much emphasis on this transition. As pointed out in chapter B.4.3, 
this criticism is contestable and belongs to the long tradition of emphasizing single aspects of the de Mailletian 
system in an attempt to demonstrate that the French naturalist could not be an early propagator of 
evolutionary ideas. 
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One may permit us some poetical expression since prose would in no way be adequate. A 
monstrous spirit, as one which in the ocean could well show itself as a whale, throws itself 
upon a swampy, gravelly shore of a torrid zone. It loses the advantages of a fish. It lacks a 
supporting element to bear its weight – an element which grants the most heavy body ease of 
movement through the smallest of organs.72  (Goethe 1954 (1821), I, vol. 9, 247-248) 
(translated by Astrida Orle Tantillo) 
Goethe’s evolutionary scenario is very similar to following passage by de Maillet. In his 
attempt to exemplify the circumstances in which an aquatic organism would leave the water 
and occupy the land, de Maillet used an analogy between flying fishes and birds and 
imbedded it in an evolutionary scenario. De Maillet wrote as follows (translation by Carozzi): 
For instance we know that often winged or flying fish, either chasing or being chased in the 
sea, stimulated by the desire of prey or the fear of death, or perhaps tossed a few feet on the 
shore by stormy waves, have fallen among reeds or weeds, from which it was not possible for 
them to resume their flight to the sea, under which circumstances they could have developed a 
greater facility for flying. Then their fins, being no longer bathed in sea water, were split and 
became warped by drying. While they found among the reeds and weeds in which they had 
fallen some food to support them, the vessels of their fins, separated from each other, were 
lengthened and covered with fringes, or to speak more precisely, the membranes which 
previously had kept them adherent to each other were metamorphosed. (De Maillet 1968, 187) 
De Maillet gave some details of the metamorphosis from flying fish to bird: 
The fringe formed by these warped membranes was lengthened, and the skin of these animals 
became gradually covered with a down of the same color as the skin, and this down in turn 
increased, The little wings which they had under their belly, and which like their fins helped 
them to walk on the sear bottom, became feet and served them to walk on land. Other small 
changes occurred in their shape. The beak and neck of some were lengthened, and those of 
others shortened; this was also true for the rest of the body. However, the appearance of the 
original shape remains in the whole; it is and will always be easy to recognize. (De Maillet 
1968, 187) 
                                                          
72 Man erlaube uns einigen poetischen Ausdruck, da überhaupt Prose wohl nicht hinreichen möchte. Ein 
ungeheurer Geist, wie er im Ozean sich wohl als Walfisch darthun konnte, stürzt sich in ein sumpfig-kiesiges 
Ufer einer heissen Zone; er verliert die Vorteile des Fisches, ihm fehlt ein tragendes Element, das dem 
schwersten Körper leichte Beweglichkeit durch die mindesten Organe verleiht. Ungeheuere Hilfsglieder bilden 
sich heran, einen ungeheueren Körper zu tragen. Das seltsame Wesen fühlt sich halb der Erde, halb dem Wasser 
angehörig und vermisst alle Bequemlichkeit, die beide ihren entschiedenen Bewohnern zugestehen. (Goethe 
1954 (1821), I, vol. 9, 247-248) 
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While the similarities between de Maillet’s and Goethe’s text are striking,73 the difference of 
the scenarios concerns mainly the relatedness of the organisms: by Goethe the evolutionary 
change implies two mammals (although Goethe mistakenly called the cetacean a “fish”); in de 
Maillet’s scenario a fish is transformed in a bird.74 Is the strong similarity between both 
passages merely coincidental? Given the ample dissemination of de Maillet’s ideas, Goethe 
might have adopted the evolutionary scenario from other contemporaneous authors influenced 
by the Mailletian system or even have developed his idea independently. However, it is not 
only the striking similarity of ideas that speaks for the hypothesis that Goethe borrowed de 
Maillet’s idea. As Kohlbrugge (1912, 50) noted, Goethe lent Telliamed 180675 and again 1816 
from a library in Weimar. On the other hand, Goethe mentioned de Maillet’s ideas in other 
parts of his publications (Kohlbrugge 1912, 507; Neubert 1920, 18).  
An example of transformist ideas close to the de Mailletian system can be found in Robert 
Chambers’ Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (first published anonymously in 
1844).76 In several parts of this work he implied a view on land forms originating from 
secondary aquatic organisms. This erroneous concept is compatible with Chamber’s attempts 
to explain organismic evolution as a phenomenon of continuous, gradual, progressive and 
predictable steps. (As a deist, Chambers believed that God had created the laws of nature, 
without any intervention towards subsequent developments.) For instance, several passages of 
Vestiges imply that the land once seemed to be an invitation to create higher forms of life. It 
seems that the idea of animals abandoning terra firma (where, according to the concept of 
progressive transformism, they could “develop further”) to return into the water was rather 
sophisticated and counterintuitive in this time. Chambers was not able to identify the 
erroneous views on aquatic discrepant organisms. He saw for instance the semi-aquatic 
platypus as belonging “to a class at the bottom of the mammalian” (Chambers 1844, 195), 
referring not only to the fact that this mammal lays eggs, but also to aquatic features which 
confused other early naturalists (see Appendix A), like the webbed feet and rubbery snout.  
                                                          
73 Both authors envisaged (a) the transformation of an aquatic to a terrestrial organism; mentioned (b) an 
aquatic animal falling / being flushed on the shore; mentioned (c) organs used for propulsion in the aquatic 
environment as starting point for the subsequent development of organs of locomotion in a non-aquatic 
environment; envisaged (d) a scenario conveying the impression of a rather punctual or abrupt evolutionary 
change. 
74 Interestingly, as de Maillet and Lamarck, Goethe did not realize that the whale is a secondary aquatic 
mammal, and therefore inaccurate to exemplify such a transition. This topic will be treated in the next section. 
75 On 25 October of the same year Goethe mentioned Telliamed succinctly in one of his diaries: “Elpenor und 
die Fischerin. Telliamed. Hauptmann Gautier, Zeichner, zu Tische. Unterhaltung über den Krieg, die Kunst und 
die politischen Lagen. Abends bey Hofe. Geheimerath von Wangenheim von Eisenach” (Goethe 1805, 185). 
76 On Chambers’ transformism possibly influenced by the Copernican revolution see footnote 39. 
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Chambers did not quote de Maillet, and although he discussed the Lamarckian system 
(Chambers 1844, 230-231), it is not possible to assess if Chambers took the concept of 
secondary aquatic animals descending from primary aquatic organisms from Lamarck’s 
Philosophie zoologique. As already stated, the idea of terrestrial animals which moved “back 
into the water” was not an intuitive one, and naive assumption of gradual and progressive 
evolution were prone to produce concepts of platypus or dolphins as primary aquatic animals. 
Even today, educated non-biologists are often not able to discern clearly secondary from 
primary aquatic organisms. 77    
B.4 Discrepant evaluations of Telliamed  
B.4.1 Darwin’s historical sketch 
In response to criticism78 that he had not sufficiently considered early proponents of 
evolutionary ideas (Freeman 1977, 78), Darwin reviewed the topic in a historical sketch added 
to the 3th edition of his Origin79 (see below). In the 6th and usually regarded as the last 
edition of Origin, he mentioned a total of 34 authors who accepted the modification of species 
(Darwin 1872, xii-xxi). The oldest evolutionary ideas pioneers he mentioned in this edition 
                                                          
77 An interesting example can be found in the book Sea Enchantress: The Tale of the Mermaid and her Kin. In a 
passage which was probably hastily added shortly before the publication of the book, the authors wrote: “An 
eminent zoologist, Sir Alister Hardy, has recently propounded the theory that Ape-man, our ancestor, was 
obliged at one time to return to the sea to find his food. He may have left some of his kin the sea” (Benwell & 
Waugh 1961, 276). Although the authors were aware that Hardy argued towards an ape “returning” to the sea, 
they listed following argument for the aquatic scenario: “Even today man retains evidence of his marine 
ancestry. The human race still has faint traces of gills, and in a few cases these traces may be so marked as to 
warrant surgical removal” (Benwell & Waugh 1961, 276-277). Humans to not have vestigial gills - the authors 
probably refer to branchial cleft and arch anomalies (Waldhausen 2006). In any case, “vestigial gills” are 
misplaced in a discussion on a possible semi-aquatic scenario in human evolution as well as in a discussion on 
semi-aquatic mammals which descended from terrestrial species. See also Buffon’s experiments in an attempt 
to bread an amphibious race of dogs (below, chapter B.4.3) and Steinmann’s speculations on ichthyosaurs as 
ancestors of dolphins in Appendix D.  
78 In a review published in the Edinburgh Review, Owen (1860) wrote:  
Mr. Darwin rarely refers to the writings of his predecessors, from whom, rather than from the 
phenomena of the distribution of the inhabitants of South America, he might be supposed to have 
derived his ideas as to the origin of species. When he does allude to them, their expositions on the 
subject are inadequately represented. Every one studying the pages of Lamarck's original chapters (iii. 
vi. vii., vol. I., and the supplemental chapter of 'additions' to vol. ii. Of the 'Philosophie Zoologique'), 
will see how much weight he gives to inherent constitutional adaptability, to hereditary influences, 
and to the operation of long lapses of time on successive generations, in the course of transmuting a 
species. The common notion of Lamarck's philosophy, drawn from the tirades which a too figurative 
style of illustrating the reciprocal influence of innate tendencies and outward influences have drawn 
upon the blind philosopher, is incorrect and unjust.  
The passage is available online in The Victorian Web 
(http://www.victorianweb.org/science/science_texts/owen_review_of_origin.html#sixteen, accessed on 26 
December 2013); in the same review Owen mentioned several times de Maillet as a precursor of Darwin’s 
evolutionary ideas.  
79 This sketch is absent in the first two English editions of Darwin’s Origin published in November 1859 and 
October 1860. 
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were Aristotle, his grandfather Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), the French naturalist G. Leclerc 
de Buffon (1707-1788), Jean Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829), Étienne Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire (1772-1844), Lorenz Oken (1779-1851) and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-
1832).  
As pointed out by Egerton  (1976, 453), the historical sketch was “a literature review and not 
a brief intellectual autobiography”. As we will see, the historical sketch sheds light on 
problems Darwin faced in his attempts to separate his own views from earlier discredited 
ideas on evolution; the difficulty of this task is certainly one of the main reasons why he did 
not write such a review in the first edition of Origin.  
It is interesting to see that the historical sketch is not in line with the above mentioned 
research by Mornet (see chapter B.3), who indicated that Telliamed in the 18th century was a 
“popular” scientific book. It might come to a surprise for some Darwin and de Maillet 
scholars that Darwin knew Telliamed, mentioning it in two Origin’s editions that are rarely 
considered in historical investigations.  
Although Telliamed was not a part of Darwin's Library, at least not at the time of his death80, 
Darwin possessed a copy of it. In fact, the question of whether Darwin had a copy of 
Telliamed or not is hardly considered in the literature. The only concrete indication I had 
when I wrote on this topic (Bender 1999b, 59) was from Jordan, who pointed out that Darwin 
had known Telliamed, "because the same one copy stood in the Catalogue of the library of 
Charles Darwin now in the botany at Cambridge (Cambr. 1908) in his library” (Jordan 1914, 
5, my translation). In the 1990s I did not have access to this catalogue; now it is published 
online.81 According to this catalogue, Darwin had a copy of  the Telliamed edition published 
in London in 1750 (Rutherford 1908, 54). The information on the background of this copy can 
be found in the correspondence Darwin had with the Scottish horticulturalist Isaac Anderson-
Henry. In a letter to Darwin on 20 May 1867 Anderson-Henry asked if Darwin knew 
Telliamed, offering to send him an English translation of it dated 1750. He wrote: “Have you 
ever seen a singular book I fell in with lately the ‘Telliamed’ of M. Maillet in which he treats 
‘of the origin of men & Animals’. My copy, a Translation, is dated 1750 [.] If you have not 
                                                          
80 This information was confirmed by David Kohn (personal communication), the Director of the Darwin 
Manuscripts Project at AMNH. He referred to the comprehensive Bibliography that forms part of Charles 
Darwin's Library, which was produced by the Darwin Manuscripts Project and now appears on the BHL site.  
81 In (http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=A4&viewtype=text&pageseq=1 The Complete 
Works of Charles Darwin Online). 
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seen, and should wish to see it, I will gladly send it. It stoutly asserts the fact of men 
having tails & gives instances”.82  
Darwin answered on 22 May 1867: “You are so kind as to offer to lend me Maillet's work, 
which I have often heard of, but never seen. I should like to have a look at it, and would return 
it to you in a short time. I am bound to read it, as my former friend and present bitter enemy 
Owen generally ranks me and Maillet as a pair of equal fools” (Darwin 1903, 280). 
I do not have confirmed information on how this copy came to Darwin, where it was stored 
and when it was rediscovered.83 According to Annie Kemkaran-Smith, curator at the National 
Collections Group, English Heritage, the copy is now at Down House. It is listed as belonging 
to Cambridge University Library and is on loan together with other books from Darwin’s 
library (pers. comm.); she kindly provided pictures showing Darwin’s marginalia in this copy 
(see Fig. B.1). It is interesting to see that Darwin was interested in the parts of the work which 
also are mostly treated in detail here84; they are: (a) terrestrial animals having counterparts in 
the sea (De Maillet 1750, 222-223); (b) fishes crawling at the bottom of the sea as ancestors 
of terrestrial animals and flying fishes as ancestors of birds85; (c) flying fish transformed into 
a bird (De Maillet 1750, 223-224); (d) a sentence on the moons of the planets86; (e) terrestrial 
fruits having counterparts in the sea87; (f) the passage where de Maillet tries to explain some 
difficulties of his system concerning the evolution of organisms88; (g) human skin similar to 
the fish scales (De Maillet 1750, 258); (h) the sea as the cradle of all living organisms (De 
Maillet 1750, 259); (i) on several species of sea-apes, which are “precisely the same figure 
with those of the land” (De Maillet 1750, 225); (j) on “sea-bears” (De Maillet 1750, 226); (k) 
                                                          
82 In Darwin Correspondence Database, http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/entry-5542 accessed on 25 December 
2013. 
83 The only information was given by Stott (2013, 129), who wrote that Anderson-Henry posted this copy to 
Kent in 1867, and that it disappeared into a box stored in the family attic at Down House; it was retrieved only 
in 1993. Unfortunately she did not give references to this specific source. 
84 I received the pictures only after the main text of the present analysis was finalized. 
85 On this page there is a typo: the page number is given as 122, instead of 221; Darwin corrected it (De Maillet 
1750, 122 (sic: 221)). 
86 He marked the word ‘Mars’ in the sentence beginning with “If then as the Earth” (De Maillet 1750, 209). 
87 The passage marked begins with “They there find” until the end of the paragraph (De Maillet 1750, 219); he 
wrote at the margin “see pp 222,23”, which refers to the passage on counterparts land/aquatic animals.  
88 Passage verbatim: „I am now to convince you, that without the Help of this new Creation, all the Species 
which now live in the Globe might have been there naturally produced, tho‘ they had been extinguished“ (De 
Maillet 1750, 276). 
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on men with tails found in several countries of the world89; (l) on humans interbreeding with 
apes and having descendants able to speak (De Maillet 1750, 273). 
 
Figure B.1 Picture of Darwin’s copy of Telliamed showing lines placed to mark up passages he was 
especially interested in. It is not surprising that he marked de Maillet’s sentences on terrestrial 
organisms having counterparts in water and the famous passage of a fish transformed into a bird. 
Photography by Annie Kemkaran-Smith. 
Although the historical sketch was prepared for the first authorized American edition 
published in May 1860, curiously it first appeared in the first German edition translated by 
Heinrich Georg Bronn from the second English edition and published in April 1860.90 This 
German historical sketch was shorter compared to the third English edition91 of March 1861. 
Darwin mentioned in it that, apart from the writers of the classical period and of de Maillet 
and Buffon (with whose writings he stated not to be familiar), Lamarck’s opinion on species 
                                                          
89 Darwin wrote “Men with Tails” beside this passage (De Maillet 1750, 247). As we will see below, Owen 
(1860) used exactly this sentence to compare with Darwin’s views on bears as precursors of whales to make 
Darwin appear ridiculous. 
90 See  Johnson (2007) for an analysis of Darwin’s historical sketch; see also Darwin (1993, vol. 8, 572). 
91 The title was almost the same as in the sixth edition of 1872, which is usually regarded as the last:  “An 
historical sketch on the progress of opinion of the origin of species” -, but without the subtitle “Previously to 
the publication of the first edition”, which appears from the sixth edition onwards. 
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change was the first that, “excited much attention” (Aufsehen erregte).92 The text in English, 
when finally published, appeared in July 1860 in the fourth printing of Origin in the United 
States under the title “Preface”, followed by “Contributed by the author to this American 
Edition”.93 In this edition Darwin wrote: “Passing over authors of the classical period, and 
likewise Demaillet and Buffon, with whose writings I am not familiar, Lamarck was the first 
man, whose view that species undergo change excited much attention” (Darwin 1860a, v).  
As far as I know, de Maillet is not mentioned in any of the English editions of Origin, and 
most reprints94 do not refer to this specific difference in the historical sketches. In the fourth 
English edition of 1866 (p. xiii), Darwin added a footnote on Aristotle to the sentence 
“Passing over allusions to the subject in the classical writers”; this footnote was also 
reproduced in subsequent editions (Darwin 1872, xii; Darwin 1876a, xv).  
There is also an indirect, early link to Telliamed. Darwin wrote in Notebook B178e from 
183895 a passage where Telliamed is mentioned; the passage is almost a verbatim quotation of 
following statement published in the Bulletin de la société géologique de France (1re série, 
Tome IV) from the Société géologique de France, 1834 (pp. 90-110), reporting on the meeting 
of 2nd December 1833. In this statement, Deshayes criticized Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire for 
referring to Lamarck’s rudimentary transformist ideas in Hydrogéologie instead of referring to 
the more elaborated ideas expressed in Philosophie zoologique and in the introduction of his 
Histoire des animaux sans vertèbres (Lamarck 1815-1822, 7 vol.).96 In Deshayes’ opinion, 
                                                          
92 The passage reads as follows: „Abgesehen von den Schriftstellern der klassischen Periode, so wie von 
Demaillet und Buffon, mit deren Schriften ich nicht vertraut bin, war Lamarck der erste, dessen Meinung, dass 
Arten sich verändern, Aufsehen erregte“ (Darwin 1860c, 1). Already the second German edition was based on 
the third English edition and does not mention de Maillet (Darwin 1863). 
93 It is the work number 380 in Freeman’s list of Darwin’s works (Freeman 1977, 85), with “new edition, revised 
and augmented by the author” on the title page.  
94 See below. The variorum text of Origin edited by Morse Peckham (Darwin 1959) does not belong to the 
exceptions, since it does not consider the American editions. 
95 In http://darwin.amnh.org/viewer.php?eid=77099 Darwin Manuscripts Project. 
96 The original in French reads as follows:  
M. Deshayes, répondant à ce que M. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire a exposé dans la séance précédente en 
présentant son opuscule intitulé : Paléontographie, réclame en faveur de notre célèbre Lamarck la 
priorité de cette idée, que les animaux sont modifiés dans leur organisation par les circonstances 
ambiantes. « Cette thèse, dit-il, a été développée par Lamarck, non seulement dans sa philosophie 
zoologique, en 1809, mais encore dans sa belle introduction à l’histoire des animaux sans vertèbres, 
1815. «  M. Deshayes fait observer qu’il n’est pas juste de citer, comme l’a fait M. Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire, l’Hydrogéologie de Lamarck, ouvrage antérieur aux deux précédents, et dans lequel cette idée 
n’est exposée que très accessoirement[.] (p. 99) 
I quoted the passage from the digital version available in  
http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Bulletin_de_la_soci%C3%A9t%C3%A9_g%C3%A9ologique_de_France/1re_s%C3%
A9rie/Tome_IV/S%C3%A9ance_du_2_d%C3%A9cembre_1833 (accessed on 11 January 2014). I wish to thank 
David Kohn, Director of the Darwin Manuscripts Project at AMNH, who drew my attention to the reference 
concerning Telliamed in Darwin’s notebook.  
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Lamarck did not share the ideas expressed in Telliamed, which were also reproduced by 
Bonnet and Rodig, as Saint-Hilaire seemed to believe.97   
As seen from Darwin’s notice in Notebook B178e, Darwin was already aware of statements 
on Telliamed as a book defending transformist ideas as early as 1838. Interestingly, this diary 
entry was written shortly after what is often regarded as the period in which he changed his 
belief concerning the fixity of species, around the end of 1836 (Limoges 1970b, 9). See also 
below (chapter B.4.3), where Cuvier mentioned Robinet, Rodig and Lamarck as amendments 
to de Maillet’s transformism. 
The reason for omission of de Maillet’s name in later versions of the historical sketch is 
insightful for understanding the problems Darwin and later evolutionists had to face when 
discussing the ideas of an 18th century precursor of evolutionism who believed that humans 
descended from hommes marins. Darwin realized that mentioning Buffon and de Maillet in 
connection with “allusions to the subject” was not precise – this sentence is only true 
concerning Buffon. Darwin had to make a decision – he would have to treat Telliamed 
separately or to erase de Maillet’s name to correct the issue that arose from the expression 
“allusion”. The first alternative was associated with three problems. First, de Maillet defended 
views which were obviously perceived as extremely speculative; second, it was impossible to 
refer to Telliamed as a work mentioning evolutionary ideas marginally; finally, as shown 
below, the book had been praised by his friends, Charles Lyell and Thomas Huxley. The 
danger of Darwin’s evolutionary system being associated with a speculative author became 
evident after the publication of a review in the Edinburgh Review where Owen associates 
Darwin’s famous bear / whale statements with de Maillet’s flying-fish / bird views (see below 
chapter B.4.3). This review certainly played the most important part in Darwin’s decision to 
delete de Maillet’s name from the historical sketch. We see in the third English edition 
Darwin wrote: “Passing over authors from the classical period to that of Buffon, with whose 
writings I am not familiar, Lamarck was the first man whose conclusions on this subject 
excited much attention” (Darwin 1861, xiii).   
                                                          
97 The original passage reads as follows: 
[...] enfin, M. Deshayes termine en affirmant de la manière la plus positive, et en citant les pages 129 
et 130 de l’introduction précitée, que jamais Lamarck n’a partagé les idées systématiques de 
Telliamed, reproduites par Bonnet et Rœdig [Rodig], comme paraît le croire M. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. 
(pp. 99-100) 
In: 
http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Bulletin_de_la_soci%C3%A9t%C3%A9_g%C3%A9ologique_de_France/1re_s%C3%
A9rie/Tome_IV/S%C3%A9ance_du_2_d%C3%A9cembre_1833, accessed on 11 January 2014.  
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This solution was still not optimal, as Darwin was aware that the above statement implied an 
astonishing gap in his historical knowledge. This applied to not only Buffon’s works, which 
could be easily forgiven, but at the same time gave credence to the possibility of identifying 
Buffon as an important forerunner of evolutionary ideas. More serious was probably the 
section on authors of the classic period, since Darwin would certainly not like to be regarded 
as insufficiently educated relative to the intellectual heritage of ancient thinkers. So the 
statement was again modified in the 5th edition of 1869. He mentioned Aristotle as an 
example of a classical writer and included at least a negative aspect related to Buffon’s 
evolutionary views:  
Passing over allusions to the subject in the classical writers,* [footnote on Aristotle] the first 
author who in modern times has treated it in a scientific spirit was Buffon. But as his opinions 
fluctuated greatly at different periods, and as he does not enter on the causes or means of the 
transformation of species, I need not here enter on details” (Darwin 1869, xv).  
It seems that most investigators in the past were not aware of the specifics concerning De 
Maillet in the first German edition or the fourth American printing from 1860. Despite the 
enormous work that has been carried out on Darwin, even today’s historians (apart from the 
few specialists mentioned above) ignore this difference, as explained by Johnson, who 
investigated the history of the historical sketch (although he did not specially focus on de 
Maillet):  
Most accessible editions of the Origin are reprints of the sixth English edition (or translations 
thereof) and so, unlike the first English edition, include the “Historical Sketch” as it appeared 
in the sixth English edition. The bibliographic details of the various editions of Darwin’s 
Origin are no doubt of subordinate interest to the general reader, but in view of the numerous 
changes Darwin made to successive editions it behoves those working in Darwin studies to be 
attentive to these subtleties. (Johnson 2007, 529) 
My own copies of German editions of Origin endorsed Johnson’s judgement (Darwin 1876b; 
Darwin 1892; Darwin 1899; Darwin 1989; Darwin 1990); furthermore, from the 26 editions 
of Origin published in Darwin Online which I can read98 only the first German edition 
mentioned de Maillet in the historical sketch. In fact, I myself did not have the opportunity to 
consult the fourth American printing from the original until shortly before submission of this 
thesis (on 14 February 2014); I quoted therefore from the historical sketch fully reproduced in 
                                                          
98 In http://darwin-online.org.uk/contents.html, accessed at 22 December 2013. I could not check the Russian 
edition. 
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Darwin (1993, vol. 8, 572-573) which I compared to the only online version available, which 
is however without OCR correction.99 Please note that the excellent variorum text of Origin 
edited by Morse Peckham (Darwin 1959) does not contain the changes in the historical sketch 
from the American editions (or other non-English editions). In the meantime, after I pointed 
out the absence of the 4th American printing in Darwin Online, John van Wyhe, Senior 
Lecturer at Darwin Online, added it to the website.100  
In the sixth English edition and subsequent reprints and translations thereof, de Maillet is 
implied as an author not belonging to the category of scholars who had treated evolutionism 
“it in a scientific spirit”. By passing over de Maillet in the historical sketch, Darwin did not 
acknowledge the enormous impact of de Maillet's evolutionary ideas in the development of 
the evolutionary view. Darwin cannot be blamed for his decision on de Maillet, as the 
association between Origin and Telliamed would certainly instigate similar attempts to 
undermine Darwin’s ideas (see below, chapter B.4.3). However, the sketch had (and still has) 
a significant impact on biologists who consulted Origin to use Darwin’s views on what he 
believed to be the precursors of his own evolutionary system, and the absence of de Maillet in 
this review certainly had a sensible impact in later historical analyses.101    
B.4.2 The underrepresentation of de Maillet’s ideas in textbooks 
Before we begin to analyse the reception of Telliamed, it is useful to address the question of 
how often de Maillet is mentioned as a precursor of evolutionary ideas in modern biological 
textbooks. Eiseley, after discussing Telliamed, was surprised to note that this work was rather 
ignored in textbooks of his own library; “Telliamed, though known to English historians of 
science, has passed comparatively unnoticed. Of five histories of biology which I have 
                                                          
99 In http://www.archive.org/stream/onoriginspecies01unkngoog/onoriginspecies01unkngoog_djvu.txt, 
accessed on 22 December 2013. OCR: Optical Character Recognition. 
100 In http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=F380&viewtype=text&pageseq=1, accessed on 15 
February 2014. I wish to thank John van Wyhe for his efforts.  
101 See Samuel Butler’s book Evolution, old and new, or, The theories of Buffon, Dr. Erasmus Darwin and 
Lamarck, as compared with that of Charles Darwin in an early example of historical investigation closely 
oriented to the historical sketch (Butler 1879). It is probably not wrong to assume that most early and modern 
historians expressing detailed views on the roots of the evolutionary ideas after 1860 consulted Darwin’s 
historical sketch in the course of their investigations. Summarized reviews on the history of evolutionary 
thought on the World Wide Web seem to endorse the result of our review on biological textbooks in not 
mentioning de Maillet. For instance, from the 20 first results of a Google search (“history of evolutionary 
thought”) carried out on 26 December 2013, the summaries of the history of evolutionary thought do not 
mention de Maillet, with one remarkable exception -  the article in Wikipedia written in English 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_evolutionary_thought, accessed on 26 December 2013). Interestingly, 
the corresponding articles in German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Romanian, Dutch, Catalan and even French 
(!) follow again the general trend of not mentioning de Maillet. Also the article “History of evolutionary 
thought” in EvoWiki, which lists a “timeline of important events in evolutionary biology”, does not mention de 
Maillet (http://evolutionwiki.org/wiki/History_of_evolutionary_thought, accessed on 26 December 2013). 
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consulted on my shelves, only one mentions Telliamed - and then only in a passing sentence” 
(Eiseley 1961, 30).  
To compare Eiseley’s observation with works published after 1958, I checked 27 randomly 
chosen102 biological introductory books for undergraduate and postgraduate students or books 
on evolution written by experts for general readers published between 1960 and 2013 for text 
on the development of evolutionary thoughts (see Table B.1). The sample contains textbooks 
on biology, evolution, species concept, palaeontology, botany and zoology published in 
English, German and Italian; two of the works are books on evolution written by experts for 
general readers (Mayr 2001; Norman 1994). I did not consider here the specialized literature 
on history of science, as they will be treated separately, but only textbooks, where, for space 
constraints, the precursors of the evolutionary idea are only succinctly mentioned. Authors 
were not listed in the table when they did not play a significant role in the scientific discussion 
(for instance Robert Fitzroy). The same applies to authors mentioned within detailed 
discussions on a specific topic, for instance, concerning species concept (e.g., Willmann 
1985) or the development of palaeontology (e.g., Ziegler 1986). Authors included in these 
chapters are regarded as major figures whose contributions had a positive or negative 
influence on the consolidation of evolutionary concepts. Authors sporadically or consequently 
coined as proponents of evolutionary ideas are underlined. The number of books indicates 
how many books mentioned a specific author. 
Statements on the history of evolutionary views from textbooks are insightful because, due to 
space constraints, these works can consider only a limited spectrum of ideas expressed by 
other scientists. In doing so, they help to retell both accurate and inaccurate aspects of the 
history of a certain field. Although the sample of this investigation is small, it is useful to give 
at least an approximate picture of common misconceptions or omissions concerning modern 
views on the history of evolutionary ideas.  
  
                                                          
102 Inspired by Eiseley, 15 of the books were randomly chosen from my personal library. In order to enlarge the 
number of reference works, seven other titles have been added from the open access library of the University 
of Bern. The only criteria for the inclusion in the sample were the presence of a historical sketch and 
publication year (after 1958).  
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Table B.1. Authors mentioned in chapters summarizing the development of evolutionary 
ideas in 27 randomly chosen textbooks103 published in English, German and Italian 
between 1960 and 2013 
Authors  Number of 
books 
Charles Darwin 27 
B. de Lamarck  26 
Charles Lyell,  George Cuvier 15 
Alfred R. Wallace 14 
Carl Linnaeus 12 
Thomas R. Malthus 9 
G. Leclerc de Buffon 8 
Aristotle 7 
Ernst Haeckel 5 
James Hutton, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Plato 4 
Anaximander, Gregor Mendel, John Henslow, Immanuel Kant, Robert H. 
Hooke, Robert Chambers,  Pierre L. Maupertuis, Denis Diderot, Erasmus 
Darwin, John Ray 
2 
Herbert Spencer, Johannes Müller, Alexander Pope, Empedocles, Svante 
Arrhenius, Julien O. de La Mettrie, August Weismann, Johann W. von 
Goethe, G. R. Treviranus, Pliny, J.C.M. Reinecke, H.G.Bronn, Charles 
Bonnet, Benoît de Maillet, Richard Owen 
1 
 
In the above review, de Maillet was mentioned by only one author. It is certainly not a 
coincidence that this (positive) reference to de Maillet by Bernhard Ziegler (1986, 2) is found 
in a historical sketch on the development of geological and palaeontological research. As we 
will see below, Telliamed is often considered as a landmark in the history of these fields by 
                                                          
103 (Autorenkollektiv 1992, 855; Autorenkollektiv 2002, 386; Belk & Maier 2013, 224-227; Bickel et al. 2001, 
341-347; Campbell & Reece 2006, 504-507; Creager et al. 1986, 132-136; Frisch 1960, 168-198; Futuyma 1998, 
17-21; Hoefnagels 2013, 220-221; Kühn 1972, 434; Kutschera 2008, 24-31; Linder et al. 1961, 278-280; Linder & 
Bayrhuber 1992, 421-425; Mader & Windelspecht 2013, 272-274; Mayr 2001, 5-11; Norman 1994, 18; Oram 
1982, 277-283; Purves et al. 2006, 4-5; Raven et al. 2006, 227-229; Reece 2011, 499-503; Ridley 1993, 7-11; 
Starr 2013, 237-243; Strickberger 2000, 30; Wehner & Gehring 1990, 540-543; Willmann 1985, 33-39; Ziegler 
1980, 2-3; Zrzavý et al. 2009, 6-7, 10). 
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specialized historians; this trend is even more evident after the publication of Carozzi’s 
edition of this work. Carozzi himself specialized in the history of geology. 
In the opinion presented here, the under-representation in textbooks does not reflect basic 
historical facts on de Maillet. This statement does not imply a criticism of the textbooks 
quoted above, as their historical sketches reflect scholarly consensus. In fact, the 
misconceptions about the role that de Maillet played in the biological sciences were not 
created by modern historians, but adopted from biased historical analyses of late 19th and 
early 20th century.  
B.4.3 Main points raised by early and modern authors in their negative evaluations of de 
Maillet’s evolutionary ideas 
Darwin's historical overview was the beginning of an extensive line of research104 in the 
history of biology.105 Especially the earlier phase of this research program was, however, 
anything but objective. In the decades around 1900, an intensive debate about the validity of 
"Darwinism" was in progress (Bowler 1983). Anti-Darwinian historians sometimes used their 
analysis to disdain Darwin's achievements. An extreme example of this is Kohlbrugge’s 
article War Darwin ein originelles Genie? (Was Darwin an original genius?) (Kohlbrugge 
1915), in which 57 pre-Darwinian proponents of evolutionary ideas are listed to expose 
Darwin's priority-claims as exaggerated.106  
The study of the history of evolutionary theory has gained much distance and objectivity since 
the elimination of fundamental conflicts between different areas of biology in the 1930s and 
                                                          
104 In an early phase, 189 single naturalists reviewed succinctly the ideas of authors from the 18th and early 19th 
century proposing “transformation des espèces”, to use the expression of Cuvier (1841, 79) when he discussed 
de Maillet’s evolutionary views (see full quotation below). 
105 Several works were published on the history of evolutionary thinking, so that only a very frugal selection of 
the works can be listed here (for historical investigations focusing on the history of anthropology see Appendix 
D). The author consulted investigations written originally or translated into German (Engels 1995; Junker 
1998a; Kohlbrugge 1914; Kohlbrugge 1912; Kohlbrugge 1915; Krause 1879; Krause 1880; Lang 1877; Lefèvre 
1984; Potonié 1890; Rádl 1909; Schindewolf 1941; Todes 1995; Uhlmann 1923; Wenzel 1982; Young 1993; 
Zimmermann 1953), in French (Bourdier 1960; Lanessan 1914; Quatrefages 1870) and in English (Bowler 1975a; 
Bowler 1973; Bowler 1989; Burckardt 1983; Burckhardt, Jr. 1977; Burkhardt, Jr. 1972; Butler 1879; Coleman 
1964; Crocker 1959; Eiseley 1961; Farber 1999; Friedman & Diggle 2011; Ghiselin 2003; Gillispie 1959; Glass 
1959a; Glass 1959b; Glass 1959c; Greene 1961; Haber 1959b; Haber 1959c; Larson 2004; Lovejoy 1959a; 
Lovejoy 1959b; Lovejoy 1959c; Lovejoy 1959d; Lovejoy 1959e; Mayr 1982; Oppenheimer 1959; Osborn 1924; 
Richards 1982; Ruse 1981; Ruse 1993; Sapp 2003; Secord 2000; Temkin 1959; Wells 1973; Zirkle 1941; Zirkle 
1946; Zirkle 1954).  
106 In this article, which is provided through and through with ironic and derogatory remarks about Darwin, 
Kohlbrugge described Darwin’s historical sketch as „extremely superficial“ (äusserst oberflächlich), an utmost 
unfair assessment when it is considered that Darwin’s  historical sketch represents the first-ever attempt to 
present the history of evolutionary theory. It seems that Kohlbrugge forgot that he published his own 
investigation on the topic in 1915 (54 years after Darwin published his own historical studies) and that he had, 
unlike Darwin, access to secondary literature on this topic - Darwin’s historical sketch was one of them.  
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1940s and the formulation of the synthetic theory of evolution. Although new avenues for a 
more realistic analysis of the emergence of evolutionary thinking have been opened up, de 
Maillet’s evolutionary ideas are – as we will see below – often negatively evaluated both by 
biologists as well as historians. (This judgment is not shared by all naturalists in the 19th 
century and early 20th century and modern historians; see below, chapter B.4.3) The results of 
an analysis of this evaluation are insightful and are taken up in later chapters of the present 
thesis. My most important conclusions are related to the following topics: On the one hand, 
early and modern views on de Maillet’s ideas reveal crucial aspects of the attempts to 
establish the boundaries of scientific debate, a topic which is essential in our analysis of 
modern hypotheses on human evolution (see topic “aquatic hypotheses” in Appendix D). On 
the other hand, they will supply new insights related to the use of analogies in the emergence 
of evolutionary thinking in the 18th century.  
De Maillet’s views as fantasies, fancies, fiction, or threat to Christian dogma 
In a book on shells released in 1752, only four years after the first publication of Telliamed, 
Dezallier d’Argenville wrote: “What a folly in this author to substitute Telliamed for Moses, 
to force man out of the depths of the sea, and for fear that we might descend from Adam, to 
give us marine monsters for ancestors! Only a kind of godless could invent such dreams.” 
(Dezallier d'Argenville 1757, 74, my translation). 107 (A similar reaction can be found in 
lengthy and vociferous passages published in a German popular science magazine.)108  The 
indignation at the possibility that humanity could have emerged from something other than 
Adam is comparable to the reactions towards Isaac La Peyrère’s pre-Adamite views, first 
published in 1655,109 as well as towards the implications of Darwin’s Origin. Although 
Darwin conceived his main work in a way to avoid the topic on human evolution,110 it was 
widely perceived as implying the idea that human originated from apes,111 an assumption 
                                                          
107 Quelle déraison à cet auteur, de substituer Telliamed à Moïse, de faire sortir l'homme du fond de la mer; et 
de peur que nous ne descendions d'Adam, de nous donner des monstres marins pour aïeux ! Il n’y a que des 
impies qui puissent inventer de pareilles rêveries. 
108 This specific volume of Allgemeines Magazin der Natur, Kunst und Wissenschaften was edited by the 
German astronomer Johann Daniel Titius (1729-1796). This journal was the source for important naturalists, as 
for example, Immanuel Kant (Kautzleben 2004, 126). The articles on de Maillet (Anonymous 1753a; 
Anonymous 1753b; Anonymous 1753c) were published only five years after the first edition of Telliamed. Some 
parts of the criticism imply that the work was known in Germany and Italy.  
109 On La Peyrère and his influence see Allen (1949, 86-91), Grayson  (1983, 140-142) and Popkin (1987). 
110 It is usually stated that Darwin dared to make only one statement concerning human evolution in the first 
edition of Origin – “Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history” (Darwin 1859, 488). However, this 
does not correspond to the facts, as Darwin touched the topic in several parts of Origin (Bajema 1988, 404); 
Bajema explains how Darwin also played a role in the dissemination of this myth. 
111 On the reception of Darwin’s evolutionary ideas by general readers see Ellegård (1958, 293-331). Several 
works were published on the role of primates in the way that humans deal with the animal-human boundary 
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which certainly was not less shocking than de Maillet’s explicit interpretation of human 
genesis.  
This was not the only analogy between de Maillet and biblical figures, as we can see in 
following translated passage from Voltaire’s Dictionnaire philosophique (first published in 
1764), where he wrote:   
It is really strange that men, while denying a Creator, should have attributed to themselves the 
power of creating eels112. But it is yet more deplorable that natural philosophers, of better 
information, adopted the jesuit Needham’s ridiculous system, and joined it to that of Maillet, 
who asserted that the ocean had formed the Alps and the Pyrenees, and that men were 
originally porpoises, whose forked tails changed in the course of time into thighs and legs. 
Such fancies are worthy to be placed with the eels formed by meal. (Voltaire 1824, 340) 
In the case of Voltaire, the aggressive response was motivated by the perception of Telliamed 
as an attempt to mimic Christian doctrine, an interpretation which is endorsed by an even 
sharper criticism Voltaire expressed (hidden under the cover name of M. de Morza) in his 
books Cabales:  
This consul Maillet was one of those charlatans who wanted to imitate God, and create a 
world with words. It was he who, abusing the story of some changes that arrived in the world, 
claims that the seas had formed the mountains, and that fish have changed into men. So when 
this book was printed, one did not fail to dedicate it to Cyrano de Bergerac. (Voltaire 1772, 
36-37, my translation)113 
A similar statement can be found in his Singularités de la nature. In the chapter “De la 
formation des montagnes” he criticized de Maillet’s and Buffon’s views that mountains were 
formed by the effect of the seas over a long period of time. He wrote: 
What then is the true system? the one of the great Being who has made all, and who has given 
to each element, to each species, to each genus its form, its place, and its eternal functions. 
The Great Being who has formed the gold and iron, the trees, the plants, man, and the ant, has 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and on apes as “the missing link”(Barnard 1995; Barsanti 1990; Barsanti 1995; Blanckaert 1995; Cartmill 2001; 
Corbey 1995; Corbey 2005; Dougherty 1995; Haraway 1989; Janson 1952; Kjærgaard 2011; Kruk 1995; Morris & 
Morris 1966; Nash 1995; Reybrouck 2001; Wokler 1995). 
112 He refers to the English scientist and Catholic priest John Needham, who in middle of the 18th century tried 
to prove by experiments that microscopic creatures (“eels”) can emerge from decaying organic substances (see 
Fellows 1970, 31). 
113 Ce consul Maillet fut un de ces charlatans dont on a dit qu'ils voulaient imiter Dieu, et créer un monde avec la 
parole. C'est lui qui, abusant de l'histoire de quelques bouleversements avérés, arrivés dans ce globe, prétend 
que les mers avaient formé les montagnes, et que les poissons avaient été changés en hommes. Aussi quand on 
a imprimé son livre, on n'a pas manqué de le dédier à Cyrano de Bergerac.   
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made the ocean and the mountains. Men have not been fish, as Maillet says; all is probably 
what it is by immutable laws. I cannot repeat too often that we are not gods who can create a 
universe with a word.(Voltaire 1831, chapter XI, 241, translated by Francis C. Haber)  
Voltaire stressed the most bizarre-sounding aspects of de Maillet’s system, an invitation to 
consider the whole system as a product of wild fantasy – a strategy found in several early and 
modern succinct criticism of the biological ideas expressed in Telliamed.  
The French geologist and palaeontologist Adolphe d’Archiac suggested putting aside the 
“fantastic part of his book” (cette partie fantaisiste de son livre) (D'Archiac 1864, vol. 1, 
276). When taking into consideration the first four conversations, he believed that “Telliamed 
is better than its reputation” (D'Archiac 1864, vol. 1, 276, my translation). The positive114 
evaluation of de Maillet’s geological views and contrasting it with his biological ideas is also 
popular in modern publications (see below).  
It is understandable that several naturalists and theologians in the second half of the 18th 
century and the first half of the 19th century reacted with indignation when confronted with 
the different aspects of de Maillet’s evolutionary idea; likewise it is also reasonable that these 
early critics focused on aspects of de Maillet’s arguments, which they perceived as more 
vulnerable instead of considering the whole system. However, as I show below, a similar 
reaction can be found in commentaries of Telliamed published in the 20th and 21st century. 
In his work on scala nature, Thienemann described Telliamed as a highly original book. 
However, he mentioned it mainly to show that the belief on “fabulous merman and mermaids” 
(fabelhaften Meermänner und Meerweiber) were still most abundant in works of the 18th 
century (Thienemann 1909, 227).  
Similarly, the following statement by Osborn expressed both a positive and a negative 
evaluation of Telliamed:  
In these transformations De Maillet was not embarrassed by the fixity of characters or by the 
fact that no such metamorphoses had ever been witnessed. Yet, we find buried in all this 
fiction two suggestions of theory. De Maillet claims for the scientist the right to search into 
Nature direct for her secrets. He finds in the world proofs that the days of Genesis were great 
                                                          
114 Although the geological aspects of Telliamed were often well received by early and modern naturalists, 
some early authors criticized de Maillet’s views regarding the diminution of the sea. An interesting example is 
provided by the detailed examination by Nicolas Desmarest in his Encyclopédie méthodique: géographie 
physique; he disagrees with de Maillet’s idea that the position of the coasts changed over time (Desmarest 
1828, 319-327). 
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epochs of time, and he suggests in his metamorphoses, absurd as they are, the idea of the 
modification of organisms by environment and habit, and the transmission of these 
modifications to the descendants; in other words, he advocates the ‘transmission of acquired 
characters’” (Osborn 1924, 112-113) 
Arnold Lang published in the journal Kosmos a paper with crude, one-sided and often 
incorrect remarks on de Maillet’s ideas (Lang 1878). His criticism was revised promptly by 
Ernst Krause, editor of Kosmos, in a footnote at the end of Lang’s paper. Krause rectified 
Lang’s statements, indicating that Lang did not give de Maillet the recognition he deserved. 
He remembered that these were the first ideas on the evolution from simple to complex 
organisms ever expressed (Krause in Lang 1878, 261); see also Krause (1880, 107-109).  
In a footnote in his book on history of biology, Erik Nordenskiöld characterized Telliamed as 
a “natural philosophical work” (naturphilosophisches Werk) in which the evolutionary 
phenomena were described “in the highest fantastic way” (auf höchst phantastische Weise) 
(Nordenskiöld 1926, 332). Similarly to D’Archiac (see above), Karl von Zittel regarded 
Telliamed as a very original and important work on geology, but referred to the two last 
chapters (which contain de Maillet’s evolutionary arguments) as “unfounded fantasies” 
(grundlose Träumereien) (Zittel 1899, 44). Guyénot mentioned the evolutionary ideas by de 
Maillet and Buffon. He regarded the two works “of very unequal value” (de valeur très 
inégale), but recognized that they definitely disseminated ideas regarding the origin of fossils 
and sedimentary terrain (Guyénot 1941, 353); for him de Maillet’s transformism “belongs in 
the realm of fables” (du domaine de la fable) (Guyénot 1941, 388), and concluded: “After the 
two fantastic precursors [Robinet and de Maillet], the work of Maupertuis seems more serious 
and profound”115 (Guyénot 1941, 389, my translation). Gayon, a specialist on Charles 
Darwin, believes that it is useless to begin the account of evolutionary ideas before Darwin 
(Gayon 1999, 392), a similar sentiment as expressed by François Jacob (see below). King-
Hele, after explaining that “Between 1740 and 1790 there were many, most notable perhaps 
Diderot, De Maillet and Goethe, who believed that species are variable” concluded that “their 
beliefs, like those of the ancient Greeks, cannot be regarded as more than intelligent 
speculation” (King-Hele 1963, 66); as Erasmus Darwin’s biographer he concluded (perhaps 
not very surprisingly) that “The credit for first propounding a well-rounded theory of 
evolution, with examples in support, belongs instead to Erasmus Darwin” (King-Hele 1963, 
67). The designation of de Maillet’s biological views as “fantasies” is also often used in 
                                                          
115 Après ces deux précurseurs fantaisistes, l'oeuvre de Maupertuis n'en paraît que plus sérieuse et plus 
profonde. 
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passages of modern works (Ferenbach 1982, 398; Glass 1959b, 81). These and other similar 
statements will not be further discussed here, as the criteria used for them cannot be assessed 
from these succinct texts. 
Criteria for a classification of de Maillet’s views as lacking any evolutionary concept 
A criterion sporadically used in modern evaluations of de Maillet’s evolutionary ideas is 
supplied by the French biologist François Jacob (1920 – 2013). He regarded de Maillet as 
non-evolutionist, because he only had the transition from water to land life in mind, a concept 
lacking organismic changes or increasing complexity (Jacob 1972, 150), a view sporadically 
adopted or independently formulated by other authors (see, e.g., Lefèvre 1984, 28). In fact, 
the transition of organisms from an aquatic to a terrestrial environment is central in de 
Maillet’s system. The most quoted statement from Telliamed – the description of a flying-fish 
turning into a bird (see above, chapter B.3) – illustrates the importance de Maillet gave to this 
topic. The frequent quotation of this passage implies two criticisms: one, the lack of a solid 
concept of systematics in Telliamed; the other, the extent to which de Maillet believed that 
organisms are transformed through drastic (saltation) instead of gradual changes. Both 
criticisms are used as self-evident demonstration for the absence of a concept of evolutionary 
changes in Telliamed. As we will see later, the saltation argument stands in stark contradiction 
to the views expressed by several modern authors, who stress the concept of eternal 
recurrence implied in the Mailletian system. Another interesting aspect of the criticism is 
from a comparison with a similar evaluation proposed by Junker and Hossfeld (2001). They 
summarise de Maillet’s views, stressing that this work is important as it documents the extent 
to which some writers of the 18th century were liberated from the limited thinking of earlier 
centuries. Concerning the similarities between the Mailletian ideas and today's evolutionism, 
they write:   
Despite the similarity that this transformation has to today's notion of the origin of terrestrial 
organisms, one cannot speak of a true theory of evolution. The emphasis of this system lies 
clearly on the phase of origin, of spontaneous generation, and the subsequent changes in 
various landforms that correspond more to the metamorphosis116 of an individual. (Junker & 
Hossfeld 2001, 38, my translation) 
                                                          
116 With this expression, the authors pointed out an important aspect of de Maillet’s biological ideas – the 
similarity with the idea of ontogeny, an element which might be interpreted as de Maillet’s close interpretation 
of Anaximander’s ideas evoking transformation of species (see chapter B.2). 
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Although their criticism is based on a similar logic as used by Jacob and Lefèvre, Junker and 
Hossfeld added new aspects to the list of de Maillet’s biological views that are considered as 
incompatible with modern evolutionary thinking. However, it is doubtful if de Maillet’s most 
characteristics aspects117 can be used to coin his system as no “true theory of evolution”. First, 
although the transition of aquatic to terrestrial organisms was essential in his system, there are 
several parts in Telliamed describing the evolution of terrestrial creatures, notably the human 
races (see above). Second, de Maillet obviously defended the idea of an increasing complexity 
in the transformation of organisms, and although he was inspired by the metamorphosis of an 
individual (he seems to follow Anaximander in this point), his ideas on species change 
contain elements that are quite different from a mere transfer of an ontogenetic to a 
phylogenetic process. Third and more important, although a comparison between modern 
evolutionary views with those conceived in the past can be useful, the goal of such 
comparisons should not be a categorization of “true” or “not true” evolutionary hypotheses, as 
also carried out by Mayr when he coined de Maillet’s views as “not genuine” evolutionary 
(see below). This categorization is misleading both by the implied anachronism of the 
expression as well as by the arbitrariness of the criteria used.  
For instance, Lamarck’s biological views can be regarded as lacking a genuine concept of 
evolution, if it is assumed that a genuine evolutionary idea must include a formal concept of 
natural selection; the same applies to Darwin’s biological views, if it is assumed that genuine 
evolutionary views might (a) not overestimate the value of natural selection, (b) not 
underestimate factors like the complex interplay between structural laws and adaptation, (c) 
not underestimate the importance of punctuated evolution, and (d) not be formulated without 
scientific knowledge of genetics.118 The list can be prolonged to a large extent. Although de 
Maillet’s thesis used an eternal repetition of evolutionary events, the spectrum of evolutionary 
events which de Maillet described on earth is undoubtedly evolutionary. De Maillet’s views 
on evolutionary events might appear naive according to present knowledge. However, these 
ideas should be assessed from the perspective of the then state of knowledge. 
More relevant than dualistic categorization of early evolutionary ideas is the identification of 
the influence that these ideas had on other early scholars. We have seen the strong similarity 
                                                          
117 Although I agree with Junker/ Hossfeld’s identification of characteristic aspects of the Mailletian system, I 
include also the aspect of preformism and cosmogony (plurality of world) implied in de Maillet’s evolutionary 
views, as explained in chapter B.5. 
118 Such premises are often expressed by modern evolutionary biologists. Stephen Jay Gould, for instance,  
discussed  in several influential works (see Gould 2002, passim, and references therein) the gap between 
orthodox Darwinism and modern evolutionary theory, stressing the non-selectionist forces in evolution. 
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between the ideas of de Maillet and Goethe on animals adapting to a terrestrial life, and the 
influence that Telliamed had on Kant, Monboddo and Ballenstedt. Also Diderot’s atheist and 
evolutionary ideas were sporadically associated to de Maillet.119 A further association can be 
found between de Maillet’s interpretation of the development of the feathers expressed in his 
“flying-fish / bird” passage and Lamarck’s following statements on the development of 
feathers in birds:  
Now we come to a very strange peculiarity which is connected with the environment of these 
animals. They live more than other vertebrates in the air, and are almost continually rising into 
it and passing through it in every direction. They have adopted a habit of swelling their lungs 
with air in order to increase their volume and make themselves lighter; and this habit has 
caused the organ to adhere to the sides of the chest so that the air within, being rarefied by the 
heat of the place, has had to pierce through the lung with its investing membranes and to 
penetrate every part of the body even to the inside of the great bones which are hollow, and to 
the quills of the large feathers. (Lamarck 2006, 76, translated by Hugh Elliot) 
Several of Lamarck’s ideas on species changes can be regarded as an improvement of de 
Maillet’s views, especially concerning the changes made in the links between closely related 
organisms and the lack of mythological creatures in the evolutionary scenarios. Nonetheless, 
in several cases the influence is still evident, for example when Lamarck envisaged secondary 
organisms as ancestors of terrestrial species, following strictly the Mailletian schema (see 
below and Fig. B.2). In the passage above, Lamarck’s attempts to explain the evolution of 
feathers is remarkably similar to de Maillet’s scenario on flying-fish / bird. Although he 
avoided de Maillet’s saltatory schema, it is not difficult to recognize in Lamarck’s words the 
strong mechanical process implied in de Maillet’s speculations of scales turning into feathers.  
                                                          
119There are several hypotheses on the possible contemporary influences on Diderot’s concept of species 
changes. Some authors mention Maupertuis and Buffon (Guyénot 1941, 389-393, 394-401; Roger 1963, 484ff.) 
in this context. (Guyénot mentioned de Maillet’s and Robinet’s transformism as “précurseurs fantaisistes” 
(Guyénot 1941, 389).) Cru states that “the works that attracted Diderot’s attention to the question of the origin 
of animate and inanimate nature were those of his French contemporaries, De Maillet, Bonnet, Robinet, Buffon 
to some extent, but above all Maupertuis” (Cru 1913, 207). Winter (1972, 46) criticizes Cru’s statement, 
pointing to the fact that the works by Robinet and Bonnet were not formulated before 1761. For her Diderot 
was also not influenced by de Maillet since the evolutionary concept of both French naturalists diverged 
essentially. Vartanian (1949) points to the fact that Telliamed was published in 1748, short before Diderot 
published his Lettre sur les aveugles à l'usage de ceux qui voient  (Letter on the Blind)  in 1749; in this letter 
Diderot formulated for the first time clearly and unequivocally a materialist-atheist position (see Spittler-
Massolle 2001). The background on the contemporaries who potentially influenced Diderot’s atheist and 
evolutionary views is discussed by other authors (Crocker 1959 and references therein; Gregory 2007; Winter 
1972).  
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Views on scales that had been transformed into “more developed” structures120 were also 
expressed by Johann Christian Rodig, the author of two books with passages on evolution of 
organisms. Very interesting is Rodig’s widely ignored book Lebende Natur (Rodig 1801a) 
published in the same year as his Naturlehre121. Starting from the idea of the principle of 
continuity (scala naturae) (p. 2-3, 40), he expressed ideas on the evolution of intestines (p. 
56), the evolution of snakes (p. 66) and the evolution of mammals from aquatic organisms 
adapting to a terrestrial environment; he certainly had in mind an analogy between the scales 
of fishes / reptiles and the scales of mammals of the genus Manis: he regarded the single hairs 
found between the scales of these animals as illustrating the initial process in the evolution of 
hair (p. 68). As correctly stated by Zimmermann (1953, 254), several of Rodig’s evolutionary 
views may be referred to as “Lamarckism”. Amazing are his ideas on the evolution of aquatic 
mammals: he correctly saw them as originating from terrestrial mammals that returned to the 
water (p. 96). By recognizing the true nature of secondary aquatic mammals, he was more 
accurate than de Maillet and Lamarck. The idea of aquatic mammals as former terrestrial 
creatures became known only 58 years later through Darwin’s Origin of Species. 
To return to de Maillet’s and Lamarck’s ideas on feathers, Cuvier noted the similarity in their 
views when he made an allusion to de Maillet’s ideas on birds (in the first sentence) when 
commenting on Lamarck’s evolutionary ideas:   
Whoever dares seriously suggest that a fish, by staying on dry land, would be able to see its 
scale crack and change into feathers, and itself become a bird [an allusion to Telliamed, RB]; 
or that a quadruped by penetrating narrow passageways and wiggling along could change 
itself into a snake, does nothing other than prove the most profound ignorance of anatomy. 
(Cuvier 1835, vol. 1, 101, translated by R. W. Burckhardt) 
Darwin’s famous bear-whale statement expressed in Origin, which was modified in later 
editions, was noted immediately after the publication of Origin as naive and simplistic as de 
Maillet’s and Lamarck’s ideas on the evolution of feathers. Darwin wrote:  
In North America the black bear was seen by Hearne swimming for hours with widely open 
mouth, thus catching, like a whale, insects in the water. Even in so extreme a case as this, if 
the supply of insects were constant, and if better adapted competitors did not already exist in 
the country, I can see no difficulty in a race of bears being rendered, by natural selection, more 
                                                          
120 On de Maillet’s arguments on ‘scales’ on human skin as demonstrating the aquatic origin of humans see 
below and footnote 138. 
121 On Naturlehre see below; on Rodig being mentioned in connection with de Maillet and Lamarck, see 
footnote 97. This reference is interesting, as it was known by Charles Darwin. 
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and more aquatic in their structure and habits, with larger and larger mouths, till a creature 
was produced as monstrous as a whale. (Darwin 1859, 184) 
This statement appeared also in the first American printings of 1860, but was modified in later 
editions of his work, as for instance in the second edition, where he wrote:  
In North America the black bear was seen by Hearne swimming for hours with widely open 
mouth, thus catching, almost like a whale, insects in the water. As we sometimes see 
individuals of a species following habits widely different from those of their own species and 
of the other species of the same genus, we might expect, on my theory, that such individuals 
would occasionally have given rise to new species, having anomalous habits, and with their 
structure either slightly or considerably modified from that of their proper type. (Darwin 
1860b, 184) 
This sentence is also found (slightly modified) in the sixth edition (Darwin 1872, 141). 
The early associations between Lamarck’s and de Maillet’s evolutionary views were not 
necessarily proposed as an attempt to emphasize the role of de Maillet as a pioneer of 
evolutionary ideas, but more as a strategy to undermine Lamarck’s views. The same is true 
concerning the criticism published after the first publication of Origin, on mermaids and other 
mythological creatures122 and de Maillet’s passages on flying-fish / bird to undermine 
Darwin’s ideas. One example of such a strategy making an association between Darwin’s bear 
/ whale passage and de Maillet’s flying-fish /bird can be found in a review of the Origin 
published in the Edinburgh Review (Owen 1860).123   
                                                          
122 For an investigation on the role of mermaids and other mythological creatures in late 19th century criticism 
to Darwinism see Brink-Roby (2008). 
123 Owen wrote:  
If the ursine species had not been restricted to northern latitudes, we might have surmised this to 
have been one of the facts connected with 'the distribution of the inhabitants of South America,' 
which seemed to Mr. Darwin, when naturalist on board H. M. S. Beagle, 'to throw some light on the 
origin of species.' But the close resemblance of the style, and of the tone and frame of mind which 
could see no difficulty in the adequacy of the above-cited circumstances of 'external conditions, of 
habit, of volition,' to change a bear into a whale, to those exemplified in the Philosophie Zoologique, 
point strongly to the writings of Lamarck as the true suggestor of Mr. Darwin's views of animated 
nature. We look, however, in vain for any instance of hypothetical transmutation in Lamarck so gross 
as the one above cited; we must descend to older illustrators of the favourite idea, to find an 
equivalent case of the bear in pursuit of water-insects, and we find one in the following: [text of de 
Maillet on fish transforming into bird].  
Owen’s statement is available online in The Victorian Web 
(http://www.victorianweb.org/science/science_texts/owen_review_of_origin.html#sixteen, accessed on 26 
December 2013). On early statements on Darwin’s bear / whale statement see the investigation by Soren 
Lovtrup’s controversial book Darwinism: Refutation of a Myth (Lovtrup 1987) in which he repeated the unfair 
criticism formulated by Kohlbrugge (1915) (see above) and criticized the gradualism implied in neo-Darwinian 
hypotheses.   
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One influential work in the Telliamed discussion is Albert V. Carozzi’s excellent commented 
edition of Telliamed [De Maillet, 1968b]. The importance of this work is because the 
investigations carried out by Neubert (see chapter B.2 and B.3) did not lead to a German (or 
French) historical-critical edition of Telliamed, so that Carozzi’s is certainly the most 
consulted Telliamed edition since its publication. Consequently, his opinions on de Maillet’s 
biological views flowed (and still flow) regularly in the discussion on Telliamed, reinforcing 
the picture released before 1968.124  
In this work, Carozzi repeated the classical opinion of de Maillet’s evolutionary ideas as 
fantasies: 
This cosmological discussion is followed by a long and fanciful section about the marine 
origin of plants, animals, and mankind, their transformation into terrestrial equivalents, and 
the propagation of species by seeds. Although the last discussion contains more fantasy than 
scientific truth, it is of fundamental importance because it integrates the theory of the 
diminution of the sea into a broader framework, giving to the entire work the character of a 
cosmological system. (Carozzi in De Maillet 1968, 3) 
In another part of the work he added to a certain passage by de Maillet125 a footnote: “This 
statement that extinct species could reappear in the future under favourable circumstances 
demonstrates that de Maillet advocated only transformation and had no concept of evolution 
as such” (Carozzi in De Maillet 1968, 402-403).  
                                                          
124 As often stated in the present chapter, the positive evaluations by Kohlbrugge and Tschulok are based on in-
depth studies, but these works are usually not considered in the modern discussion on Telliamed. 
125 De Maillet wrote: 
These species which we know have been lost for our globe, like that of the giants who were seventy-
five-feet tall and vanished from earth, certainly survive in the sea. Or their seed still occur in the air 
surrounding it and therefore could reappear again any day (De Maillet 1968, 229).  
As we will see, Carozzi regards this passage as an indication that de Maillet did not have a true concept of 
evolution, an evaluation which I criticise for several reasons. In my opinion, de Maillet’s words in the quotation 
above indicate a much more relevant aspect of his system: that de Maillet was rigorously consistent with his 
views on evolution expressed in other parts of his work. It is not very productive to get involved in a pure 
semantic discussion on an essential difference between the words “evolution” and “transformism. I defend the 
view that de Maillet had definitively a concept of species change over time. He was right concerning the crucial 
aspect of his evolutionary concept (in the sense of negating immutability of species and denying life created by 
a God). However, almost all details of his system are from today’s point of view wrong, since they imply a high 
degree of preformationism, a concept which was only discarded in late 19th century (Jahn 1998). Instead of 
denying that de Maillet had a concept of evolution, as it is usually done in the literature, it would be more 
precise to state that he proposed a preformistic evolution, in which the idea of eternal recurrence and 
panspermia was presented within a discussion on plurality of worlds.  
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As specialist in history of geology, Carozzi focused more on the geological part of Telliamed, 
as stated by himself.126 It is therefore not surprising that Carozzi’s s opinion on de Maillet’s 
biological views strongly resembled the views expressed by earlier authors, as John C. Greene 
in his book The Death of Adam: Evolution and Its Impact on Western Thought. In a note 
Greene wrote succinctly:  
Despite the novelty of his views and his rejection of the Deluge as an explanation of terrestrial 
phenomena, Demaillet was more classical than modern in his view of nature. Eternal 
recurrence, not evolution, was his theme. Moreover, by casting his speculations in the form of 
a romance he lessened their appeal to men of science. Whether Buffon drew on him is 
doubtful, since Buffon’s theory of the earth, though not published until 1749, was composed 
several years earlier. (Greene 1961, 338) 
This statement resumes two common evaluations of de Maillet’s biological views. As we will 
see, his evolutionary ideas are exposed on the one hand as not modern; on the other hand the 
influence of his biological ideas on other authors is considered as irrelevant,127 in view of the 
dialogue form of his system or in view of what are considered the fantastic aspects of his 
work.  
The definition of criteria to evaluate early ideas is often associated with conceptual problems 
that are hard to solve without using tautological arguments. In fact, historical events are often 
very complex in nature, making it difficult to argue objectively about how “scientific” an idea 
might be using modern perspectives. An example of this difficulty is criticism by Carozzi, 
Greene (and Mayr, see below) directed against de Maillet’s ideas of organisms migrating in 
space (eternal recurrence), which de Maillet thought was possible because the organisms 
passed from one planet to another in the form of “seeds” in the universe. How useful it can be 
to evaluate de Maillet’s concept of germ-development having in mind modern notions of plant 
and animal gametes? To understand de Maillet on this topic, we have to understand 
                                                          
126 Carozzi was confronted with an enormous work in his efforts to integrate for the first time the multiple 
facets of de Maillet’s contribution into a theory of the earth. For this purpose, he commented on Telliamed 
“with particular reference to its geological significance”  (Carozzi in De Maillet 1968, 5).  
127 Interestingly, Greene’s criticism concerning eternal recurrence is diametrically opposed to the criticisms 
formulated by other authors who stress the aquatic / terrestrial transitions as a high degree of saltation for 
some of these events. The fact that both critiques are regularly represented in the literature without reference 
to this contradiction is insightful, since it shows how little these judgments are based on a careful analysis of 
the whole Mailletian system. Furthermore, some authors defend a modified form of Greene’s views by denying 
evolutionary views in Telliamed but recognizing de Maillet as a precursor of later evolutionists. This position is 
for instance defended by Garcia Cruz when he concludes that “although de Maillet does not speak in 
evolutionary terms (términos evolutivos), we can consider him a precursor of biological transformism”. He saw 
de Maillet’s influence as “evident, albeit implicitly, in Lamarck” (García Cruz 1997, 9, my translation), a view 
also defended by Tschulok (see below) and which I likewise consider as probable. 
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particularly the germ concept expressed in the book De rerum natura written by the Roman 
poet Titus Lucretius Carus (ca. 99-55 BC). Lucretius’ book is the most extensive defence of 
the Epicurean philosophy and the most detailed exposition of ancient atomic cosmology and 
cosmogeny, which originated with Democritus and Leucippus (Lukrez 1981). From this work 
de Maillet borrowed the ancient atomistic concept of a dynamic universe with several 
worlds.128 For Lucretius129 and de Maillet, the term “germ” included organismic and non-
organismic elements and was intrinsically related to the idea of atoms – again a term which 
cannot be viewed from a perspective of modern concepts. The strong similarity with the 
ancient Greek atomism allows interpreting Telliamed as a work conceived in the materialistic 
tradition of the Epicurean philosophy. De Maillet merged the atomism with Descartes’ ideas 
on the evolution of cosmos, using geological arguments to corroborate his ultraneptunian130 
theory of the development of the Earth. Although De Maillet’s ideas on organismic evolution 
are unique in this time by the extent of his arguments, he could borrow the notions of 
organismic plasticity already expressed by Epicurus and Lucretius (Bender 1999b, 9-12). 
Carozzi’s statement of de Maillet as defending “transformation instead of evolution” is 
common place in the literature. And although the term is rarely defined clearly,131 it is often 
used to separate some evolutionists - often Darwin (or Darwin and Lamarck) – from 
precursors of this idea.  
It is well known that prior to the widespread dissemination of the evolutionary idea after the 
publication of Origin, the term “evolution” was often used in connection with embryological 
development (Bowler 1989, passim). Darwin did not use the word „evolution“ in the first 
edition of Origin until the last line which reads:  
                                                          
128 For an overview of Lucretius’ role in the plurality of worlds-discussion see Bender (1999b, 8-14) and 
references in next footnote. See also Zeller on “Greek precursors of Darwin” (the translated title) (Zeller 1879). 
129 (Lukrez 1981, book II, 951-1022, book V, 722-824); see also Bender (1999b, 9-12). Zimmermann (1953, 
315) indicates that Telliamed adopted the view of the ubiquity of very small seeds already advocated by the 
Stoics. 
130 De Maillet mentioned several times an Arabic author named Omar-al-Khayyam who was apparently also 
treating at great length the idea of the diminution of the sea around A.D. 1100. Carozzi wrote on a possible 
influence on de Maillet’s views: “On the basis of the Maillet’s own candid description, Omar-al-Khayyam’s 
theory of the diminution of the sea was almost identical to his. Such statement raises the question if de Maillet 
did not get his original ideas from the books on natural history (now lost) written by this famous Arabic 
philosopher which he might have read in Cairo or during any of his numerous travels in the Middle East” 
(Carozzi in De Maillet 1968, 13). For an investigation on the diminution of the sea by 18th century  naturalists 
(including Swedenborg and de Maillet) see Rappaport (1997, 226-234) 
131 To be more precise, the term “transformism” in biology can be used in at least three ways. It is used as (a) a 
synonymous of “evolution”, for instance in dictionaries (Buarque de Hollanda Ferreira & Baptista da Luz 1987); 
(b) designates evolutionary ideas expressed prior to the time when the term “evolution” began to be used in 
connection with the concept of species changing over time; and final, (c) to separate certain evolutionists from 
their precursors; (b) and (c) are explained below. 
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There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed 
into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the 
fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most 
wonderful have been, and are being, evolved. (Darwin 1859, 490)132  
From the first until the fifth edition of Origin, Darwin referred to evolution with different 
expressions, as “transmutation of species”, “course of descent”, “descent with modification”, 
“ongoing changes”. The word “evolution” in the sense of “transmutation of species” was 
popularized by Herbert Spencer,133 and his influence reached also Darwin, who used the 
terms “evolution” and “evolutionists” in the sixth edition of Origin (Darwin 1872, 189, 201, 
202, 215, 282).  
Although the shift in meaning of the word “evolution” seems to be a reasonable justification 
for using the term “transformism” to designate evolutionary ideas expressed in pre-Darwinian 
natural sciences, there is a more subtle reason for the use of this word: as a convenient 
expression for the categorization of pre-Darwinian evolutionary views as “not modern”, or 
“less scientific”. To be sure, I share the opinion of most historians that Darwin’s evolutionary 
ideas represent a landmark in science, and I am convinced that there are several strong 
arguments which might justify the originality of Darwin’s work.134 However, there are several 
problems in attempts to draw a clear line between Darwin and naturalists expressing 
evolutionary ideas before 1859 when these attempts do not consider adequately historical 
facts. For instance, when strictly employing the term “evolution” to designate the nature of 
transformist views, Darwin might be considered as not a “true” evolutionist, during the first to 
fifth editions of Origin, but merely as a “transformist”, an evaluation which might change 
only with the sixth edition, where he began to use the terms “evolution” and “evolutionists”  
(Darwin 1872, 189, 201, 202, 215, 282). The obvious nonsense implied in this statement 
shows how difficult it is to use a specific terminology to designate an idea, which often 
implies a great degree of oversimplification, instead of considering the development of ideas, 
                                                          
132 In the second edition, the phrase “by the Creator” was added to read:  “having been originally breathed by 
the Creator into a few forms or into one” (Darwin 1860b, 490). 
133 Although Spencer’s essay  The Development Hypothesis first published anonymously in 1852 (Spencer 1891, 
vol. 1, 1-7) is usually quoted to demonstrate that he used the term “evolution” as equivalent to transmutation 
of species before 1859, Bowler pointed out that the expression “Theory of Evolution” only appeared in the 
later versions of the essay - the original 1852 essay refers to the "the theory of Lamarck and his followers" 
(Bowler 1975b); on Spencer as evolutionist see Bowler (1975b; 1995). 
134 Elsewhere (see Fig. B.2) I will propose that one of the main features of Darwin’s evolutionary ideas when 
compared with his precursors was the fact that Darwin recognized that secondary aquatic organisms did not 
immediately descend from aquatic ancestors, an insight that  has proven to be extremely favourable for his 
system; the only exception I could find are the views expressed by Johann Christian Rodig in his book Lebende 
Natur (Rodig 1801a, 96). 
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which is basically a highly complex task demanding more careful statements on what might 
be considered as “scientific” and what not.  
The alleged discrepancy between de Maillet’s geological and evolutionary views 
There is an important aspect of Carozzi’s judgment implied in his designation of de Maillet’s 
evolutionary views as a “long and fanciful section” which “contains more fantasy than 
scientific truth” (see full quotation above). Carozzi did not justify these statements, and his 
negative evaluation contrasts drastically with his views on the geological aspects of 
Telliamed.  
Similarly, after acknowledging de Maillet’s contribution to geology in his book The Growth 
of Biological Thought, Ernst Mayr added following sentence: “Since there is always merely a 
transformation of a previously existing organism into a new form, a concept of genuine 
evolution did not exist for de Maillet” (Mayr 1982, 312). More than 100 years before, in an 
article entitled Evolution published in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Thomas Huxley used 
almost the same words as Mayr to describe de Maillet’s views of species changing over time, 
reaching, however, a completely divergent conclusion about the Mailletian system: “For De 
Maillet not only has a definite conception of the plasticity of living things, and of the 
production of existing species by the modification of their predecessors” (Huxley 1878, 748, 
italics added) (see full quotation below). 
The discrepancy between Carozzi / Mayr's and Huxley’s evaluations can be explained by the 
fact that the former stressed the aspects of de Maillet’s system which are wrong from a 
modern point of view, while Huxley judged the same system having in mind the revolutionary 
insights de Maillet introduced in the natural sciences of his time.  
I regard the often expressed dualism “de Maillet’s geology and cosmogony = rational / de 
Maillet’s biological views = irrational” as highly questionable, to put it mildly. From an 
objective point of view, the geological / cosmogony chapters are not more or less scientific 
(or more or less fantastic) than the biological views of the last parts of the work. As a 
historian of geology, Carozzi was aware that planets do not evolve within a Cartesian system 
of vortices (as proposed by de Maillet), that celestial bodies are not involved in an endless 
process of alternations between luminous and dark phases, that the globe was not entirely 
covered by sea water and therefore there was no gradual and global diminution of the sea, that 
consequently all of de Maillet’s arguments elaborated specifically on this process were 
equally wrong. Furthermore, Carozzi knew that de Maillet’s estimation of the long duration of 
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geological time was strongly inspired by de Maillet’s wrong specific views of celestial bodies 
been constantly recycled in an eternal universe.  
Why are de Maillet’s geological views not regarded– to use the same expressions as in 
connection to de Maillet’s evolutionary views – as fanciful or the product of the imagination 
of a folly author? The reason lies in several new aspects that de Maillet brought into natural 
science, such as his emphasis on gradualism, his insistence in considering a long geological 
time scale, his use of inductive methods, his emphasis on the planet itself and its inhabitants 
when discussing geological issues, to mention a few. The fact that de Maillet’s evolutionary 
views are often regarded as inferior to his geological system is not based on an objective 
evaluation of the facts, but is influenced by an anthropocentric perception of his ideas. This 
subject cannot be discussed in detail here, so we will confine the analysis to a single example 
related to arguments expressed by de Maillet and Buffon, concerning what both erroneously 
believed to be a theoretical possibility that mammals might be able to return to an aquatic life 
and “breathe” in a way analogous to a foetus in the uterus.  
It is important to note the possibility that Buffon knew Telliamed and was strongly influenced 
by this work. This influence was assumed, for example, by the contemporary Lamoignon de 
Malesherbes (1721-1795). He pointed out that Telliamed was such a famous manuscript in 
this time that no educated man could have ignored its existence and no one working on the 
theory of the Earth could not have consulted it (Malesherbes 1798, vol. 1, 242-243); 135 see 
also the passage in which he refers to the fact that Telliamed circulated as a manuscript for 20 
years among all educated people of this time (Malesherbes 1798, vol. 1, 222). Malesherbes 
specifically pointed out to similarities of Buffon’s geological ideas to the views expressed in 
Telliamed: “What therefore belongs to M. de Buffon in this theory of the earth?” 
(Malesherbes 1798, vol. 1, 240). 136 
Buffon started from the idea that the foramen ovale in the foetal heart is not closed 
immediately after birth and consequently a part of the blood may continue to pass through that 
aperture. (He was not wrong in this point. The foramen ovale closes usually within a few days 
or weeks after birth. In several cases, however, this process did not occur.137) He thought that 
                                                          
135 Telliamed [...] c’étoit un manuscrit si fameux qu’il n’étoit pas permis à un homme de lettres d’en ignorer 
l’existence, ni à un homme qui travaille à la théorie de la terre de ne l’avoir pas consulté. 
136 Qu’est-ce donc qui appartient à M. de Buffon dans cette théorie de la terre? 
137 It is estimated that 20-35-% of individuals live with a patent foramen ovale (PFO) (Wilmshurst & de Belder 
1994), a remnant of the foetal foramen ovale in the atrial septum through which some blood flows between 
the left and the right atria. The PFO is clinically associated with different problems, among others with 
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(due to this possible persisting opening of the foramen ovale) a new-born child might sustain 
a privation of air for a considerable time without losing its existence. Based on this working 
hypothesis, he carried out experiments in 1739 with new-born puppies, which he described as 
follows (quoted from a translated edition of his Histoire naturelle):   
I put a pregnant bitch, of the large greyhound species, just as she was about to litter, into a tub 
filled with warm water, where after fastening her in such a manner that the lower parts were 
covered with some water, she brought forth three puppies, which were accordingly received 
into a liquid as warm as they had left. After washing them in this water, I removed the 
puppies, without giving them time to breathe, into a smaller tub filled with warm milk; I chose 
milk in order that they might receive nourishment if they required it. In this milk they were 
kept immersed above half an hour; and when taken out they were all found alive. They began 
to breathe, and to discharge some moisture by the mouth. Having allowed them to respire for 
half an hour, I again put them into warm milk, and left them a second half-hour; at the 
expiration of which two of them were taken out vigorous and seemingly no wise incommoded, 
but the third appeared rather in a languishing state; this I caused to be carried to the mother, 
which by this time had produced, in the natural way, six other puppies; and though it had been 
brought forth in water and had lived in milk one half hour before, and another after it had 
breathed, it yet received so little injury from the experiment, that it presently recovered and 
was as strong and lively as the rest of the litter. After allowing the other two about an hour to 
breathe, I put them once more into the warm milk, in which they remained another half hour. 
(Buffon 1797, 336-337) 
After this experiment Buffon was convinced that “it might be possible, with proper 
precautions, to keep the foramen ovale from being closed, and thus produce excellent divers, 
which might live equally in air or in water” (Buffon 1797, 338). 
De Maillet expressed similar ideas in Telliamed. In the sixth conversation of the printed book, 
he described the possibility “that one may pass form the respiration of water to that of air and 
vice versa”, as the marginal note to this passage reads (De Maillet 1968, 217). He was 
convinced that the passage from the respiration of water to that of air is natural, since it is 
demonstrated by several facts, and believed that the inverse change from the respiration of air 
to water, although much less frequent, is equally supported by evidence: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
paradoxical thromboembolism occurring during scuba diving  (Sykes & Clark 2013; Wilmshurst et al. 1994a; 
Wilmshurst et al. 1994b; Wilmshurst & de Belder 1994) 
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 I [de Maillet’s mouthpiece “Telliamed”] have read in relation from your country that a Dutch 
captain called Baker, commanding about seventy years ago a merchant ship named the 
Swallow and sailing along the coasts of Holland, saw a sea man jump out of the sea onto the 
ship, in the middle of a group of sailors to whom the captain was talking. Their astonishment 
was still increased when they heard him speak Dutch, and in that language ask for a pipe of 
tobacco which was readily granted to him. (De Maillet 1968, 217-218) 
In de Maillet’s views, this sea man did not evolve primarily in water, as most aquatic 
organisms described in his system, but was a secondary aquatic organism, descending from a 
human living as a terrestrial creature: 
He was covered with scales138, his hands were like the fins of a fish, and he looked about 
thirty years old. They asked him who he was. He replied that he was a Dutchman, and that, 
having embarked when eight years old on a ship which had been lost with all its crew, he hand 
since lived in the sea without knowing how such a thing could have taken place. But 
perceiving that the captain made a sign to the sailors to get hold of him, he threw away the 
pipe, and by a spring similar to the first one which had brought him aboard, he jumped back in 
the sea and was never seen again. (De Maillet 1968, 218) 
De Maillet explained that this story, although strange, will seem incredible only to those not 
familiar with the anatomy of the human body, and who have not taken into account the 
anatomical and physiological changes taking place when humans are still inside of the womb, 
where they live “without respiration” (see below) (De Maillet 1968, 218). He continued with 
a remarkable description of this process: 
The latter [the respiration], which only serves to renew the blood and to carry it through the 
arteries to all the parts of the body for the preservation of life, is provided by two apertures, 
which correspond to the four large vessels through which the blood, upon leaving the heart, 
passes from one vessel to another without entering the lungs. Of those two openings, one is of 
                                                          
138 Close to this passage, de Maillet made another reference to scales, which he used as part of his arguments 
towards the origin of man from aquatic creatures:  
There is even in all men an indelible mark that they originate from the sea. Indeed if you examine their 
skin with one of these microscopes, recently invented, which magnify a grain of sand to the size of an 
ostrich’s egg, you will find it all covered with small scales like that of a carp. Besides, we have several 
examples of men covered with scales, visible without a microscope, which furthermore confirms such 
an origin. If, therefore, the men who now inhabit the earth descended from other men who lived 
originally in the sea, is it not probable, as is demonstrated by the previous observations, that some of 
them, particularly during their youth, might recover the habit of living in the sea as their ancestors 
did? (De Maillet 1968, 219-220) 
When de Maillet mentioned “men covered with scales, visible without a microscope” he is possibly referring to 
a medical condition: people with the skin disorder called “ichthyosis” (Greek ichthyis = fish) have a skin which 
somehow resembles the scaled skin of a fish. 
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oval shape and called hole of Botal [= foramen Botalli = foramen ovale], from the name of the 
surgeon who first discovered it a few years ago. The other is called the arterial duct, because 
of its arterial structure. It arises from the vena cava, passes into the right ventricle of the heart, 
above the right auricle, and terminates in the pulmonary vein. Its construction is such, that by 
means of valves, it allows the blood to circulate from the vena cava into the pulmonary vein, 
but no inversely; therefore, in the foetus, the blood neither passes through the lungs nor enters 
into the left ventricle of the heart. (De Maillet 1968, 218) 
He explained that these two canals dried up and obstructed both when the infant is born and 
begin to breathe, opening “another and easier path to the blood, in which it circulates 
thereafter for the whole life” (De Maillet 1968, 219). Since in adults no traces generally 
remain of these two apertures, which provide for the respiration of the foetus, adults usually 
are not able to breathe under water. He believed that sometimes these apertures are not 
completely closed up. That would explain the performance of some famous divers and 
criminals who did not suffocate by hanging (De Maillet 1968, 219). He rejected the opinion 
that the latter did not suffocate due to the hardness of the larynx of these individuals, 
preferring the hypothesis of these men breathing in an analogous manner as unborn humans 
when living in the womb:  
It is by means of this structural arrangement that sea men and sea calves live in the sea without 
respiration. There is no doubt, therefore, that the young Dutchman, who lived in the sea 
without being suffocated, had these two holes still open when shipwrecked at the age of eight, 
and that he had resumed the habit of living without respiration, as he did in his mothers’ 
womb. (De Maillet 1968, 219) 
In his attempts to prove the origin of humans from water, de Maillet expressed what I believe 
to be the first139 evolutionary medicine-argument:  
This opinion has not only been adopted by the most famous philosophers of the past centuries, 
but also leads to several very conclusive statements which demonstrate that men owe their 
origin to the sea. How many diseases do your physicians cure only by the use of water, either 
ice cold or warm? Has it not been recognized that it is the most rapid and efficient remedy to 
extinguish, in a patient’s veins, the heat of a fever which consumes him? Has it not been found 
that, of two runners, if the loser bathes himself and runs again, he will beat his opponent? This 
is also demonstrated among the Jews by the pool in which lepers were thrown to be cured [.] 
(De Maillet 1968, 220) 
                                                          
139 Erasmus Darwin is usually mentioned in discussions on early precursors of evolutionary medicine (see 
Antolin 2011,  and references therein).  
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As we see, Buffon and de Maillet shared similar ideas concerning the possibility of mammals 
adapting to an amphibious life through anatomical changes of the cardiovascular system. In 
the school of morphology established by the French Academy of Sciences in 1666, 
investigations of comparative anatomy were carried out in connection with the aquatic 
mammal’s ability to stay long periods under water, as explained by Cole: 
They are aware that the seal is not a fish, and is incapable of aquatic respiration, and they are 
led to assume that it must have an intranarial epiglottis to enable it to feed under water. They 
also understand that in the mammalian foetus blood is diverted from the right side of the heart 
to the left through the foramen ovale in order to avoid the lungs [this was known to Galen, and 
is discussed by Servetus and Harvey], and they draw from this the fatal conclusion that the 
foetus does not respire. They profess to have found, and, indeed may actually have found, a 
persisting foramen ovale in the heart of the seal, and they believe that when the animals dives, 
and remains some time below water, the circulation follows the same course as in the intra-
uterine embryo. The fact that the seal is below water only for a relatively short time, whilst the 
circulation of the foetus remains the same throughout foetal life, should have warned them of 
the risk of assuming an interruption in the normal circulation every time the breathing organs 
are cut off from the atmosphere.(Cole 1944, 420-421) 
The only difference between de Maillet and Buffon is related to the species they considered as 
being able to develop cardiovascular structures, enabling them to stay longer underwater: 
dogs in Buffon, different mammals – including humans – in de Maillet.  
The existence of aquatic counterparts in humans is, from a modern point of view, of course 
completely inconceivable. However, similar ideas were sporadically expressed by scholars in 
the 17th and 18th century, not long before de Maillet formulated his ideas. For example, in 
1654 the Dutch anatomist Thomas Bartholin published the illustration of a skeletal forelimb 
and a rib from a creature found on the coast of Brazil. He interpreted this organism – probably 
a manatee (Senter & Snow 2013) – as a specimen of Homo marinus. The Dutch naturalist 
François Valentijn (1666-1727) published in his book Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indiën (Valentyn 
1724-1726)140 a large collection of observations to support his belief in the reality of 
                                                          
140 For an analysis of Valentijn’s Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indiën see LaBarge (2011) and references therein. 
Athanasius Kircher believed on the existence of mermaids. In his book on Noah’s ark (Kircher 1642) he wrote 
that anyone who doubts the existence of the creatures needs only to see the skeleton from his museum (see 
Allen 1949, 186). 
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mermaids; this work was influential in later speculations on mermaids. Similarly, Monboddo 
described the amphibious nature of a girl141 in his Antient Metaphysics (Monboddo 1782, 79).  
When early and modern authors interpret de Maillet’s beliefs on hommes marins as a sign of 
great ingenuity, they often do not take into consideration that de Maillet proposed his 
evolutionary views at the beginning of the 18th century. It seems that biologists and historians 
tend to compare de Maillet’s ideas with works published middle 18th century, perhaps because 
Telliamed was first published in 1748, after his death, while his system was conceived around 
1715. De Maillet grew up in a time in which the classical works were still influential. The 
light of the cultural movement emphasizing reason and scientific method did not shine with 
the same intensity on the different areas of the natural sciences. De Maillet developed his 
system without help from other works where he could have borrowed the specific terminology 
needed to describe evolutionary processes. Solid concepts on systematics were also absent in 
this period, and among the few evolutionary ideas available at this time were crude concepts 
of species changes expressed by authors of the classical period or by theologians in their 
attempts to explain the dilemma of so many organisms having a place in a rather small Noah’s 
Ark.142  
Although de Maillet based some of his thoughts on zoological and anatomical publications of 
the late 17th century,143 he also used the works of medieval European naturalists which were 
still influential in his time. In contrast, Charles Darwin and Alfred R. Wallace carried out 
                                                          
141 Monboddo described the “last step of this progression [from a quadruped and Ourang Outang to men] I 
likewise saw, and it was a great one” (Monboddo 1795, 33). He referred to Marie-Angélique, the wild girl, “or 
fille sauvage, as the French called her”. He interviewed her on 28 March 1765, which was reproduced in an 
appendix of Antient Metaphysics. This is the beginning of the interview:  
This day saw and conversed with Mademoiselle le Blanc (so they called her). — Says that she 
remembers the country she came from is a very cold country, covered with snow a great part of the 
year, and the nights very long. That the children there are accustomed to the water from the moment 
of their birth — that they learn to swim as soon as they can walk; and also to climb trees — and that a 
child of a year old there will climb up a tree. That they live in little huts above the water like Beavers; 
and that they subsist very much by fishing. That she was so much in the use of the water, that, when 
she came to France, she could not live without it; and, at first, was in use to plunge into it over head 
and ears, and to dwell in it like an Otter, or any other amphibious animal; and afterwards, when she 
was restrained from that, she always washed her head and hands. That, though she supposes she was 
a child only about seven or eight years of age when she was carried away, yet, by that time, she had 
learned to swim, to fish, to shoot with the bow and arrow, to climb and to leap from one tree to 
another like a squirrel. (Monboddo 1795, 403) 
It seems that Monboddo exaggerated the physical strength and aquatic abilities of a rather normal girl who 
enjoyed swimming and diving.   
142 As for instance, Athanasius Kircher (1642) in his book Arca Noë (Allen 1949, 182-191; Bourdier 1960; Krause 
1880, 219). For a discussion on problems of all animals having place in the Ark from the point of view of young 
earth creationists see Whitcomb and Morris (1978, 63-88). 
143 See above on de Maillet’s ideas on anatomical and physiological aspects related to an amphibious life. 
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research at a time when biology was evolving to an unprecedented extent. Works published in 
the 19th century by naturalists like Alexander von Humboldt, Linné, Richard Owen, Karl von 
Baer, Cuvier and Thomas Huxley led to an unequivocal attenuation away from the influence 
of ancient naturalists. The terminology needed to describe the design of various species of 
animals were not only supplied by naturalists, but also by proponents of natural theology like 
William Paley’s book Natural Theology (Paley 1802), a work which strongly influenced 
Darwin (Darwin 1958, 59). Thomas Robert Malthus’ An Essay on the Principle of 
Population, first published in 1798, had an immense influence on Darwin’s and Wallace’s 
views on the role of natural selection (Darwin 1887, vol. 1, 83; Wallace 1905, vol. 1, 361-
363).144  
Although Telliamed reflects the influence of ideas expressed prior to the Enlightenment, it is 
from an objective point of view unjustifiable to stress this aspect of his work negatively when 
considering what de Maillet actually achieved: the first extensive system of species change 
ever proposed by a naturalist. There is another interpretation of de Maillet’s use of 
mythological creatures. As de Maillet regarded all terrestrial organisms as having counterparts 
in water, it would be inconsequential to exclude humans from this system. By taking the risk 
to include hommes marins in Telliamed, he avoided the strong anthropocentrism bias - 
humans as the only organisms not evolving from aquatic counterparts. By doing so, however, 
he was perceived by most naturalists more as a highly speculative layman than as a serious 
naturalist. As a result, scholars who recognized both the value of the Mailletian system, as 
well as its problematic aspects, were inclined to adopt large parts of his views and reinterpret 
the system without referring to him. An example is supplied by Lamarck, who deviated from 
the Mailletian system by envisaging primeval man evolving from an ape coming out of the 
forests and entering into an open environment (see below and Appendix D). However, in his 
views on the evolutionary path of several other living organisms, Lamarck is much closer to 
the ideas propagated by de Maillet than to Darwin’s evolutionary hypotheses when he 
defended a version of de Maillet’s thesis of counterparts (see Fig. B.2). 
                                                          
144 This work was basically conceived as to demonstrate the effect of natural selection in human populations. It 
is well known that Darwin and Wallace recognized the far-reaching meaning of Malthus’ arguments (Richards 
2008; Schweber 1977). Both naturalists adopted independently from each other Malthus’ concept of human 
populations being regularly checked (selected), merged it with the concept of evolutionary changes occurring 
over long periods of time and applied the resultant system to all organisms. 
65 
 
         
 (A)       (B) 
Figure B.2 Lamarck’s generals views on aquatic organisms changing to a terrestrial environment –
here depicted schematically in (A) – are an adaption of de Maillet’s views on aquatic beings as 
counterparts to terrestrial organisms. The most important difference to de Maillet’s concepts concerns 
Lamarck’s decision to depict humans as descending from an ape (B). Darwin was the first known145 
evolutionist who fully recognized that, for example, whales and crocodiles are secondary aquatic 
organisms. In his views on the evolutionary path of several other (non-human) living organisms, 
Lamarck is much closer to the ideas propagated by de Maillet than to Darwin’s evolutionary 
hypotheses. 
As it is often the case in historical investigations, we cannot decide here if Lamarck knew de 
Maillet or not, as he did not mention Telliamed in connection with his own ideas. It is of 
course difficult to assess which works were consulted by early naturalists – the case of 
Goethe, who demonstrably borrowed Telliamed (as shown above, chapter B.3) is exceptional. 
Taking into consideration the popularity of de Maillet’s ideas in France in his time, it would 
be certainly much more difficult to defend the thesis that Lamarck did not know de Maillet’s 
ideas, rather than the contrary. Sinai Tschulok, a specialist146 on Lamarck, states that some 
passages of Lamarck (he did not specify which ones) are almost word for word compilations 
of de Maillet’s work (Tschulok 1938, 336). A structural and thematic comparison of the two 
works is required. However, as Tschulok already noted, although Lamarck knew Buffon, 
                                                          
145 See chapter B.4.3 on Johann Christian Rodig’s views on aquatic mammals as descending from terrestrial 
ancestors. 
146 This authors is rather unknown by modern Lamarck’s scholars; however, he is highly praised for his 
investigations on Lamarck’s work by historians working in German speaking countries. 
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Bonnet and de Maillet, all these authors developed quite different evolutionary ideas. The 
most crucial differences between Lamarck and other French authors, so Tschulok, lie both in 
the corroboration of his system through physiological processes, which he describes through 
chemistry, and that Lamarck did not find it necessary to prove the reality of these processes, a 
fact that Tschulok believed was “the most characteristic aspect of Lamarck’s system when 
compared to other authors” (Tschulok 1937, 88, my translation). Despite these differences, 
several early authors pointed to the similarities between de Maillet’s and Lamarck’s 
evolutionary ideas, or mentioned both authors in the same context; only a selection of 
examples can be given here.  
When commenting on de Maillet’s views on organismic evolution, Cuvier wrote: “He is the 
one who first envisaged the possibility of a transformation of marine species into terrestrial 
species”147 (Cuvier 1841, 79). He pointed out that this theory “has been reproduced in many 
ways by modern authors”148 (Cuvier 1841, 79), and that there are “on this subject four or five 
systems, which are nothing other than amendments of de Maillet's system” (Cuvier 1841, 
79).149 He mentioned Jean-Baptiste-René Robinet’s Considerations philosophiques de la 
gradation naturelle des formes de l'etre (Robinet 1768) (according to Cuvier “Le plus 
singulier de ces systèmes”150 (Cuvier 1841, 82)), Johann Christian Rodig’s Naturlehre (Rodig 
1801b)151 and Lamarck’s Hydrogéologie, Recherches sur les corps organisés and Philosophie 
zoologique (Cuvier 1841, 85ff). Similarly, Bertrand associated de Maillet’s ideas on human 
evolution with Lamarck’s ideas: “Although Maillet's opinion on the origin of the human race 
                                                          
147 C’est lui, qui le premier, a avancé la possibilité de la transformation des espèces marines en espèces 
terrestres. 
148 Cette théorie a été reproduite de beaucoup de façons par les auteurs modernes [.]  
149 Il y a sur cette matière quatre ou cinq systèmes qui ne sont guères que des modifications de celui de De 
Maillet.  
150 Cuvier judged correctly - Robinet’s ideas are quite singular. Basically, he interpreted the scala naturae in 
terms of a natural philosophical transformism characterised by a high anthropocentrism and a radical 
continuity principle. In his system the organisms are not transformed from one species to another. Rather he 
believed that the more progressive forms only could be created after the less progressive forms emerged. In 
this concept, all organisms are failed attempts to be transformed in the most perfect creature – humans. His 
natural philosophical world view allowed him to believe that “living stones” can be transformed into fossils; 
this account for the fact, so Robinet, that we can find stones in the form of heart, kidney and skull, things that 
he interpreted as natural attempts towards the formation of humans (Robinet 1768, passim). See Rappaport 
(1997, 105-135) and references therein for views on fossils in late 17th and first half of 18th century. 
151 The interesting parts of his Naturlehre (Rodig 1801b) are the two last chapters entitled Analogien (pp. 172-
176) and Allgemeine Naturgeschichte der Erde (general natural history of the earth ) (pp. 1762-186), especially 
on p. 185, where he specifically mentioned organismic evolution taking place on a large time scale. As implied 
in the title of the last chapter, Rodig makes frequent references to ideas expressed by Immanuel Kant. It is 
interesting to see that Rodig’s views on transformism are – similar to de Maillet and Chambers – inspired by 
the discussion on the evolution of the universe; on Rodig’s evolutionary views expressed in another of his 
books see above; on an author mentioning Rodig, Lamarck and de Maillet in the same context already in 1838 
see above. 
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is similar to the one of a contemporary famous naturalist [footnote: M. de Lamarck], I hardly 
dare to mention any such opinion, since I have a feeling it was ridiculous and shocking” 
(Bertrand 1833, 14, my translation).152 Charles Lyell mentioned Telliamed as a precursor of 
evolutionary ideas in his Principles of Geology, although he mistakenly mentioned Jean-
Claude Delamétherie (1743-1817) as the authors of this work: 
These speculative views [on the progressive evolution of organisms defended by Lamarck] 
had already been, in a great degree, anticipated by Delamétherie [sic] in his Teliamed [sic], 
and by several modern writers, so that the tables were completely turned on the philosophers 
of antiquity, with whom it was a received maxim, that created things were always most perfect 
when they came first from the hands of their Maker, and that there was a tendency to 
progressive deterioration in sublunary things when left to themselves. (Lyell 1832, vol. 2, 11) 
These mistakes were corrected in further editions of the work (see, e.g., 5th ed., vol. 2, 373) 
and in his book The Antiquity of Man (Lyell 1863, 573), where he wrote: 
[H]e [Lamarck] also shows that he was deeply impressed with a belief prevalent amongst the 
older naturalists, that the primeval ocean invested the whole planet long after it became the 
habitation of living beings; and thus he was inclined to assert the priority of the types of 
marine animals to those of the terrestrial, so as to fancy, for example, that the testacea of the 
ocean existed first, until some of them, by gradual evolution, were improved into those 
inhabiting the land. These speculative views had already been, in a great degree, anticipated 
by Demaillet in his Telliamed, and by several modern writers [.](Lyell 1863, 573)  
I did not investigate possible sources of Lyell’s positive views on Telliamed. It is known that 
some early authors evaluated de Maillet more or less positively in geological treatises, as did 
Alexandre Bertrand in the introduction of his  Lettres sur les révolutions du globe (Bertrand 
1833, 10-15).153 In his book, The Origin of Species or, The Causes of the Phenomena of 
Organic Nature, Thomas Huxley referred briefly to Telliamed as follows: “So far, the facts of 
palaeontology are consistent with almost any form of the doctrine of progressive 
modification; they would not be absolutely inconsistent with the wild speculations of De 
Maillet, or with the less objectionable hypothesis of Lamarck” (Huxley 1863). In a later work, 
he expressed himself quite positively on de Maillet’s evolutionary views; as I gave above only 
a fragment of his statement, here is the full quotation:  
                                                          
152 Quoique l'opinion de Maillet sur l'origine de la race humaine ressemble à celle d'un célèbre 
naturaliste de nos jours, je n'ose presque la faire connaître, tant je sens qu'elle paraîtra ridicule et choquante ». 
153 See full quotation above, where Bertrand associated de Maillet’s hypotheses with Lamarck’s views. 
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Considering that this book was written before the time of Haller, or Bonnet, or Linnæus, or 
Hutton, it surely deserves more respectful consideration than it usually receives. For De 
Maillet not only has a definite conception of the plasticity of living things, and of the 
production of existing species by the modification of their predecessors; but he clearly 
apprehends the cardinal maxim of modern geological science, that the explanation of the 
structure of the globe is to be sought in the deductive application to geological phenomena of 
the principles established inductively by the study of the present course of nature. (Huxley 
1878, 748)   
Similarly, Armand de Quatrefages de Bréau also was very positive on de Maillet: 
I just mentioned a name that has the unpleasant privilege to almost always and everywhere 
elicit a mocking smile. When I count him to the precursors of the ideas that I will discuss, I'll 
do it not with the intention to discredit his ideas. I do it mainly because this name appears 
regularly in controversies on the topic discussed here, and I also do it because it always 
seemed to me that this author was treated unfairly. Without wishing to rehabilitate him beyond 
his merits, I think that it would be useful to show why he was so violently attacked, not only 
by its natural enemies, but also from those who should actually judge him favourably. 
(Quatrefages 1870, 19-20, my translation)154 
A reviewer of The Brisbane Courier defended Darwin’s claims on originality by attacking 
Quatrefages’ positive evaluation of the Mailletian system: 
In Charles Darwin et ses précurseurs Français we see perhaps a tendency to make too much 
of what had been effected by previous workers in the same field in France. No one can indeed 
be more candid or even generous than Mr. Darwin in acknowledging the steps by which he 
had himself been guided in his path of discovery. Still it will never do for England to part with 
the priority and originality which invest the ideas of natural selection, the struggle for life, and 
especially the great recent doctrine of pangenesis. We should ourselves incline to class even 
above these special gains to science what has been done to bring to an issue that which is of so 
much importance to philosophy in general – the definition of species itself. Upon this latter 
point we find naturalists of eminence in our own day almost as hopelessly groping for light as 
their predecessors of the scholastic period. First on M. de Quatrefages' list of predecessors of 
                                                          
154 Je viens d’écrire un nom qui a le privilége [sic] désagréable de provoquer à peu près toujours et partout un 
sourire dédaigneux ou railleur. Cependant si je l’inscris parmi ceux des précurseurs des idées que je vais 
discuter, ce n’est point avec l’intention de jeter d’avance sur elles le moindre discrédit. C’est surtout parce que 
ce nom revient ã chaque instant dans les controverses soulevées par l’ordre de conception qui nous occupe ; 
c’est aussi parce qu’il m’a toujours paru qu’on a été injuste envers cet auteur. Sans vouloir le réhabiliter au delã 
de ses mérites, je crois utile de montrer pourquoi il a été si vivement attaqué, non-seulement par ceux dont il 
était en quelque sorte l’adversaire naturel, mais encore par ceux qui semblaient devoir l’accueillir en allié. 
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Darwin is De Maillet. Telliamed, the name of the author written backwards, a work of 
immense ingenuity, but fanciful to a degree which caused it to pass for little more than 
pleasantry, and which brought upon it the crushing raillery of Voltaire, started the idea of 
transmutation of species by a kind of adaptation to the surrounding medium, in which was 
anticipated the landing principle of the system of Lamarck. (Anonymous 1870, 4) 
Interesting in this criticism is the association between de Maillet and Lamarck as an obvious 
attempt to undermine Lamarck’s views. 
Similar positive views on the scientific value of Telliamed to those expressed by Huxley and 
Lyell were also sporadically expressed by later historians. The Dutch physician, 
anthropologist, anatomist and historian Jakob Hermann Friedrich Kohlbrugge (1865-1941) 
and the Swiss (born in the Ukraine) biologist and historian Sinai Tschulok (1875-1945) were 
decisive opponents of one-sided evaluations of Telliamed. In their works (which are widely 
ignored by modern historians of science), they argued convincingly that Telliamed deserves a 
place as a forerunner of Lamarckism and Darwinism (Kohlbrugge 1912; Tschulok 1938); at 
least part of Kohlbrugge’s motivation of stressing the positive aspects of Telliamed was 
certainly his antipathy towards Darwin and his attempts to undermine Darwin’s (justified) 
claims on originality (see above, footnote 56). Günthart (1928, 22) based his succinct 
statement on de Maillet’s evolutionary views on Tschulok and therefore evaluated Telliamed 
positively.  
Walter Zimmermann summarized de Maillet’s views in his book on the history of 
evolutionary ideas, quoting extensive passages of Telliamed translated in German 
(Zimmermann 1953, 310-316). Rather unusually, he did not judge negatively de Maillet’s use 
of mythological creatures in the corroboration of his evolutionary theory, but stressed 
unconditionally the positive aspects of de Maillet’s evolutionary concepts: “B. de Maillet [...] 
has set out for the first time a clear theory of evolution under the anagram Telliamed” 
(Zimmermann 1953, 311, my translation). Among modern historians, Claudine Cohen, a 
Telliamed expert, investigated the intellectual context in which this work was produced 
(1989b; 1993; 2011). She defends the idea that the geological, evolutionary and 
anthropological ideas expressed in Telliamed  were a progress in natural science in this time 
(Cohen 1989a); see also (Stott 2013), who emphasizes the positive aspects of de Maillet’s 
evolutionary ideas.    
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B.5 Conclusion 
A historically founded evaluation of de Maillet’s ideas is essential, because it opens new 
perspectives for analysing the emergence of evolutionary ideas. A scientist cannot always 
satisfy all the expectations of the scientific community in a particular period of time. 
Individualities – as for example childish naivety or the inclination of unconventional pattern 
recognition – often do lead to insightful ideas as well as to disappointing concepts. For 
example, Alfred R. Wallace’s reputation suffered from his interest in spiritualism and from 
certain aspects of his views on human evolution (Kottler 1974). Perhaps it is Wallace’s 
fondness for unusual ideas that could explain why he was influenced by Chambers (see 
McKinney 1972, 9, 11). This same Chambers was criticized frequently as the author of a 
flawed book on evolution by more conventional scientists – like Darwin, who confessed that 
Chamber’s book “simply irritated me by the prodigious ignorance and thoroughly unscientific 
habit of mind manifested by the writer” (Darwin 1887, vol. 2, 188).155 Chambers and Wallace 
were open to the idea of evolution, while most naturalists prior to 1859 rejected this 
concept.156  
In the present chapter I showed that several views implied in the negative evaluations of de 
Maillet’s evolutionary ideas are essentially attempts to create a clear but quite artificial 
delineation between scientific and non-scientific ideas. Instead of comparing Telliamed 
directly with the works on evolution published in the 19th century,157 from a historical point of 
view, it is more useful to compare de Maillet’s system with the evolutionary ideas expressed 
in the period in which Telliamed was conceived, i.e., circa 1690-1715.158 From this 
                                                          
155 However, it is interesting to see that the difference in character between Darwin and Wallace did not 
prevent both naturalists from recognizing the value of Malthus’ ideas for the formulation of their hypotheses 
on natural selection (see above, chapter B.4.3). 
156 For example, it is well known that Thomas Huxley resisted the evolutionary idea not only after reading 
Chambers’ Vestiges, but even after Darwin’s first attempts to convince him. Commenting on this topic (he 
referred specifically to the fact that he did not conceive the idea of natural selection), he wrote the famous 
words: "My reflection, when I first made myself master of the central idea of the ‘Origin’, was, “How extremely 
stupid not to have thought of that!”" (Huxley 1887, vol. 2, 197). Although Huxley played an important role in 
evolutionism, his picture does not hang in the gallery of first proponents of evolutionary ideas, but Chamber’s 
and Wallace’s do. Also interesting is the role Cuvier played in the debate on evolutionary thought in early 19th 
century, as Ernst Mayr aptly stated: “Given this background and experience, one might have expected him to 
become the first proponent of a thoroughly sound evolutionary theory. In actual fact, Cuvier throughout his life 
was wholly opposed to the idea of evolution (see above), and his arguments were so convincing to his 
contemporaries that even after his rather early death evolutionism was unable to assert itself in France for the 
next half century” (Mayr 1982, 364); see also Limoges (1970a).   
157 It should be remembered that the first Telliamed-manuscripts were written 145 years before the publication 
of Darwin’s Origin of Species and 95 years before Lamarck’s Philosophie zoologique 
158 The intellectual context in which Telliamed was produced was investigated by (Cohen 1989b; Cohen 1993; 
Cohen 2011). She repeatedly defended the idea that, despite its archaism, the evolutionary ideas expressed in 
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perspective, the French naturalist stands alone with his transformism, both concerning the 
elaboration of his system as well as his efforts to corroborate it by rational arguments. I argue 
that the implicit classification of Telliamed as non-scientific, pseudo-evolutionary prose 
should be abandoned, as it serves the sole purpose of obliterating crucial aspects of the origins 
of early 18th century evolutionary ideas. 
This discussion should not be perceived as an effort to “rehabilitate” de Maillet as an early 
evolutionist. Such rehabilitation is only secondary159, if compared with a much more 
important aspect of the discussion. I argue that the traditional negative opinion of the 
scientific character of Telliamed prevented an understanding of a fundamental aspect of the 
historical development of evolutionary thoughts in early 18th century: I submit that concepts 
of species changes and deep time had a crucial impulse from the plurality of worlds-debate. 
The term “plurality of worlds” or “cosmic pluralism” (or simply “pluralism”) is commonly 
used to describe ideas of the existence of life on other planets. Early thinkers usually regarded 
“other planets” as “Earth-like planets”, and “life” usually as intelligent, mostly “human-like”. 
The debate on the plurality of worlds, with roots in ancient Greece, has been investigated in 
several historical works and will not be summarized here.160 
De Maillet’s evolutionary ideas are important, because they reveal that 18th century 
transformism is on the one hand closely linked to the views evoking species transmutation 
and pluralism expressed by ancient philosophers (Anaximander and Lucretius among others), 
while on the other hand it is the consequence of the pluralism directly linked to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Telliamed – including de Maillet’s views on the evolution of man (Cohen 1989a)– represented a progress in 
natural science at this time.    
159 Please note that I usually do not refer to de Maillet as a “precursor” – this expression evokes ideas of 
anachronistic interpretation of historical facts. For some reason there is a tendency to refer to pre-Darwinian 
proponents of evolutionary ideas through the rather naive dichotomy “precursor of Darwin” / “not precursor of 
Darwin”, which goes hand in hand with evaluations on “genuine or non-genuine” evolutionary ideas. The 
problems with such discussions are that ideas expressed by different authors in different times are very difficult 
to compare. This applies even to similar ideas expressed by contemporary authors and sometimes even to 
ideas expressed by the same author in different contexts. One way to circumvent anachronistic interpretations 
is to focus on the degree of influence a certain idea had on contemporary thinkers; this approach is followed 
here.    
160 The doctrine of the plurality of worlds is topic of several investigations (Benz 1978; Carré 1974; Crowe 1986; 
Dick 1982; Dick 1998; Dijksterhuis 1956; Duhem 1914, chapter 20 in volume 9; Fellmann 1971; Guthke 1983; 
Heffernan 1978; Knight 1967; Koyré 1980a; Kuhn 1957; McColley 1936; McColley & Miller 1937; Oresme 1977; 
Paul 1986b; Rossi 1972). The impact of pluralism on religious traditions is also extensively researched (Benz 
1969; Benz 1977; Benz 1978; Brooke 1977; Coyne 2000; Dick 2000; Dick 2005; Kragh 2004; Kreiner 2011; Nibley 
1975; Paul 1986a; Paul 1992; Westfall 1958; Zabilka 1979); for the consequences of the condemnations of 1277 
on pluralism see Al-Biruni  (1991) and Strohmaier (1991); the connection between plurality of worlds and the 
emergence of evolutionary ideas is already suggested in an unpublished manuscript (Bender 1999b). 
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Copernican revolution161. The most common metaphor between the Copernican revolution 
and evolutionism is linked to a curious, immodest parallelism expressed by Sigmund Freud, 
who saw the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions along with his own contribution to 
psychoanalysis as decisive blows against “human megalomania” (menschliche Grössensucht) 
(Freud 1922, 323-324); the irony of Freud’s statement is speaks for itself. (Although, the 
comparison between Darwin and Copernicus harks back to earlier sources.)162 Sporadically, 
modern authors163 refer to the analogous impact of both events in science.  
However, the specific connection between the emergence of evolutionism and pluralism is 
usually not acknowledged in the literature, since historians specialised in the Copernican 
revolution and/or in the doctrine of plurality of worlds usually do not follow the implications 
of these events in the discussion of evolutionary thinking;164 one interesting exception is 
Michael J. Crowe’s excellent historical treatise on the extra-terrestrial life debate between 
1750 and 1900.165  
                                                          
161 The Copernican revolution was extensively investigated (Bialas 1994; Dick 1982; Dick 1998; Dijksterhuis 
1956; Koyré 1980b; Kuhn 1981; Neuser 1994; Pruett 2012; Scheidler 1994; Wolfschmidt 1994; Wolfschmidt 
1995). 
162 It is sporadically mentioned that Freud was perhaps inspired by Emil Du Bois-Reymond concerning the 
comparison with Copernicus, who published in his book entitled Reden a reprint of a speech delivered on 25 
January 1883 in the Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften (Du Bois-Reymond 1912). In this talk (a Darwin’s 
obituary), he called Darwin “the Copernicus of the organic world” (der Kopernicus der organischen Welt). Ernst 
Haeckel (1908, 39) indirectly accused Du Bois-Reymond of plagiarism, since Du Bois-Reymond used exactly the 
same words expressed by Haeckel fifteen years before in one of his own talks. 
163 For an example of a link between Copernican revolution and evolutionism see Theodosius Dobzhansky’s 
famous essay Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution, where the geocentrism of Shaikh 
Abdul Aziz bin Baz is used in the introduction; the paper is conceived as a criticism to creationism (Dobzhansky 
1973). Another example is supplied by Francisco J. Ayala (2007) who refers to Darwin as the author who 
“completed the Copernican Revolution by drawing out for biology the notion of nature as a lawful system of 
matter in motion that human reason can explain without recourse to supernatural agencies” (Ayala 2007, 
8567). Ayala is referring to the conflict raised between Paley’s natural theology and Darwin’s evolutionism. He 
compared the Copernican/Darwinian revolution in order to stress the importance of Darwin’s ideas to solve the 
conflicts raised between natural theology and evolutionism. My own argument – that emergence of 
evolutionary thought is intrinsically related to ancient and Copernican pluralism – refers obviously to an earlier 
aspect of the link between evolutionism and Copernican revolution.   
164 There are of course several well-known implications of pluralism on evolutionary views after 1859. Insightful 
are for instance Carl du Prel’s books  Der Kampf ums Dasein am Himmel (1874), Die Planetenbewohner und 
die Nebularhypothese  (1880) and Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls (1882), in which he transferred 
Darwinism to astronomy, or Alfred R. Wallace’s Man’s Place in the Universe:  A Study of the Results of Scientific 
Research in Relation to the Unity or Plurality of Worlds (1903), in which he expressed his anthropocentric 
worldviews. Implications on evolutionism are also evident in the ideas expressed by Richard A. Proctor, Camille 
Flammarion, Percival Lowell, and many others scientists in the second half of 19th century (see above for 
explanations and references). However, as stated, most investigations on the topic “plurality of worlds” do not 
mention de Maillet, although Telliamed is mentioned in Flammarion’s influential book La pluralité des mondes 
habités; I consulted the second ed. (Flammarion 1864, 477); he also discussed Telliamed extensively in his book 
Dieu dans la nature (Flammarion 1867, 439-442). 
165 It is interesting that Crowe does not follow de Maillet’s pluralism; he merely mentions de Maillet as a 
passing thought that Diderot was partially influenced by de Maillet (Crowe 1986, 135, 579), referring to 
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The Copernican revolution had a stronger and above all earlier link to evolutionary thoughts 
than usually assumed. As we saw, de Maillet was obviously influenced by the elements of 
atomistic doctrine expressed by Lucretius (c. 96-55 BC), and combined these ancient views 
with the cosmogony defended by Descartes and the pluralism of his friend Fontenelle. De 
Maillet used elements166 in his system that are often regarded as proving his ingenuity and 
demonstrating that his system was a typical construct of early 18th century Naturphilosophie.  
However, what is usually regarded as non-scientific elements in de Maillet’s system can be 
interpreted from a different perspective. I submit that de Maillet’s so-called naive or fantastic 
views on real or imaginary aquatic organisms as counterparts to terrestrial creatures provided 
him with an unusual dichotomic pattern in the organismic world. His emphasis on this 
doubtful dichotomy had two main consequences: on the one hand he was able to envisage an 
erroneous, but insightful phylogenetic link between (all) aquatic organisms as ancestors of 
terrestrial counterparts; on the other hand he was able to transfer the concept of stellar 
evolution (again wrong, but insightful) to the realm of living organisms. By using 
epistemological discrepancies as bridges between distantly related taxa, he formulated what 
can be regarded as the first lengthy evolutionary concept. De Maillet’s envisage of the 
evolutionary process in vast spatial dimensions and in events of eternal recurrence certainly 
forced him to assume an extended time scale, which he integrated with his geological ideas.167 
Although his ideas are quite different from modern evolutionary views, I showed that his 
system influenced several naturalists in the 18th and 19th century that are often regarded as 
important precursors of the evolutionary thought.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Vartanian’s (1949) investigation on Diderot (on Vartanian’s views see above, chapter B.4.3). Crowe and other 
experts on pluralism cannot be blamed for not stressing de Maillet’s work, as the number of authors who 
expressed views on the plurality of worlds around 1750 was immense. Historical treatises on pluralism aim at 
covering several aspects of the doctrine of plurality of worlds, and the issue of pre-Darwinian evolutionism is 
irrelevant in this discussion. 
166 See, for example, de Maillet’s ideas on a “flying fish evolving into a bird” and his belief in hommes marins 
(chapter B.3) which are the most quoted passages of his evolutionary views; in several modern reviews of early 
evolutionary ideas the fish-bird transition is the only verbatim quotation of his work.  
167 Historians often stress the importance of early geological investigations on the emergence of a general 
awareness of great periods of time, correctly regarding this awareness as a precondition for the emergence of 
evolutionary thinking (Albritton 1980; Berry 1968; Burchfield 1998; Gohau 1990; Haber 1959a; Haber 1959c; 
Porter 1977). Although I basically agree with this interpretation – large parts of Telliamed do refer to geology - I 
stress the importance of the views on the awareness of vast interstellar space as a precondition for the views 
on geological time-scale; see also Gould (1987), who criticizes wrong dichotomies related to the emergence of 
the deep time concept. Although de Maillet is often mentioned in connection to the geological investigation, 
the aspect of a plurality of worlds-discussion implied in these geological views are, as far as I know, not 
adequately acknowledged. De Maillet’s views on geology had several components of what later became known 
as the “gradualistic school” in geology, a concept that was one of the pre-conditions for the formulation of 
Charles Darwin’s evolutionary ideas. I suppose that de Maillet’s views on geological time are highly relevant, 
since the impact of Telliamed in natural sciences was enormous and diversified. Further studies are needed to 
assess the association between geological time and pluralism in other naturalists in 18th and early 19th century. 
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APPENDIX C – Historical aspects related to the use of convergence as a 
tool in biology 
C.1 Introduction 
Although the focus of the present thesis is the use of convergence as a tool (= convergence 
approach, see definition in chapter 3) in human evolution, with special consideration on 
hominoid interaction with water, a precondition for the present investigation is to understand 
how convergence approaches are used in other biological fields. In the preparations for a 
previous work on convergence approach (Bender 1999a), I planned to invest a few weeks to 
evaluate historical reviews of this topic before the proper analyses of hypotheses on early 
hominin evolution. However, after some years (from 1993 to 1999), I have learned that 
although uncountable researches on adaptation imply, and some explicitly state, the 
epistemological relevance of convergences in adaptive analyses, the historical development of 
this field has been sadly neglected. Not only is the history of the use of convergence as a tool 
poorly understood – I was further unable to find any analyses on the similarities and 
differences in convergence approaches in different biological disciplines. The only statements 
on this topic I could find were succinct historical sketches in the introduction of works on life 
forms in ecological publications and in an introductory chapters in Mark Ridley’s book on 
comparative methods (Ridley 1983, 3-9) (see Appendix E).168 Interestingly, investigators 
working within different research programs usually do not refer to a connection between these 
disciplines concerning a common use of convergences approaches. This apply to research 
carried out on the already mentioned comparative methods and life forms (and other attempts 
to classify organisms according to non-homologous traits), as well to the use of non-
homologous patterns of similarity for the formulation of useful generalizations of biological 
phenomena, as for instance in the description of patterns of territoriality in birds and 
mammals, the classification of organisms as  r/K selected, and in different hypotheses 
focusing on certain aspects of ontogenetic development –  e.g., the division between 
nidicolous and nidifugous or between altricial and precocial organisms, just to mention few 
(see chapter 2 for references).  
This chapter describes few episodes related to the historical development and modern use of 
convergence in adaptive analyses this topic. With “few” it is implied that the present review is 
not conceived as an exhaustive investigation of this topic. These events are chosen primarily, 
                                                          
168 Other investigations of the “comparative methods” that I consulted explicitly avoid a historical review of the 
topic, as for instance by Harvey and Pagel – they mention the difficulty to review this topic and refer to Ridley’s 
book (Harvey & Pagel 1991, 6).   
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as already noted above, to supply the basis for own investigations on the use of convergence 
as a tool in hypotheses on human evolution treated in chapter 3. The review can be used as 
well as a preliminary work for more in-depths investigations on convergence approaches in 
biology.  
C.2 Three chosen historical aspects of the term convergence 
C.2.1 “Twigs turning against each other”: the emergence of the term convergence  
Although evolutionary ideas were already known from the 18th century (see Appendix B), it 
was only after the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species that naturalists had to incorporate 
the evolutionary view, or at least to justify why the evolutionary perspective was inadequate 
(Bowler 1983; Bowler 1989; Junker 1998b, 851; Lefèvre 1984). In Germany, this process of 
assimilation of the Darwinian paradigm was at the same time characterized by the attempt of 
anatomists to distance themselves from the natural philosophical school. The Zeitgeist of early 
19th century was increasingly hostile towards speculation and favourable toward empirical 
approaches and concise theoretical constructs. One important aspect in this debate was the 
different views on convergences. In opposition to most evolutionists prior to 1859, Darwin 
was fully aware that cetaceans and other aquatic mammals are secondary aquatic organisms, 
and recognized clearly that these organisms could not be regarded as ancestral to terrestrial 
mammals. Guided by this perspective, Darwin automatically excluded discrepant 
organisms169 as bridging links in phylogenetic trees, and most170 naturalists in the decades 
following the publication of his Origin of Species followed his lead. Instead of being 
perceived as paradoxical or as gaps between distantly related taxa, the functional affinity 
between such organisms became a crucial argument in Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
Convergent evolution – as demonstrated by distantly related aquatic or flying animals – 
                                                          
169 I proposed this term to designate species difficult to place in a single logical category in pre-Darwinian 
zoological treatises. Discrepant organisms were, for example, ostriches, secondary aquatic vertebrates, bats, 
carnivore plants, flying and climbing fishes, snakes, eels, blindworms and polyps. These organisms were 
perceived as paradoxical because they exhibit features atypical for closely related species; rather, they were 
perceived as functionally related to distantly related creatures. In pre-Darwinian period, discrepant organisms 
were often used to bridge distantly related taxa within linear and hierarchical schemes in the Aristotelian chain 
of beings (Bender 1999a); see Appendix A.  
170 Single authors were still confused by discrepant organisms, as for instance Gustav Steinmann when he 
speculated about dolphins as descendants of Ichthyosaurus; Steinmann assimilated Lamarck’s ideas uncritically 
(see Appendix D). A similar faux pas in the interpretation of superficial analogies as homologies was expressed 
by the Friedrich H. Dieterici (1821-1903), an influential German orientalist with insufficient knowledge of 
zoology. In his book Der Darwinismus im zehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhundert, he speculated on the 
possibility that camels descent from giraffes. When the ancestors of camels began to eat from the ground 
instead from the trees – they had continuously to bend down in the process – soft tissues moved from the belly 
to the back of the primeval camels (Dieterici 1878, 65). 
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became a phenomenon of high heuristic value and examples of convergent organisms were 
and still are used to illustrate the power of natural selection in shaping organismic form.  
The geometric aspect implied in the word “convergence” in evolutionary biology was 
suggested by Carl Vogt (1817-1895) – a German zoologist and geologist living in 
Switzerland. In his Vorlesungen über den Menschen (Vogt 1863, vol. 1, 285), he described 
the phenomenon of species independently developing similar traits (quoted from the English 
translation, Lectures on Man): 
The simian type parts in various directions; it first divides into two chief branches – monkey 
of the old, monkey of the new world – each of these main branches produces twigs which 
seem more and more to part from each other. But on arriving at perfection the ends of the 
twigs turn again towards each other, so that from the fundamentally distinct families of the 
gibbons, Macaci, and baboons are developed the three anthropoid apes, which, by a number of 
common characters stand considerably nearer each other than the groups of which they are the 
heads. (Vogt 1864, lecture XVI, 468, italics added) 
Because Vogt described the phenomenon of convergence within an evolutionary framework, 
it attracted Darwin’s attention. He referred to Vogt’s views in The Descent of Man: 
It is, however, possible, though far from probable, that the early progenitors of man might at 
first have diverged much in character, until they became more unlike each other than are any 
existing races; but that subsequently, as suggested by Vogt, they converged in character. 
When man selects for the same object the offspring of two distinct species, he sometimes 
induces, as far as general appearance is concerned, a considerable amount of convergence. 
(Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 230) 
After mentioning opinions on convergence in pigeons expressed by Hermann Engelhard von 
Nathusius and alleged convergence in apes’ brains expressed by Louis-Pierre Gratiolet, 
Darwin concluded:  
If this conclusion, which rests almost exclusively on brain-characters, be admitted, we should 
have a case of convergence at least in external characters, for the anthropomorphous apes are 
certainly more like each other in many points than they are to other apes. All analogical 
resemblances, as of a whale to a fish, may indeed be said to be cases of convergence; but this 
term has never been applied to superficial and adaptive resemblances. (Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 
230) 
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In the next paragraph, by describing the fallacy of Vogt’s views, he formulate an argument 
which is still valid today: “It would be extremely rash in most cases to attribute to 
convergence close similarity in many points of structure in beings which had once been 
widely different”  (Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 230-231). In fact, Vogt’s ideas on convergent 
evolution of apes towards different human races imply the highly anthropocentric idea that all 
organisms are part of an evolutionary process aiming at “perfection”. For several early 
advocates of the evolutionary idea,171 the evolutionary process was perceived as an inexorable 
production of more complex and “progressive” forms towards a humanoid life-form.  
In his Origin of Species (1859) Darwin supplied several examples of convergences, which he 
called “analogous variations”172: (a) the independent development of electric organs in fishes 
(1859, 192-193); (b) of luminous organs in distantly related insects (1859, 193); and (c) the 
“very curious contrivance of a mass of pollen-grains, borne on a foot-stalk with a sticky gland 
at the end” in distantly related plants like Orchis and Asclepias (1859, 193). In later editions, 
Darwin included the example of (d) convergent evolution of eyes in cephalopods and 
vertebrates (1872, 151-152); (e) the independent modification of air-breathing apparatus in 
different groups of crustaceans (1872, 152-153); and (f) the convergent evolution of hair-
claspers in parasitic mites (Acaridae) (1872, 153).  
Some years after the publication of Origin, the German pioneer of evolutionary ideas Ernst 
Haeckel (1834-1919) listed several cases of convergences in a largely modified edition of his 
book Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte (1868), supplying a description of the term 
convergence that is indistinguishable from analogous explanations in modern textbooks (here 
quoted from the English edition, which is based on the 8th German edition of 1889): 
A series of important phenomena, which appear to stand opposed to those of divergence or 
separation, are those of so-called convergence or resemblance. For while divergent selection 
makes forms that are perfectly alike absolutely different in the end by adaptation to changed 
conditions of life and activity, convergent selection, on the other hand, makes forms which 
were originally altogether different become extremely alike by adaptation to similar conditions 
of existence and similar functions. The warm-blooded whales are genuine mammals, which 
                                                          
171 See (Gould 1996) on early and modern anthropocentric concepts on progress and increasing complexity in 
evolutionary thinking. In a famous passage on the last two pages of his Origin of Species Darwin wrote: “And as 
natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will 
tend to progress toward perfection” (Darwin 1859, 489-490); this specific statement contradicts his main views 
on this topic. About Darwin’s contradictory concepts on perfection see (Gould 1996, 135-146). 
172 Darwin changed the expression “analogous variations” with “all favourable variations” in the 6th edition 
(Darwin 1872, 152); see chapter C.2.2 for the reason for this change. 
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have assumed the form of fish by having adapted themselves to their mode of life; but they are 
descended from land mammals, and, moreover, the herbivorous Sirenia, probably from hoofed 
animals, the carnivorous dolphins and bearded whales from rapacious animals. In these two 
groups, convergent selection has not only changed the external form; the inner structure too 
has become so alike, that they were formerly classed as one order. (Haeckel 1876, 314-315) 
After Haeckel included the extinct aquatic reptile Ichthyosaurus as convergent to cetaceans in 
later editions (Haeckel 1909b, vol. 1, 272), the tradition of using these animals as examples of 
convergences was initiated and became an inherent part of biological textbooks for the next 
hundred years.  
C.2.2 The interpretation of convergences in the framework of orthogenetic ideas  
Beside the establishment of convergent organisms as textbook’s examples to illustrate the 
power of natural selection, several authors were inclined to see the phenomenon convergence 
from a completely different perspective. It is useful to analyze some of these views in 
influential textbooks published after 1859, as for example in the works by Carl Gegenbaur 
(1826-1903). The first edition of his Grundzüge der vergleichenden Anatomie (Gegenbaur 
1859) was evidently not influenced by Darwin’s evolutionary ideas, as it was published in the 
same year as the Origin of Species. Gegenbaur divided the organisms into components, 
describing certain organs in a sequence that reflected the authors’ opinion of an ascending 
scale of complexity in different groups of organisms. Gegenbaur’s comparative anatomy is a 
good example of how scientists in the second half of the 19th century were able to transform 
typological views in evolutionary thinking. The language used was often the same - German 
expressions like Bauplan (body plan), Typus (type), Urtypus (archaic or archetypical type), 
Grundform (basic form) could be used both by essentialistic and non-essentialistic thinkers.173 
However, Gegenbaur’s use of the concept of types was formulated in a way that suggested the 
influence of idealistic philosophy.  
Gegenbaur differed in two aspects from most of his predecessors in comparative anatomy. 
Firstly, he opposed the concepts homology and analogy (Gegenbaur 1859, 35-36), terms 
explicitly defined by Richard Owen as follows: homology – “same organ in different animals 
                                                          
173 After the increasing rejection of idealistic ideas in biology, essentialistic concepts were changed to 
accommodate non-idealistic concepts in systematics, or transformed to hide idealistic views (on essentialism 
see Appendix D). See for instance the ideas defended by the German botanist Wilhelm Troll (1897-1978) and 
the German pathologist Max Westenhöfer, who were both influenced by Goethe’s idealistic morphology 
(Bender-Oser 2004a, 54-77);  see Appendix F). Adolf Remane, an influential German zoologist, who published 
several articles against essentialistic ideas in biology (see Appendix D), discussed also the problem of Typus in 
morphological biology (Remane 1951a). 
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under every variety of form and function” (Owen 1843, 379); analogy – “part or organ in one 
animal which has the same function as another part or organ in a different animal” (Owen 
1843, 374); see Rupke (1995). Secondly, in the first edition of this work there is a 
recognizable incipient attempt to integrate embryological research in anatomical comparative 
studies to clarify relationships between organisms. This approach was further developed in the 
second edition of this work published eleven years later, which then also integrated Darwin’s 
evolutionary concepts. By doing so, Gegenbaur influenced several prominent naturalists and 
evolutionists, as for instance the German evolutionist Ernst Haeckel.  
Gegenbaur clearly formulated the main goal for what later became the traditional research 
programme in comparative anatomy: the identification and description of homologies to 
understand natural relationships between the treated groups (Gegenbaur 1859, 35; 1874, v). 
He was convinced that homologies are much more relevant for comparative studies than 
analogies: while the first are identifiable in the Bauplan of a restricted number of organisms 
conditioned to a certain Typus, the latter are based only on the functional similarity between 
organs and “can be regularly found in the whole animal kingdom (Thierreich), since a certain 
amount of functions has to be provided in each animal” (Gegenbaur 1859, 35, my translation). 
Within the Darwinian paradigm, the concept of organisms belonging to a Bauplan became 
intrinsically connected with the concept of organisms sharing traits due to a common 
ancestry. Before the emergence of genetic analysis, comparative anatomy (complemented by 
palaeontological and later ethological research) became the most reliable way to place every 
organism in the right systematic position.  
The study of analogy had a very different historical development to the study of homology. 
As we will see, the adaptive similarity between organisms had long been regarded as 
impressive and insightful. However, for the purpose of systematics they were often 
considered as completely irrelevant or even an obstacle. In fact, convergences between 
organisms have to be identified and excluded from analysis of genealogical relationships 
between organisms, and are therefore often perceived as mere “noises” which hampered the 
study of homology. With the increasing status of systematics in evolutionary biology, the 
heuristic value of convergences was sporadically appreciated by single researchers working in 
different biological fields (for explanations and references see chapter C.4).  
A further negative connotation of the term convergence is related to the fact that functional 
similarities between distantly related organisms were often used by early naturalists in 
orthogenetic concepts. The term orthogenesis was first proposed by Wilhelm Haacke in his 
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book Gestaltung und Vererbung (Haacke 1893). In a discussion on preformationism and 
epigenetics he wrote:  
The evolution within each lineage [Abstammungslinie] took place only in one direction. The 
mammals derived perhaps from amphibians, and these from primitive forms of fishes […], but 
never and nowhere was a mammal transformed back into an amphibian, or an amphibian 
transformed back into a fish. (Haacke 1893, 32, my translation)  
Starting from this argument, Haacke inferred that the evolution of organisms is characterized 
by unilinear and unidirectional tendencies. These constrains are, so Haacke argued, the result 
of the limited capacity of germ plasm to produce arbitrary variations. Proponents of 
orthogenesis had different, often contradictory views (see Delage 1903, 470-481). Generally, 
they argued that the development of certain organs and structures are directed, since they 
follow certain predetermined pathways. These predetermined pathways, so was argued, often 
led to maladaptive features, and were sometimes responsible for the extinction of species (see 
Bowler 1983, 141-181; 1996, 67-74). Proponents of orthogenesis were sceptical about the 
Darwinian view of organismic diversity as being produced by random mutations and natural 
selection. It seems paradoxical that convergent evolution – already perceived as an example 
of the power of natural selection in the production of adaptive features by earliest Darwinians 
– was also used by orthogeneticists to illustrate the power of “internal forces” to produce 
organismic diversity. One example of an evolutionary theory based on orthogenesis was 
proposed by the Russian zoologist and geographer Leo Semyonovich Berg (1876-1950) in his 
book Nomogenez ill evoliutciia na osnove zakonomernostei, first published in Russian in 1922 
and translated into English in 1926 with the title Nomogenesis or Evolution Determined by 
Law (here quoted from the second edition from 1969). As other proponents of orthogenetic 
ideas, Berg believed that evolution is not a random process, and he used the phenomenon of 
convergence to underline this assumption. Berg quoted the following passage of Darwin’s 
Origin of Species, where he proposed an analogy between human inventions and the 
development of organismic features to explain the emergence of convergences: 
In all these cases of two very distinct species furnished with apparently the same anomalous 
organ, it should be observed that, although the general appearance and function of the organ 
may be the same, yet some fundamental difference can generally be detected. I am inclined to 
believe that in nearly the same way as two men have sometimes independently hit on the very 
same invention, so natural selection, working for the good of each being and taking advantage 
of analogous variations, has sometimes modified in very nearly the same manner two parts in 
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two organic beings, which owe but little of their structure in common to inheritance from the 
same ancestor. (Darwin 1859, 193-194) 
Later Darwin seemed to recognize that the expression “analogous variations” in the extract 
above was imprecise and ambiguous, since it could be interpreted as suggesting variations 
between two convergent species that arose as exact copies “already” analogue to each other  – 
a highly improbable process which implies an evolutionary process guided by orthogenetic 
driving forces. In fact, such an interpretation is diametrically opposite to what Darwin wrote 
in the two first chapters of his Origin of Species. Darwin’s theory of natural selection did not 
admit anticipation of the future. Probably for this reason Darwin changed the expression 
“analogous variations” with “all favourable variations” in the 6th edition (Darwin 1872, 152). 
This formulation mitigated the danger of misinterpretation of the concept of natural selection, 
since it now implies that convergences arise not due to analogous variation, but to contingent 
variation supplying the raw material for the operative effect of natural selection.  
Berg was aware on Darwin’s changes in the quotation above. Nevertheless, in his attempt to 
prove the existence of orthogenetic tendencies in the evolution of organisms, Berg exploited 
the ambivalence of Darwin’s original expression by showing the improbability of variations 
arising by chance to fulfil the preconditions required for convergent organisms. He wrote:   
Since every useful variation according to Darwin’s theory arises by chance, it is scarcely 
credible that such a variation should arise accidentally even in one species; but still more 
incredible would be its occurrence in different species having no common ancestors. Natural 
selection is powerless to effect anything, if the probability of the occurrence of a certain 
character may be approximately zero; unless, as it has been tacitly assumed in the passage 
cited above, the same functions be attributed to natural selection as are attributed to vital force. 
(Berg 1969, 158) 
An obvious problem with Berg’s arguments is his erroneous assumption that variations had to 
be exactly the same in two convergent species. The fact that convergences in two distantly 
related species are not necessarily based on the same morphological construction is especially 
evident in convergences between the European mole cricket (Gryllotalpa gryllotalpa) and 
mole (Talpa europea), or between hummingbirds (Trochilidae) and moths of the family 
Sphingidae, such as the hummingbird hawk moth (Macroglossum stellatarum).  
The use of convergences to challenge the power of natural selection is a standard argument of 
anti-Darwinists – or opponents of the Darwinian concept of natural selection or from 
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biologists attempting to justify the use of religious instinct in scientific investigations.174 In a 
paper on convergence, Richard Hesse emphasized the physical and chemical nature of 
biological phenomena. By addressing his criticism specifically against Berg’s arguments, 
Hesse vehemently rejected any attempt to interpret convergences as the product of 
orthogenetic tendencies. For him the belief of “an immanent purposefulness” [immanente 
Zweckmässigkeit] in the evolution of convergences is a cheap excuse, which “just covered up 
[bemäntelt] our ignorance” (Hesse 1939, 13).  
C.2.3 The definitive establishment of the modern convergence concept after the rejection 
of orthogenetic views  
The gradual rejection of orthogenetic ideas was an important aspect of the establishment of 
the synthetic evolutionary theory (Junker 2004). One enlightening example of interpreting 
convergences in a framework hostile to natural selection among German speaking scientists 
can be found in works by the German zoologist and evolutionist Bernhard Rensch (1900-
1990). Before he changed his mind and became an important German pioneer of the synthetic 
evolutionary theory, he defended Lamarckian and orthogenetic views of evolution in the late 
1920s and early 1930s. Early in his career, Rensch carried out research on the dependence of 
several avian features (like body size, proportions of legs, wings, bill, and colors of the 
plumage) on climatic conditions. For instance, he interpreted certain convergences among 
birds from a “Lamarckian point of view” [im lamarckistischen Sinne] or as orthogenetic 
predetermined coerciveness, “which contradict the Darwinian implication of contingency” 
(Zufallsprinzip)  (Rensch 1923, 32). He summarized his results in his first book published in 
1929 on speciation, where he defended the opinion that the climatic parallelism of race 
formation could be explained by a direct influence of the environment on inherited characters. 
His view was influenced by the fact that mutations of birds analyzed by ornithologists 
concerned larger differences, while the differences between neighbouring races, running 
parallel to climatic changes were rather insignificant. He thought, therefore, that climatic 
selection was probably not responsible for such insignificant differences (Rensch 1929).  
According to Rensch himself, he gave up all Lamarckian explanations in early 1930s when 
geneticists showed that “nearly all genes have pleiotropic effects and that selection can 
become effective during some thousands of generations even when the advantage of a new 
                                                          
174 For examples of the use of analogy in attempts to undermine Darwinian views by creationists see MacKenzie 
et al.  (2004)and Price (1925). There are several indications that one of the few works published in recent years 
(Conway Morris 2008) focusing on the phenomenon convergence was motivated by similar religious feelings 
(see also chapter C.5.1), although not reaching the same anti-Darwinian conclusions as the authors quoted 
above. 
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allele is only 1 to 2 percent” (Rensch 1980, 296). He then began to explain climatic 
parallelism of racial differences in several features by natural selection, for instance 
concerning (a) parallelism in birds and mammals (Rensch 1936), (b) parallelism in land snails 
(Rensch 1937) and (c) climatic rules on homeothermic animals (Rensch 1938).175 In his book 
Neuere Probleme der Abstammungslehre (first ed. 1947, second ed. 1954, translated into 
English and published in 1959 as Evolution Above the Species Level), an important work for 
the consolidation of the synthetic theory of evolution in German-speaking countries, Rensch 
underlined his views on the development of parallel forms as the product of undirected 
mutation and natural selection, stressing the role of pleiotropic genes and ontogenetic 
allometric parallelism  (Rensch 1972, 182-183). By denying any role of “special autonomous 
development forces” (Rensch 1972, 215) in the manifold cases of parallelisms and 
convergences, he defended still valid views on these topics.176  
C.3 Early attempts to consider comparative anatomy from a broader 
perspective:  Carl G. L. C. Bergmann and Rudolf K.G.F. Leuckart 
Several early authors, even some working in pre-Darwinian period, pointed out to what they 
believed to be a negative focus of biological investigation, in which homology was 
emphasized at the cost of research on analogy. It is interesting that these authors aimed a 
perspective which takes into account the complex relationship between organisms and their 
environment. The difference in approach is very well illustrated throughout the book on 
comparative anatomy Anatomisch-physiologische Übersicht des Thierreiches  (Anatomic-
physiological overview of the animal kingdom) written by the German authors Carl G.L.C. 
Bergmann (1814-1865) and Rudolf  K.G.F. Leuckart (1822-1898) (1855, first publ. 1852). As 
an anatomist and physiologist, Bergmann is known to modern biologists because of his 
famous ecogeographic principle (see below); Leuckart is one of the most distinguished 
zoologists of the 19th century. In their book these authors presented zoological knowledge 
from a physiological point of view, stressing the function of different parts of organisms - 
anatomical descriptions were only considered when necessary to understand physiological 
factors. The authors made great efforts to present organisms in a broader perspective than in 
other anatomical books, stressing a comparative approach by considering each organism’s 
mode of life. This approach is supported by the concept of the book, which divergent from 
                                                          
175 On Rensch’s role on the synthetic theory of evolution and his earlier views on mechanisms of evolution see 
(Bender 1999b, 80-81; Junker 2004, 308-309; Mayr 1980; Rensch 1980).  
176 See however Gould (2002, 352), who aptly criticizes an on-sided view negative evaluation of all ideas 
concerning orthogenesis. 
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most contemporaneous (and modern) textbooks by its treatment of both vertebrates and 
insects (Bergmann was primarily responsible for the text on vertebrates, Leuckart for the text 
on insects.) Most insightful were the comparative notes on the different locomotory systems, 
especially from vertebrates (pp. 398-404), the discussion on “dermal formations” 
[Hautgebilde] from vertebrates in relation to movement (pp. 404-412); and the comments on 
pneumatic organs in several taxa, for instance, the functional meaning of the pneumatisation 
of bird’s bones or the physiology of the swim bladder in fishes (pp. 412-426). In all these 
chapters the authors treated anatomical evidence in a broad context, with references to the 
environment in which the organisms live and with constant references to convergent solutions 
in distantly related organisms.  
The interest for convergent evolution can be found in other works of both authors. For 
instance, one year before the first edition of Über das Verhältnis…, Leuckart published an 
interesting work entitled Über den Polymorphismus der Individuen oder die Erscheinung der 
Arbeitsteilung in der Natur (1851) (On the polymorphism of individuals or the phenomenon 
of division of labour in nature) in which he addressed the problem of divergent phenotypes in 
panmictic populations. The topic is especially important in evolutionary biology due to the 
commonality of this phenomenon in several taxa and the implication for research, for 
instance, in discussions on niche diversity, on mimicry, or on the phenomenon of social 
polymorphism in social insects. Leuckart’s publication is regarded today as the basis for all 
subsequent investigations on this topic, insofar as they do not concern genetic or cytological 
research (see, e.g., Schmidt 1987, 2).  
Naturalists interested in closely related organisms living in different environments were prone 
to search for patterns of convergences between these organisms and include them in analyses 
on adaptive features. Bergmann’s interest in convergent patterns led to the formulation of the 
ecogeographic principle called “Bergmann’s rule”. In its original form, this rule applies to 
geographic variation, predicting an inverse correlation between temperature and mean body 
size in endothermic animals as an energetic adaptation to colder regions (Bergmann 1847). In 
fact, the search for non-homologous patterns of similarity to formulate predictions on the 
adaptive characters of organisms had been carried out already by earlier authors. For instance, 
inspired by an earlier work177, the German zoologist and ornithologist Constantin L. Gloger 
(1803-1863) observed that birds tend to be heavily pigmented when living in more humid 
                                                          
177 By 1811, the German naturalist Peter Simon Pallas (1741-1811) had already pointed out that patterns of 
colouration in birds varied according to environmental conditions (Pallas 1811), a work that Gloger dully 
acknowledged. 
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environments than their relatives living in more arid environments (Gloger 1833); see Burtt 
and Ichida (2004) and Tiquia et al. (2005) for a possible explanation of the Gloger’s rule.  
These early authors were the forerunners of evolutionary works stressing the value of 
convergent organisms in the analysis of adaptive features after 1859. 
C.4 Convergence: role in merging research on animal geography with 
ecological research 
In the second half of the 19th century and especially in the first half of the 20th century, some 
important concepts relating to convergent evolution were formulated within a discussion on 
ecogeographic regularities. In some cases, the framework in which these concepts were 
developed was influenced by the tradition established by Carl Bergmann and his predecessors, 
which is evident in the research carried out by the American zoologist Joel A. Allen (1877), 
by the German zoologist Richard Hesse (1924) and by the German evolutionary biologist 
Bernhard Rensch (1936; 1938; 1950). From today’s point of view, it may sound superfluous 
to indicate that a zoological work should stress the environmental aspects of animals. 
However, the perspectives of the late 19th and early 20th century were completely different 
from modern research programmes. By 1884, the Scottish biologist Patrick Geddes (1854-
1932) had already criticized an excessive focus on the descriptive approach used in classical 
comparative anatomy, and argued for a more interdisciplinary approach focusing on the 
organism as an intrinsic part of the environment in which it lives (Geddes, quoted in Böker 
1935, 3).178 The physiologists Walter Stempell and Albert Koch criticised that the zoological 
training in most German universities in early 20th century focused on systematics and 
morphological studies, ignoring other crucial aspects of biological research (Stempell & Koch 
1923). The physiologist Albrecht Bethe (1872-1954) observed with biting sarcasm that 
zoologists became so absorbed in morphological details that they seem to have forgotten that 
they were dealing with living organisms (Bethe 1917).  
The German zoologists Richard Hesse (1868-1944) and Franz Theodor Doflein (1873-1924) 
argued in a similar way in their zoological work entitled Tierbau und Tierleben: In Ihrem 
Zusammenhang betrachtet  (Animal form and life considered as a whole), published in two 
volumes (Hesse & Doflein 1910; Hesse & Doflein 1914). They complained that after the 
                                                          
178 See also the book Life: Outlines of General Biology Geddes’ by the Scottish biologist John Arthur Thomson 
(1861-1933) and Geddes. In this work, the authors illustrate “with more care, and in more detail, than usual, 
the relations between Biology and other Sciences” (Thomson & Geddes 1931, vol. I, v), stressing the need of 
ecological analyses (1931, vol. I, v, 42-225). 
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establishment of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, most zoologists invested their energy almost 
entirely on morphological disciplines and systematics, neglecting so the biological179 view of 
organisms (Hesse & Doflein 1910, vii). Impressive through the enormous amount of 
zoological data, Tierbau und Tierleben is among the first broadly conceived zoological works 
presenting comparative morphological analyses with consideration of the intrinsic relationship 
between organisms and their environment. Popular among biologists at the time,180 Tierbau 
und Tierleben had a considerable influence on German speaking naturalists of this era, 
stimulating research focusing on the limitation and the potential of adaptive characters and 
driving a new focus on investigations of convergent adaptations. Although it was not basically 
a work on experimental physiology, it had also a strong impact in the development of this 
discipline. 
Hesse and Doflein were crucially influenced by the above described work of Bergmann and 
Leuckart; Hesse and Doflein considered it as the first zoological book which aimed at a 
biological perspective, and deplored that this book was almost forgotten by contemporaneous 
young zoologists. They expressed their admiration of Bergmann and Leuckart by dedicating 
their first volume to these authors (Hesse & Doflein 1910, vii). In their attempt to stress the 
importance in studying organisms as interactive and coordinated parts of a living system, 
Hesse and Doflein followed181 the idea formulated by the German anatomist and 
embryologist Wilhelm Roux in his work Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus (The battle of 
parts in the organism) (Roux 1881) which was well received by naturalists at the time, such as 
Darwin and Haeckel (Gould 2002, 210-213; Mocek 2001). Roux had made an analogy 
between Darwin’s “struggle for life” between species or between individuals of the same 
species, and a “struggle for life” between parts in the same organism. According to this view, 
cells, tissues or organs are concurrent with other parts of the organism for space or nutriment, 
and changes in one feature have consequences on other features in the same organism.182 
Other influences on the strong emphasis that Hesse and Doflein gave to environmental aspects 
of organismal adaptations came from their familiarity with ecological concepts formulated by 
                                                          
179 The expression “biological” was often used in this time in the sense of “ecological”, see also below Böker’s 
“biological anatomy”. Also the expression “physiological” was often used in the same sense, as Friedrich Dahl  
(1921, part ii, 1) interpreted the word when commenting on Andreas F.W. Schimper’s book  
Pflanzengeographie auf physiologischer Grundlage (1898). 
180 The German physician, anthropologist and eugenicist Eugen Fischer (1874-1967) described it as well known 
and indispensable for every general biologist and zoologist (Fischer 1944). 
181 The similarity between Hesse’s/Doflein’s and Roux’s ideas is not accidental: Hesse and Doflein knew Roux’s 
work (Hesse & Doflein 1910, 765-766; Hesse & Doflein 1914, 917). 
182 Roux’s arguments have similarities with Cuvier’s argument of correlations of parts (see above), which is 
succinctly mentioned in the introductory part of the book (Roux 1881, 12).  
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the German zoologist Karl August Möbius (1825-1908) in his seminal work Die Auster und 
die Austernwirtschaft (Oyster and oyster farming) (Möbius 1877).  
This influence was everything else than casual. Möbius’ formulation of the concept of 
biocenosis and his research on this topic had a strong impact on biology at this time, leading 
to the formulation of the research programmes of ecology and marine biology (see Glaubrecht 
2008). As one of the consequences of his research, several works on animal and plant 
geography in late 19th and early 20th century were published with the specific goal of 
including ecological perspectives in zoogeographic research.183 For instance, Hesse published 
a research programme in the article Die ökologische Grundlagen der Tierverbreitung (1913) 
and planned its realization in a book with the title Ökologie der Tiergeographie (Hesse 1924, 
v). However, shortly before the book was finished, Friedrich Dahl - a former student of 
Möbius and later his assistant (Buschbaum et al. 2003; Leps 2001) - published a book entitled 
Grundlagen einer ökologischen Tiergeographie (Dahl 1921). Owing to the great similarity of 
titles, Hesse changed the title of his own work to Tiergeographie auf ökologischer Grundlage  
(Hesse 1924).184 As intellectual adversaries, both authors were suspicious about the approach 
used by the other. Dahl mentioned Hesse’s work in a second volume of his Grundlagen einer 
ökologischen Tiergeographie. He criticized Hesse’s article on ecological zoogeography for its 
consideration of internal and external anatomy in a zoogeographic investigation (Dahl 1923, 
1-2). Hesse, in turn, regarded Dahl’s book as not a work on ecological zoogeography, at least 
not what he understood to be this term (Hesse 1924, v). In fact, the reciprocal criticism 
reflected not only the competition between two leading researchers, but also a problem still 
discussed today – the multi-disciplinary nature of biogeography that lead to difficulties in 
identifying the boundaries between biogeography and overlapping fields like ecology, 
evolutionary biology or palaeontology (MacDonald 2003; Müller 1977, 16). Hesse was 
interested in a broader interpretation of zoogeography, with a strong inclusion of 
morphological knowledge. In this sense, Hesse’s “morphological zoogeography” had 
similarities with today’s ecomorphology and with the approaches proposed by Othenio Abel 
and Hans Böker (see chapter 2 for references). Hesse’s work is also characterized by the 
                                                          
183 Möbius himself wrote an article on the influence of food on the dissemination and migration of animals 
entitled Über den Einfluss der Nahrung auf die Verbreitung und die Wanderung der Thiere (On the influence of 
food on the proliferation and the migration of animals) (Möbius 1881). This almost unknown work – I found it 
only quoted in a small zoogeographic book (Maas 1907), and an internet research shows only hits from a 
couple of digitalized contemporaneous publications - was based on a talk that Möbius gave in the geographic 
society in Bremen.  
184 According to Hesse (1924, v), the title was inspired by Andreas F.W. Schimper’s  Pflanzengeographie auf 
physiologischer Grundlage (1898), a book which always served as model for him. Hesse’s book had a rewritten 
edition in English in 1937 [Ecological animal geography].  
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attempt to classify organisms according to functional groups. This is, for example, evident is 
his broad classification of animals taking in consideration the circumambient medium in 
which these organisms live: he distinguished between Wassertiere (aquatic animals, divided 
in primary and secondary aquatic animals) and Lufttiere (“air animals”, not meaning flying 
but air-breathing animals) – these were sub-divided in Feuchtlufttiere (“moist air-animals”) 
and Trockenlandtiere (“dry air-animals”) (Hesse 1924, 27-50).185 See also chapter C.2.2 on 
Hesse’s contribution to the research stressing intrinsic relationship between organisms and 
their environment, and his criticism towards orthogenetic views concerning convergences.  
Returning to Tierbau und Tierleben, in several chapters of this work, Hesse and Doflein 
discussed organic systems in distantly related organisms, choosing topics which allow a broad 
comparative perspective between different taxa, for instance hemophagic adaptations or 
animal migration. Hesse, in particular, was very interested in convergence between distantly 
related organisms. Owing to his broad and in-depth knowledge on adaptive forms, he was 
able to give several examples of convergences to discuss different aspects of ecology and 
evolutionary concepts and to demonstrate the potential and limits of adaptation to a broad 
spectrum of environmental conditions. He discussed, among others, (a) convergences in the 
origin of land snails (pp. 41-42); (b) convergent adaptations to arid regions (p. 45); (c) 
adaptive convergences between marsupials and placental mammals (p. 74); and (d) between 
not-closely related birds (pp. 74-75); (e) convergent development of chisel-shaped incisors to 
a blade-shaped set of teeth (as found in the Osteichthyes of the genera Balistes, Ostracion and 
Diodon (p. 229)); (f) convergences in buoyancy structures of pelagic organisms - mentioning 
in the same context radiolarian, the basking shark (Cetorhinus maximus) and ocean sunfish 
(Mola mola) (p. 235). 
Hesse’s interest in convergences is also evident in other publications. In an article dedicated 
entirely to this topic entitled Konvergenz (Hesse 1939) he stated that convergences are 
“probably among the central issues [Hauptprobleme] in ecology” (Hesse 1939, 3). However, 
he recognized the difficulties in any attempt to classify convergences. He stated that the 
development of similar biological traits in unrelated lineages sometimes concern extensive 
resemblances between organisms – for instance the remarkable similarities between the 
common pill-bug (Armadillidium vulgare) and pill millipede (Glomeris marginata), both able 
to roll up into a ball when disturbed. Other convergences, he wrote, concern only certain 
                                                          
185 Curiously, this classification is remarkably similar to the views expressed by the Roman naturalist and 
philosopher Pliny the Elder (23 AD-79 AD), who in his Naturalis Historia distinguished between terrestrial and 
aquatic animals (Caius Plinius Secundus 2007, vol. I, 441-523). 
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aspects of organismal features such as the wings of birds and bats, without major 
resemblances in other structures. However, a clear distinction between extensive and partial 
convergence is not possible, given the several examples of graduations between the two 
categories. For Hesse, it was more reasonable to distinguish between adaptive (sinnvolle, or 
useful) and non-adaptive (sinnlose, or useless) convergences. In his opinion, the great 
majority of convergences are adaptive186 (Anpassungskonvergenzen = adaptive 
convergences); he gave among others the following examples for “adaptive convergences”: 
(a) the aestivation of organisms living in moss mats on rocks or tree trunks, which are 
exposed to regular events of desiccation and rehydration; (b) the degeneration of functional 
wings in several insect groups living on Antarctic islands and regularly exposed to strong 
winds; (c) the regressive evolution of eyes and other convergent features in cavernicolous 
organisms187; (d) the regressive evolution in several parasitic organisms; and (e) convergences 
of marine organisms from different taxa living on the sandy bottom of shallow seas, which are 
characterized by small body size (less than 2mm).188   
All these observations on convergences are based on the same procedure: on the one hand, the 
identification of divergent adaptive patterns across species or across variations of the same 
species; and on the other hand, the identification of similar patterns in distantly related 
species. The same approach is implied in the several attempts to classify plants and animals 
according to non-homologous patterns of similarity from their external morphology, which is 
reviewed in the next section.   
C.5 Attempts to classify living organisms in non-phylogenetic groups 
In addition to the Linnaean classification of animals and plants based on the most conspicuous 
differential characters of each taxon, some pre-Darwinian naturalists tried to classify 
organisms according to non-phylogenetic criteria, as for instance taking into consideration 
similar behavioural, physiological or anatomical adaptations to their environment.  
C.5.1 Two “comparative approaches” in 18th century: Duncan and Gregory 
Before we analyse the more scientific treatises on this topic, let us see one examples how a 
thinker in early 19th century presented a synopsis of organisms according to different criteria, 
                                                          
186 As examples of “useless convergences” he mentioned the convergent patterns in the shell shape of scallops 
(Pectinidae), without further theoretical corroboration of his view; see empirical work by Serb et al. (2011) on 
the possible adaptive value of shell shape in Pectinidae. 
187 For investigations on this topic see (Dowling et al. 2002; Parzefall 1984; Schemmel 1984; Wilkens 2010) 
188 Later, Adolf Remane (1951b; 1934) carried out this research in connection with life forms of shore 
organisms; see also chapter C.5.2. 
90 
 
and how a physician in 18th century used a comparative approach in his speculations of 
human mental abilities and other issues.  
The first example concerns remarkable, but widely ignored work by John Shute Duncan 
(1768-1844) entitles Analogies of Different Classes of Organized Beings (Duncan 1831); 
Duncan was keeper of the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford between 1823 and 1829.189 In the 
introduction of this work, Duncan explained that he was interested in genera and species 
which strongly diverge and at the same time “may possess analogical agreement amongst 
themselves scarcely less clear, and at least equally deserving our attention” (Duncan 1831, 1).  
Duncan tried to organize several organisms in a “table of analogies”, in which the subjects 
selected and named at the head of each of the columns have been chosen for a synoptic 
presentation of analogies between different classes of animals and plants. Duncan’s table of 
analogies was arranged according to different criteria, for instance taking in consideration the 
environment of mammals (Land: “Lion, Dog, Bull, &c.” / Land and Water: Otter, 
Hippopotamus / Water: Dugong, Whale) or some of their anatomical features, e.g., “Feet” 
(Armed to lacerate: Lion, Wolf / Contra: Edentate, Sloth, Ruminantia, Cow, Sheep) or – as a 
concession to the anthropocentric view of nature popular in this time - according to their 
“Benefit or injury to Man”(Benefit: “Herbivora, generally” /Injury: “Some Rodentia. 
Carnivora, Dog & Cat excepted”) (Duncan 1831, 10-18). Although Duncan mentioned that 
“animals and plants of all classes exhibit peculiar adaptations to each condition of 
temperature” (Duncan 1831, 4), his treatise cannot be regarded as a precursor to evolutionary 
ideas. In fact, Duncan follows both scientific and religious purposes– a common procedure in 
this time, as is evident for instance in his physico-theological arguments; on physico-theology 
(or natural theology) see Appendix B, chapter B.4.3. Duncan is explicit in his belief that “in 
analogies we chiefly trace the unity of the designing Cause” (Duncan 1831, 4) and in his 
positive remarks on the work of natural theology by the English geologist, palaeontologist and 
theologian William Daniel Conybeare (1787-1857), in which the author writes on the natural 
evidence to prove the existence of an intelligent designer of the universe using, among others, 
arguments from analogy (Conybeare 1831, 58-85). Although statements on analogy of 
                                                          
189 John Duncan was succeeded in 1829 by his brother Philip Bury Duncan. On their activities in the museum 
see the website “British Archaeology at the Ashmolean Museum” the article History of the British Collections: 
The Nineteenth Century in (http://britisharchaeology.ashmus.ox.ac.uk/collections/history-19thcentury.html), 
retrieved on 7 January 2014. 
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organisms following both theological and scientific purposes are almost absent in modern 
evolutionary debate, this is only true for peer-reviewed publications.190   
Our second example concerns a similarly ignored booklet entitled A Comparative View of the 
State and Faculties of Man with Those of the Animal World written by the Scottish physician 
and moralist John Gregory (1724-1773). It was published first anonymously in 1765 and had 
several editions under Gregory’s own name; it was also translated in German and in French; it 
is quoted here from the 4th edition from 1767. Concerning his comparison between humans 
and other animals, Gregory basically disagreed with the general view of man “as a Being that 
had no analogy to the rest of the Animal Creation” (Gregory 1767, 7). He argued that 
although several investigations on comparative anatomy of (non-human) animals had been 
carried out, “the comparative Animal Oeconomy of Mankind and other Animals, and 
comparative Views of their states and manner of life, have been little regarded” (Gregory 
1767, 7). Rather unusual for this time, he explicitly stated that the closeness of humans to 
other animals would be a source of discomfort to humans:  
The pride of Man is alarmed, in this case, with too close a comparison, and dignity of 
philosophy will not easily stoop to receive a lesson from the instinct of Brutes. But this 
conduct is very weak and foolish. Nature is a whole, made up of parts, which, tho’ distinct, are 
intimately connected with one another. This connection is so close, that one species often runs 
into another so imperceptibly, that it is difficult to say where the one begins and the other 
ends. This is particularly the case with the lowest of one species, and the highest of that 
immediately below it. (Gregory 1767, 7-8)  
He used an interesting logic in his attempt to understand living organisms, based on their 
place in the scala naturae: 
On this account no one part of the great chain can be perfectly understood, without the 
knowledge, at least, of the links that are nearest to it. In comparing the different species of 
                                                          
190 For instance, in the book Life’s Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe (2008) the English 
palaeontologist and Christian Simon Conway Morris uses the phenomenon of convergence to underline his 
claim that “adaptation is not some occasional cog in the organic machine” (Conway Morris 2008, xv), an 
assumption which is intrinsically related to his religious beliefs. For instance, in the chapter “Towards a 
theology of evolution?” he claims that “it is reasonable to take the claims of theology seriously” (Conway 
Morris 2008, 328) and that “salient facts of evolution are congruent with a Creation” (Conway Morris 2008, 
329). Similar statements can be found in some contributions of the book The Deep Structure of Biology: Is 
Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous to Give a Directional Signal?, (Deane-Drummond 2008; Haught 2008), a 
work edited by Conway Morris. See also Conway Morris’ interview on the website of The Faraday Institute for 
Science and Religion (Conway Morris 2012). Conway Morris’ interest in convergences is also evident in the 
website ”Map of Life” (www.mapoflife.org), a project sponsored by the John Temple Foundation which 
documents several examples of convergences. For a criticism of Conway Morris’ views on convergence see 
(Powell 2007) and several blogs in the internet. 
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Animals, we find each of them possessed of powers and faculties peculiar to themselves, and 
well adapted to their particular sphere of action which Providence has allotted them. But, 
amidst that infinite variety which distinguishes each species, we find many qualities in which 
they are all similar, and some which they have in common. Man is evidently at the head of the 
Animal Creation. He seems not only to be possest of every source of pleasure, which any of 
them enjoy, but of many others, to which they are altogether strangers. If he is not the only 
Animal possest of reason, he has it in a degree so greatly superior, as admits of no 
comparison. (Gregory 1767, 8-9) 
However, despite the promising title, it is evident that Gregory used a comparative approach 
particularly to introduce medical and philosophical issues in a broad context. For instance, 
before he began to discuss the causes of high mortality in children (Gregory 1767, 18-63), he 
succinctly mentioned what he believed to be the most crucial aspect of this topic: 
By the most accurate calculation, one half of Mankind die under eight years of age. As this 
mortality is greatest among the most luxurious part of Mankind, and gradually decreases in 
proportion as the diet becomes simpler, the exercise more frequent, and the general method of 
living more hardy, and as it doth not take place among wild Animals, the general foundations 
of it are sufficiently pointed out. (Gregory 1767, 20)  
These and other aspects of Gregory work makes him interesting for historical investigations 
on the establishment of medical ethics (see, e.g., McCullough 1998). 
C.5.2 Life-forms and related concepts 
There were several attempts to classify organisms according to functional features proposed 
by researchers interested in the adaptive features related to environmental conditions, often in 
the framework of ecological research and related fields. By focusing on different features and 
different aspects of the environment, these classifications had different results. Contrary to the 
Linnean classification, these attempts were not part of an organized research programme, but 
were often the product of the work of single investigators, without a pronounced tradition 
within biology.  
Some attempts to classify plants according to plant function in the ecosystem are known by 
the term “growth-forms” or “life-forms”. These concepts take non-homologous patterns of 
similarity from the external morphology of plants as the basis of the classification. Some 
concepts on plant-physiognomy (and this term) were later published by Alexander von 
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Humboldt (1806),191 followed among others by Anton Kerner von Marilaun (1869), August 
Griesebach (1872) and Eugenius Warming (1895). The latter author proposed the term “life-
forms”, which was then translated in English as “growth-forms”.192 The Danish botanist and 
pioneer of plant ecology Christen C. Raunkiaer (1860-1938) proposed the term “life-forms” at 
the beginning of the 20th century (see Tansley in Raunkiaer 1934, xi-xvi). He envisaged a 
system of classification of plants based on the protection afforded to the perennating buds (or 
shoot-apices) by their position in relation to the surface of the soil during the unfavourable 
season to plant life. He originally proposed the division of five groups of plants: 
phanerophytes, chamaephytes, hemicryptophytes, cryptophytes, and therophytes (Raunkiaer 
1934). Raunkier’s system is certainly the most widely applied categorization of life-forms in 
plants; his system was extended by other authors, such as Ellenberg and Mueller-Dombois 
(1966) and D.W. Shimwell (1971). 
The Austrian botanist Helmut Gams (1893-1976) included animals in the analysis of life-
forms in his work Prinzipienfragen der Vegetationsforschung (1918). Later, some zoologists 
developed specific concepts to classify life-forms of animals, such as (a) the German 
entomologist Karl Friederichs (1878-1969) in his book Die Grundfragen und 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten der land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Zoologie insbesondere der 
Entomologie (1930,  41-45); (b) the German zoologist Adolf Remane (1898-1976) in different 
papers (Remane 1943; Remane 1951b); (c) the German zoologist Wolfgang Tischler (1913-
2007) in his book Grundzüge der terrestrischen Tierökologie (Tischler 1949, 14-39);  and (d) 
the Austrian zoologist Wilhelm Kühnelt (1905-1988) in a paper entitled Ein Beitrag zur 
Kenntnis tierischer Formen (Kühnelt 1953), reproduced in his book Grundriss der Ökologie 
(Kühnelt 1970, 106-168).  
The most extensive attempt to classify animals as life-forms was carried out by the German 
zoologist Hans-Wilhelm Koepcke (1914-2000) in the main work Die Lebensformen: 
Grundlagen zu einer universell gültigen biologischen Theorie, published in two volumes in 
1973 and 1974. Koepcke tried to build up a concept in which earthbound insights might lead 
to a universally oriented biology. He understood his work as a first step in discovering axioms 
for the ecological aspect of biological research. “Such use of axioms in biology”, wrote 
Koepcke, “is observed only in the field of biochemistry, biophysics, physiology of the growth 
                                                          
191 An ancient attempt to classify plants according to functional groups can be found in Enquiry into Plants 
(1916) by the Greek Theophrastus (c. 371-c.287 BC). 
192 According to Braun-Blanquet, Warming’s system has found little acceptance, perhaps because of “its variety 
and lack of a coordinating principle” (Braun-Blanquet 1932, 288). 
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and metabolism, as well as in some branches of genetics”  (Koepcke 1971, iii (my 
translation)). The final purpose of his efforts was the foundation of a “universal biology”, 
making it possible to test earthbound biological insights elsewhere in the universe, for 
instance in investigations on the possible existence of extra-terrestrial life.193 Adolf Remane, 
his former teacher, encouraged him to investigate the problem of life-forms (Koepcke 1971, 
viii)). 
Koepcke thought that this universal biology could be reached through a method based on the 
term analogy. Using a great amount of data gathered from the literature194 and his own 
investigations, he presented a comprehensive non-phylogenetic grouping of organisms 
according to functional criteria. This work is, to date, the most elaborate attempt to classify 
life-forms, and it is rather puzzling that it has been virtually ignored by modern biologists. His 
ambitious enterprise, aimed at extensively treating the phenomenon of convergence, justifies 
the importance of this pioneer work but it also revealed the main deficiencies of his approach. 
On the one hand, the broad approach supplies a rich material on convergences and stresses the 
value of convergence in the comparative approaches in biology. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that Koepcke should have restricted his analysis to fewer cases of convergences, 
which would have allowed him a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. However, 
Koepcke’s broad approach is comprehensible and probably coherent with his main goal - the 
formulation of a “universal biology”, which would allow him to make educated predictions on 
extra-terrestrial life. To fulfil this aim, Koepcke mainly used examples of clear adaptive 
features in his attempt to classify convergent adaptations through “ecological formulae” 
(Oekoformel) (Koepcke 1973, 1307-1374). This concept was implied in the work of several 
earlier authors and first proposed by Adolf Remane (1943). Koepcke’s ecological formulae 
classify organisms according to the following criteria (most with several sub categories): (a) 
assimilation of substance (Substanzerwerb); (b) locomotion; (c) “resistance” (used in a very 
broad sense); (d) sociability; (e) brood care; and (f) sexuality. Koepcke explained that this was 
only a rough classification, which could be expanded and refined by the addition of further 
criteria. For example, he used a criterion for “grade of perfection or markedness” 
(Perfektionsgrad or Ausprägungsgrad) to express the differences in intensity in which living 
organisms carried out specific performances. Although Koepcke pointed out that he was 
                                                          
193 Exobiology was the topic of one of his subsequent works (Koepcke 1975). 
194 Curiously, although an impressive number of works are referred to in the text, this book lacks a literature 
list; as well as an index. In a personal communication, Juliane Diller (Koepcke’s daughter) wrote that a third 
volume of the work was planned but never published. She sent this researcher an index of the work of 133 
pages which was planned for the last volume (Diller, pers. comm. on 12. September 2008). 
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dealing with values which are difficult to measure, his evaluations imply a high degree of 
accuracy which does not seem to correspond or reflect, even approximately, the complexity of 
the topics treated in his work. His efforts to identify degrees of adaptation are similar to early 
attempts to depict a certain feature found in different, not always close related species (see 
Figure C.1), implying a preconceived view on the evolution of these features from a more 
generalized to more specialized state. Although these series have a certain justification, if 
used to express different degrees of markedness in a certain feature, they did not consider the 
problems in comparing features which possibly developed under different selective pressures 
and therefore are not “comparable”. Furthermore, these series often imply the erroneous idea 
that organisms develop to reach a state of perfection in the development of certain features. 
 
Figure C.1 Hans Böker’s representation of anatomische Reihe (anatomical rows). He presented the 
feet of different organisms to illustrate the evolution of the human foot. These comparisons often 
reflect the author’s preconceived view about how a feature developed, and therefore they supplied 
little insight about the complexity of organismic evolution.195 (a) Young orangutan, (b) young gorilla, 
(c) adult gorilla, (d) mountain gorilla, (e) and a European; from different authors, in (Böker 1935, 
151). 
As the above mentioned works by Gams, Friederichs, Kühnelt, Remane, Tischler and 
Koepcke are less known to modern non-German speaking biologists, several independent 
concepts of life-forms of animals were later developed. One of the most widespread of these 
concepts was proposed by the American ecologist Richard B. Root, who introduced the term 
“guild” in animal ecology in a paper on the blue-gray gnatcatcher (Root 1967). By guild he 
                                                          
195 This statement should not be interpreted as an attempt to detract Böker’s merits as a biologist. Böker simply 
used a method which was widespread in his time. It was, for instance, extensively used by Carl Gegenbaur, see 
chapter C.2.2 on the concept of ascending scales in anatomical investigations. The integrative approach used in 
Böker’s “biological anatomy” is comparable with Othenio Abel’s interdisciplinary efforts. By insisting that 
biology, ethology, anatomy and palaeontology cannot be treated as separate fields, both authors paved the 
way for modern palaeobiology and ecomorphology.   
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understands “a group of species that exploit the same class of environmental resources in a 
similar way” and species “that overlap significantly in their niche requirements” (Root 1967). 
The American ecologist Kenneth Cummins proposed the term “functional groups” to discuss 
“important process-oriented ecological questions”, and the term “functional type” to describe 
“non-phylogenetic classification leading to a grouping of organisms that respond in a similar 
way to a syndrome of environmental factors” (Cummins 1974). Several plant ecology strategy 
schemes were proposed in the literature, arranging species in categories according to their 
ecological attributes, as for instance that done by Martin Westoby and contributors (Westoby 
1998; Westoby et al. 2002). For a review of further functional classifications see Blaum et al. 
(2011), Gitay and Noble (1998), Kenoyer (1929) and Westoby (1998). 
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APPENDIX D – The historical roots of the savannah hypotheses 
D.1 Introduction 
The emergence of the early ancestors of human beings is traditionally explained in connection 
with an open plain-scenario, often called the “savannah theory” or “savannah hypothesis” 
(SH). Most versions of the savannah model suggest that proto-hominins or hominins 
abandoned forested or wooded habitats and gradually adapted to an open or semi-open 
environment. As we will see, several analogies were implied in comparisons between proto-
hominins and savannah animals, mostly in attempts to corroborate long arguments leading to 
early hominins adapting to open plains or as incidental, but insightful remarks in 
palaeoanthropological publications. The discourse in which these analogies were proposed 
and used to connect with other palaeoanthropological evidence is then a central aspect of the 
present review. The results of this investigation will be integrated into a broad analysis of the 
use of convergence as a tool in early and modern hypotheses on human evolution (in chapter 
6). 
It is probably useful to quote some modern versions of the savannah scenarios to illustrate a 
major change occurred in the last years. The first example is a statement by Charles F. 
Hockett and Robert Ascher in 1964;196 it illustrates what is here denominated “traditional 
SH”. In this scenario, early hominin adaptation to open plains occurred simultaneously or 
almost simultaneously with the development of a permanent bipedalism – as an immediate 
response to this new environment. They wrote: 
Geological evidence suggests that at one or more times during the East African Miocene, a 
climatic change gradually thinned out the vegetation, converting continuous tropic forest into 
open savannah with scattered clumps of trees. As the trees retreated, some bands of hominoids 
retreated with them, never abandoning their classical arboreal existence; their descendants of 
today are the gibbons and siamangs. Other bands were caught in isolated groves of slowly 
diminishing extent. In due time, those bands whose physique make it possible for their 
members to traverse open county to another grove survived; those that could not do this 
became extinct. Thus, for those bands, the survival value of the perquisites for safe ground 
travel was not at all that they could therefore begin a new way of life out of the trees, but that, 
when necessary, they could make their way to a place where the traditional arboreal way of 
life could be continued. The hominoids that were successful at this included those ancestral to 
the great apes and to ourselves. (Hockett & Ascher 1964, 140) 
                                                          
196 According to them, it is an elaboration of the brief suggestion published by Alfred S. Romer some years 
before (Romer 1959, 327); on Romer’s SH see chapter 6. 
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Because of environmental changes and increased interspecific competition, early hominins 
were forced to abandon the forest and occupy the open plains: 
Thus, in the long run, the trees would be held by the more powerful, while the less powerful 
would repeatedly have to get along as best they could in the fringes of the forest or in open 
country. Here is a double selective process. The trees went to the more powerful, provided 
only that they maintained a minimum ability to traverse open country when necessary: some 
of these successful ones were ancestral to the great apes of today. Our own ancestors were the 
failures. We did not abandon the trees because we wanted to, but because we were pushed out. 
(Hockett & Ascher 1964, 140) 
In the last years, a lange Rochade (German for castling long side in chess) took place in 
primatology and palaeoanthropology. As we will see, this event that can be partially 
considered as a continuation of a development which took place in the early 1960s onwards, 
when several authors began to compare chimpanzees living in widely different habitats. In 
this research, they described chimpanzees living in dry open habitat, among others, in an 
attempt to understand the ecological factors which were in this time believed crucial for the 
adaptation of early hominins to similar habitats.197 As will be shown, it was also around this 
time that some authors began to stress the complexity of the palaeoenvironment of early 
hominins and to point out arboreal adaptations in australopithecines. This led to placing the 
major climatic and environmental changes and the adaptation to open plains in a later phase in 
hominin evolution. One example of this version – here called “late-SH” – was formulated by 
Ernst Mayr (1904-2005) in the final book he published. It was written in time for his 100th 
birthday and is a survey of controversial concepts in biology. He wrote: 
The decisive motor in human evolution was apparently a series of climatic changes. The 
Miocene and Pliocene were periods of increasing aridity in Africa. This drought period 
probably peaked around 2 million years ago. As Africa became more arid, the trees in the tree 
savanna suffered, more and more of them died, and the tree savanna gradually became a bush 
savanna. The dying of the trees deprived the australopithecines of their retreat to safety. They 
were completely defenseless where there were no trees. […] Some tree savannas in especially 
favorable places apparently retained their trees and australopithecines survived here for a 
while, such as Australopithecus habilis and the two robust species (Paranthropus). More 
importantly, some australopithecine populations evolved into Homo and became adapted to 
the bush savanna and its carnivorous inhabitants. (Mayr 2004, 199) 
                                                          
197 See chapters 4 and 6, and (McGrew et al. 1981; Moore 1992) on savannah chimpanzees. 
99 
 
 The expression “savannah hypothesis” (or “savannah theory”) is rather modern. It was 
certainly not used regularly in palaeoanthropological literature before being used repeatedly in 
Elaine Morgan’s publications on the aquatic hypothesis from 1972 onwards (see chapter 
D.6.3). However, as we shall see, the first hypotheses on the emergence of primeval man on 
open plains were already proposed in pre-Darwinian times. One of the main differences 
between these early ideas and modern SHs is related to the fact that the early models did not 
conceive open plains to be real geographical place, but rather as a “place of development” in 
opposition to the usual primate habitat as a “place of stagnation”. To acknowledge these 
historical facts and avoid the pitfalls of using modern terms in connection with old ideas, the 
term “open plains hypotheses” was proposed by the author to denominate the early models 
(Bender 1999a, 38).198 The term open plains hypotheses will be used here as synonym to SH, 
but more specifically in connection with hypotheses proposed before the evolutionary 
synthesis.  
As a result of the strong influence of the SHs in palaeoanthropological research, it would be 
expected that the history of this theory has been well investigated. However, besides two 
unpublished works, there is, to date, only one published analysis on the origin and 
development of the open-plains ideas.199 There are many possible reasons for this gap in the 
historical research. Firstly, previous historical analyses of the hypothetical models of early 
human evolution have been carried out by a relatively small group of specialists, and several 
basic aspects of the history of hypotheses on human evolution are still under-researched 
(Corbey 1995, 5). Secondly, in addition to projects conceived for other specific purposes,200 
most of the historical surveys deliver basic overviews of the topic (Bowler 1986; Delisle 
2004; 2007; Eiseley 1961; Parker & Jaffe 2008), which do not allow extensive analyses of 
single evolutionary scenarios. Thirdly, while some excellent reviews of the latest discussion 
on environmental changes in palaeoanthropological hypotheses have been published recently, 
they have not analyzed the palaeoanthropological discussion before 1925 (Potts 1998a; Potts 
                                                          
198 This term was inspired by the terminology of Hans Weinert (1887-1967), who used expressions like 
Freilandtiere (open plain animals) in connection with Dryopithecus and Freilandmenschenaffen (open plain 
apes) in connection with Australopithecus africanus; see chapter D.5.2. 
199 Several authors succinctly mentioned early ideas on primeval man abandoning forests and facing the danger 
of a terrestrial life or, more specifically, a life in open places (Bowler 1986, 161-170; Landau 1991, 45-47; 
Stoczkowski 2002, 55-77) without a detailed discussion of the SHs’ early origins. The present chapter expands 
and develops a historical review presented in an unpublished thesis (Bender 1999a).; this work was merged 
with the research carried out by Nicole Bender-Oser (Bender-Oser 2004b) and published in (Bender et al. 
2012); the present chapter is partially based on this publication. 
200  For instance, some works describe patterns of narrative in human evolution (Landau 1981; 1991) or identify 
alleged parallels between ancient and modern palaeoanthropological hypotheses (Stoczkowski 2002). 
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1998b; Reed 1997). One of the most important reasons for the absence of historical research 
on the open plains-ideas is related to the notion that the beginning of the SHs seemed to be 
clearly identifiable (see chapter D.4 on the discovery of Australopithecus africanus by 
Raymond Dart). As already mentioned, this opinion is not compatible with historical facts. 
D.2 Aims and scope of the investigation 
The following questions are in focus of the present review: 
(a) How did the idea of primeval man evolving in open plains develop and how was this idea 
defended in anthropological discussion after 1859? 
(b) Did the open plains-concept influence Dart’s description of the child of Taung, or was 
Dart’s SH inferred directly from the fossil evidence described by him in 1925?  
(c) How did early anthropologists use analogies between humans and other organisms to 
corroborate or illustrate the existence of primeval man on open plains? 
(d) How was the evidence gathered from different palaeoanthropological disciplines used to 
support the savannah model? 
(e) Which alternative scenarios were proposed to contextualize early hominin evolution, and 
how does the logical corroboration of these scenarios differ from the corroboration of the 
SHs? 
In the present chapter a representative sample of SHs published in the major European 
languages between 1809 and 1939 are analyzed. This timeframe is determined by two 
publications which established relevant aspects in the emergence and consolidation of the 
SHs: in 1809 Jean Baptiste de Lamarck published the first suggestion of primeval man 
standing upright in response to an open environment; and in 1939 Franz Weidenreich 
described these ideas as a “widely spread belief” (Weidenreich 1939, 87-88). 
D.3 The origin of the idea of primeval man developing on open plains  
As far as can be assessed, the first ideas about primeval man emerging in open plains in the 
framework of an evolutionary hypothesis were outlined in 1809 by the French naturalist Jean 
Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de la Marck (1744-1829). In his Philosophie 
zoologique (Lamarck [1809] 2006) Lamarck describes in details how an early ancestor of 
primeval man abandons an arboreal life to adapt itself to open plains (English translation by 
Hugh Elliot):  
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As a matter of fact, if some race of quadrumanous animals, especially one of the most perfect 
of them, were to lose, by force of circumstances or some other cause, the habit of climbing 
trees and grasping the branches with its feet in the same way as with its hands, in order to hold 
on to them; and if the individuals of this race were forced for a series of generations to use 
their feet only for walking, and to give up using their hands like feet; there is no doubt […] 
that these quadrumanous animals would at length be transformed into bimanous, and that the 
thumbs of their feet would cease to be separated from the other digits, when they only used 
their feet for walking. (Lamarck 2006, 170)  
Lamarck did not specifically use the expressions “open plains” or “savannah”, but, as we can 
see in the passage below, a “large and distant view” is not the context of a forest habitat201: 
Furthermore, if the individuals of which I speak were impelled by the desire to command a 
large and distant view, and hence endeavoured to stand upright, and continually adopted that 
habit from generation to generation, there is again no doubt that their feet would gradually 
acquire a shape suitable for supporting them in an erect attitude; that their legs would acquire 
calves, and that these animals would then not be able to walk on their hands and feet together, 
except with difficulty. (Lamarck 2006, 170) 
Lamarck was not the first to propagate ideas on the role of freed hands for human beings. 
They were sometimes expressed by ancient authors, as for instance in the text Memorabilia by 
the Greek historian, philosopher and soldier Xenophon (ca. 431-355 BC). He wrote:  
To begin with, of all the animals, it is only human beings that they made stand upright. And 
upright posture makes one able to see more before one, gaze more at the things above, and 
suffer less that is bad. And they implanted sight, hearing, and a mouth. And then, while they 
gave feet to the other animals who walk, these permit them only to travel; on human beings 
they also included hands, which produce most of those things whereby we are happier than 
they. (Xenophon 1994,1, 4, § 11, translated by Bonnette) 
The concept of a primeval man having freed hands to use weapons or tools also belongs to the 
topics discussed by philosophers of the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries, often 
linked to ancient theories on the origin and development of culture (see Müller 1968; 
Stoczkowski 2002, 124-126).  
                                                          
201 This interpretation of Lamarck’s ideas was also suggested in a paper Man’s posture: its evolution and 
disorders by the Scottish anatomist and anthropologist Arthur Keith (1866-1955) when he stated: “From this 
passage we see that […] Lamarck regarded the erect posture as a result of the chimpanzee-like ancestor having 
abandoned an arboreal mode of life for one in the open country. [...] He was fully alive to the fact that any 
anthropoid which had acquired the human mode of progression had gained an enormous advantage; it would no 
longer be confined to tracts of tropical jungle but would have the whole length and breadth of the earth open to 
it” (Keith 1923, 451, italics added). 
102 
 
In Lamarck’s view forests were not adequate enough to promote the evolution of man. 
Consequently, he believed that the first bipedal ancestor of primeval man would dominate and 
banish other primates in localities which he did not occupy, i.e. into forests or other desert 
places (Lamarck 2006, 170). For Lamarck it was clear that the emergence of bipedalism and 
freed hands and its consequences for the development of intelligence gave primeval man a 
decided advantage over other animals.  
Lamarck’s scenario of a bipedal primeval man using his free hands for purposes other than 
climbing trees and grasping branches – an idea previously termed “tower hypothesis”202 by 
the author (Bender 1999a, 65) – was the first hypothesis on human bipedalism203 embedded 
within an evolutionary context. Similar models were regularly presented in several 
publications from the late 19th century onwards (see, e.g., Baer & Hellwald 1874, 526-528; 
Keith 1923; Knauer 1916; Koch 1929, 54; Munro 1897, 90-93; Osborn 1919, 60; Reinhardt 
1906, 6; Suschkin 1933). For instance, Franz Koch (1929, 54), in an early attempt to 
corroborate his views on the emergence and dissemination of early man with help from Alfred 
Wegener’s theory of continental drift, wrote about the emergence of an erect posture for 
purposes of vigilance and defence: “The primeval man, his wife and children probably had to 
stand up to an incessant search for enemies and prey and frequently betake themselves to 
flight” (Koch 1929, 54, my translation). Koch gave no specific source of these views, which 
suggests that this idea had been defended already by other authors. Different versions of the 
tower hypotheses (today often called “vigilance hypothesis”) were defended in the three 
decades subsequent to the evolutionary synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s (Emiliani 1968; 
Heberer 1973, 34; Ravey 1978; Robinson 1963, 401; Robinson 1972, 257; Washburn & 
DeVore 1961) and are still stated in palaeoanthropological and primatological literature.  
Sixty-two years after Koch’s publication, Charles Darwin had published the Descent of Man 
with his own ideas on the evolution of man. In this book he expressed what it seems to be a 
strongly summarized version of Lamarck’s scenario of a primeval man leaving the forest and 
adapting to open plains:  
As soon as some ancient member in the great series of the Primates came, owing to a change 
in its manner of procuring subsistence, or to a change in the conditions of its native country, to 
                                                          
202 Modern versions of this idea are usually called “vigilance hypothesis“. Although modern models rescinded 
statements suggesting “a trend to evolve” in early hominin evolution, they show a remarkable similarity with 
Lamarck’s tower hypothesis, often mentioning the aspect of vigilance against predators. 
203 Although Benoît de Maillet should be considered the first naturalist to devote a book on evolutionary ideas, 
he did not consider human bipedalism in his book Telliamed; see Appendix B.   
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live somewhat less on trees and more on the ground, its manner of progression would have 
been modified; and in this case it would have had to become either more strictly quadrupedal 
or bipedal. (Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 140-141) 
The similarity between the ideas of Lamarck and Darwin relies not only on the same overall 
adaptive scenario exposed by both authors (an arboreal primate abandoning the forest, 
occupying an open landscape and developing habitual bipedalism in response to the new 
environment), but also on the identification of two alternative reasons for the evolutionary 
phenomenon: Lamarck’s picture of a primate abandoning the forests “by force of 
circumstances or some other cause” (Lamarck 2006, 170) correlates with Darwin’s scenario 
(quoted above) of a primate adapting to a more terrestrial life “owing to a change in its 
manner of procuring subsistence, or to a change in the conditions of its native country” 
(Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 140). It is therefore not surprising that at least one early historian 
pointed to the strong coincidences in the open plains scenarios of both authors. When 
commenting on Lamarck’s open plains ideas, the American entomologist and palaeontologist 
Alpheus Packard succinctly stated:  
This is certainly, for the time it was written, an original, comprehensive, and bold attempt at 
explaining […] the probable origin of man from some arboreal creature allied to the apes. It is 
as regards the actual evolutional steps supposed to have been taken by the simian ancestors of 
man, a more detailed and comprehensive hypothesis than that offered by Darwin in his 
Descent of Man, which Lamarck has anticipated. (Packard 1901, 371)204  
Some years later, Ludwig Wilser was surprised about the modernity of Lamarck’s open plains 
ideas. After quoting Lamarck, he pointed out that there is nothing really wrong with his 
account of human evolution, even taking into consideration “the advanced knowledge and 
science of our day” (Wilser 1910, 59-60, my translation). Mayr also pointed out that 
Lamarck’s hypothesis “is startlingly modern” (1982, 352), and Delisle came to a similar 
conclusion when he stated: “Lamarck’s view is modern in that it is fairly close to what we 
believe today to be true” (2007, 43). Similar statements emphasising the modernity of 
Darwin’s open plains ideas were also expressed by palaeoanthropologists. For instance, when 
discussing Darwin’s views on the evolution of man, Nesturch described a modern SH:  
                                                          
204 The negative connotation of Packard’s statement should be qualified, as he wrote these words from the 
perspective of a proponent of Neo-Lamarckism. Nevertheless, in one point Packard is right: Lamarck’s 
hypothesis on the evolution of primeval man was the most elaborate until 1863, when Thomas Huxley, Carl 
Vogt and Charles Lyell published their works on the subject (Huxley 1864 [1st ed. 1863]; Lyell 1863; Vogt 1863). 
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As a result of changes in the natural conditions, mainly due an opening of the forests in their 
home, our ancestors were forced to abandon the trees in their search for food and live on the 
ground in a wooded steppe [Waldsteppenlandschaft]. Later they occupied completely open 
landscapes. (Nesturch 1961, 25, my translation) 
In this quotation, Nesturch did not specify which were Darwin’s original ideas and which 
were the SHs developed after 1871; in doing so, he implied a strong similarity between 
Darwin’s open plains ideas and the SHs defended in the 1960s. Finally, to give some recent 
examples:  McHenry wrote that “Darwin’s view of the origin of bipedalism remains useful” 
(1982, 156); and Tobias observed that “There had been a long-standing hypothesis, going 
back to Charles Darwin and then to Raymond Dart and Robert Broom, that early human 
evolution occurred in a savanna environment. I grew up with this paradigm and it had 
acquired an aura of sanctity” (2004, 388).  
However, these indications cannot be interpreted as definitive evidence that Darwin’s SH was 
directly inspired by Lamarck’s open plains scenario. Darwin, of course, well knew of 
Lamarck’s Philosophie zoologique (Darwin 1897, xix),205 but he did not quote Lamarck (or 
any other author) in relation to his own SH. In later editions he included a “Historical Sketch” 
in which he recognised Lamarck (among many others) as pioneering the evolutionary idea 
(Darwin 1897, xiv), yet at the same time he pointed out Lamarck’s erroneous views on “a law 
of progressive development” (Darwin 1897, xv), which Darwin justifiably could not endorse. 
In private correspondence Darwin did not appreciate references to his own evolutionary ideas 
as a modification of Lamarck’s doctrine of development and progression (see Gould 2002, 
193-197). This is especially evident in a letter to Charles Lyell dated 12-13 March 1863:  
Lastly, you refer repeatedly to my views as a modification of Lamarcks doctrine of 
development & progression; if this is your deliberate opinion there is nothing to be said −; but 
it does not seem so to me; Plato, Buffon, my grandfather before Lamarck & others 
propounded the obvious view that if species were not created separately, they must have 
descended from other species: & I can see nothing else in common between the Origin & 
Lamarck. I believe this way of putting the case is very injurious to its acceptance; as it implies 
necessary progression & closely connects Wallace’s & my views with what I consider, after 
two deliberate readings, as a wretched book; & one from which (I well remember my surprise) 
I gained nothing. (Darwin 1999, 222-223)  
                                                          
205 Darwin had a copy of the 1830 printing of Philosophie zoologique  (see Hull 1985, 802). For Darwin’s 
references to Lamarck’s evolutionary ideas see Schilling (1990) and (Egerton 1976). 
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From these words it is understandable that Darwin avoided quotations of Lamarck’s views as 
supporting his own ideas, limiting himself to the formal acknowledgment of Lamarck as one 
among many precursors of the evolutionary idea. The present study does not intend to 
contribute here to the discussion on Lamarck’s possible influence on Darwin’s evolutionary 
views. Basically, I agree with Ernst Mayr when he suspected that “Darwin vastly 
underestimated the role which Lamarck had played in preparing the intellectual climate for 
the subsequent Darwinian advances” (Mayr 1972, 90). This view is also defended by some 
other historians of science (Corsi 1978; Gould 2002, 194). On the other hand, Darwin’s 
alleged failure to properly acknowledge previous naturalists is sometimes based on a complex 
set of factors, which cannot simply be explained as Darwin’s intellectual antipathy towards 
these authors or concerns about overemphasis of the pioneering work of others. A revealing 
and widely ignored example for this complexity is related to one of Darwin’s ideas, which I  
once named “Darwins Inseltheorie”(Darwin’s island hypothesis) (Bender 1999b, 111). This 
topic will be dealt with in the next section.  
D.3.1 Darwin’s island hypothesis and possible reasons for his failure to acknowledge 
certain authors  
Darwin speculated in Descent on the possibility that a “helpless” primeval man could have 
developed first on a large island, where he would not be confronted with dangerous predators:  
But granting that the progenitors of man were far more helpless and defenceless than any 
existing savages, if they had inhabited some warm continent or large island, such as Australia 
or New Guinea, or Borneo (the latter island being now tenanted by the orang), they would not 
have been exposed to any special danger. In an area as large as one of these islands, the 
competition between tribe and tribe would have been sufficient, under favourable conditions, 
to have raised man, through the survival of the fittest, combined with the inherited effects of 
habit, to his present high position in the organic scale. (Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 157) 
Darwin did not mention that John Frederick William Herschel (1792-1871) had already 
suggested a connection between human as helpless creatures and the refuge in islands in 
tropic regions like humans survive?” In the first page of his work A Preliminary Discourse on 
the Study of Natural Philosophy, first published in 1830, Herschel wrote: 
The situation of man on the globe he inhabits, and over which he has obtained the control, is 
in many respects exceedingly remarkable. Compared with its other denizens, he seems, if we 
regard only his physical constitution, in almost every respect their inferior, and equally 
unprovided for the supply of his natural wants and his defence against the innumerable 
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enemies which surround him. No other animal passes so large a portion of its existence in a 
state of absolute helplessness, or falls in old age into such protected and lamentable imbecility. 
(Herschel 1831,1) 
In the same paragraph Herschel envisaged a non-evolutionary scenario in which man could 
have some chances to linger:  
 Remarkable only for the absence of those powers and qualities which obtain for other animals 
a degree of security and respect, he would be disregarded by some, and hunted down by 
others, till, after a few generations, his species would become altogether extinct, or, at best, 
would be restricted to a few islands in tropical regions, where the warmth of the climate, the 
paucity of enemies, and the abundance of food, might permit it to linger. (Herschel 1831, 2) 
It is highly problematic to interpret the obvious similarity between the ideas of Herschel and 
Darwin as mere coincidence. It is well documented that Herschel’s work was influential in 
Darwin’s career (Gildenhuys 2004; Ruse 199313-33; Warner 2009), so this subject will not be 
treated in detail here. Darwin not only knew and acknowledged Herschel’s book A 
Preliminary Discourse, but also considered it as fundamental to his work as a naturalist, as he 
freely admitted in his autobiography:  
During my last year at Cambridge, I read with care and profound interest Humboldt's Personal 
Narrative. This work, and Sir J. Herschel's Introduction to the Study of Natural Philosophy206 
stirred up in me a burning zeal to add even the most humble contribution to the noble structure 
of Natural Science. No one or a dozen other books influenced me nearly so much as these two. 
(Darwin 1958, 67-68) 
What is probably more relevant than the simple similarity between the statements of Darwin 
and Herschel is that Darwin’s island hypothesis is diametrically opposed to other statements 
expressed in his Descent, where he speculated on the birthplace and antiquity of man:  
We are naturally led to enquire where was the birthplace of man at that stage of descent when 
our progenitors diverged from the Catarhine stock. The fact that they belonged to this stock 
clearly shews that they inhabited the Old World; but not Australia nor any oceanic island, as 
we may infer from the laws of geographical distribution. In each great region of the world the 
living mammals are closely related to the extinct species of the same region. It is therefore 
probable that Africa was formerly inhabited by extinct apes closely allied to the gorilla and 
                                                          
206 Darwin meant A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. The deviation in the title is due to 
the fact that Herschel’s book was initially the introductory volume to Cabinet Cyclopedia, edited by Dionysius 
Lardner. 
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chimpanzee; and as these two species are now man's nearest allies, it is somewhat more 
probable that our early progenitors lived on the African continent than elsewhere. (Darwin 
1871, vol. 1, 199, italics added) 
This almost207 unnoticed amazing contradiction indicates that Darwin’s island hypothesis was 
not developed in consonance with the bulk of arguments presented in other parts of his work. 
One can assume that it is difficult to classify as mere coincidence the similarities between 
Lamarck’s and Darwin’s open plains views (as well as the similarities between Herschel’s and 
Darwin’s island hypotheses). However, this is not to accuse Darwin of plagiarism or to doubt 
on his integrity. Contrary to the passionate conclusions expressed by early anti-Darwinists 
(see, e.g., Kohlbrugge 1915), the opinion of most historians is shared here: that Darwin’s 
work is a landmark in evolutionary biology. He was undoubtedly an original genius, but he 
was nevertheless anticipated by some earlier authors concerning the formulation of some 
specific ideas. Darwin was working with a prodigious amount of data obtained both from 
publications or directly supplied through personal communications in the correspondence 
with other naturalists. After years of intensive research it seems that it was increasingly 
difficult for him to draw a sharp line between original ideas and information he obtained from 
the literature. It may be that Darwin reformulated Herschel’s statements in an evolutionary 
context, inserted it in the chapter on the cradle of mankind, and subsequently forgot to check 
the compatibility of these ideas with his own concepts expressed in other chapters in the same 
book. However, why should Darwin not mention Herschel’s authorship in connection with the 
island hypothesis? When I addressed this question to Darwin’s expert Mario Di Gregorio208, 
he pointed out that Darwin made great efforts to present his evolutionary ideas as a 
contribution to natural science and not to a philosophical debate. This is a plausible 
explanation for the absence of any acknowledgement of Herschel, since Herschel’s island 
hypothesis was proposed in a work on natural philosophy. 
To sum up, the hypothesis that Darwin’s open plains ideas were inspired by Lamarck seems 
corroborated by the different facts. It would be however misleading to consider Darwin’s 
                                                          
207 It is remarkable that this evident incongruence is ignored by historians of science, but was identified by an 
early author interested in finding misconceptions in Darwin’s work. In his book Homo Versus Darwin: A Judicial 
Examination of Statements Recently Published by Mr. Darwin Regarding "The Descent of Man", William 
Penman Lyon (1812-1877) presented his thoughts in the form of a judicial enquiry. He wrote:  “How can Mr. 
Darwin make such a supposition  [on helpless primeval man surviving on a large island like Australia or New 
Guinea, or Borneo], my Lord, when he says elsewhere, "the fact that they (man's progenitors) belonged to this 
(the Catarhine) stock, clearly shows that they inhabited the Old World ; but not Australia, nor any oceanic 
island, as we may infer from the laws of geographical distribution?” (Lyon 1872, 81). 
208 In his talk Charles Darwin: His methods of work and their influence on how he conceived and shaped his 
theories (1st of March 2011, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Cape Town). 
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failure to acknowledge Lamarck’s open plains ideas as plagiarism. It is possible that Darwin 
was inspired by Lamarck’s open plains ideas but simply forgot where he first read about it. It 
is not impossible that Darwin avoided acknowledging Lamarck in connection with an idea 
that Darwin perceived as so obvious that a reference to a similar idea expressed by an earlier 
author would be redundant. Finally – and closely related to the latter explanation – it cannot 
be completely excluded that Darwin did not pay attention to Lamarck’s open plains ideas and 
convergently developed the same idea; this topic is treated in the next section.  
D.3.2 The intuitive passage from an arboreal to a terrestrial mode of life 
The picture of an arboreal ancestor of man abandoning the trees and adapting to open plains is 
an intuitive one. It is strongly connected to the ancient dichotomy of non-human primates 
living on forest / humans living outside of forests. This dichotomy is reinforced by the idea of 
forest as a place which accommodates “progressive” non-human animals or – at the other end 
of the comparison between humans and other animals - what was once believed to be 
primitive human races “still living” on forests. These ideas can be identified for instance in 
the myths of wild men (Bernheimer 1970; Husband 1980), in the Eurocentric comparisons 
between non-human primates and allegedly “primitive humans” (Corbey 2005; Duchet 1995; 
Gerbi 2010; Hodgen 1971; Thijssen 1995; Thomas 1983) and in the innumerable 
anthropomorphic depictions of non-human primates, for instance holding a stick in the 
hand.209  
The idea of humans living first in woodlands and then, with the passage of time, becoming 
inhabitants of open land already had been expressed outside the context of evolutionary 
thinking. One early example concerns the statements by William Pownall (1722-1805), 
Governor of Massachusetts from 1757 to 1760, in a book An Antiquarian Romance 
Endeavouring to Mark a Line by which the Most Ancient People and the Processions of the 
Earliest Inhabitancy of Europe may be Investigated, first published in 1795. In this account of 
the history of the European races based on ancient authors, Pownall described first humans as 
“woodland-men” or “Sylvan men”, who did not have the same opportunities to become as 
prolific as “land-workers”. He wrote:  
Whilst men continued living the Sylvan life, gathering the spontaneous vegetables and fruits of 
the woods, or as hunters catching the wild animals of the forest, for their food; they would, 
                                                          
209 Primates staying or walking with sticks – see figures in (Bender 1999a; Spencer 1995) – were not only 
depicted in zoological treatises, but also sometimes described in travel books, as for instance by the Muslim 
traveller Ibn Baṭūṭah  (1304-ca. 1368) (Ibn-Battuta 1858, vol. IV, 176).  
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from the mode of that life, and from the nature of that occupation, multiply but slowly. […] 
The Sylvan Hunter Nation, from principle, never could be prolific and populous, and in fact 
never was. (Pownall 1795, 136-137) 
The idea of humans descending from “less progressive” animal forms (= e.g., creatures 
walking on four legs and the body entirely covered with fur) was even expressed within 
theological discussions. One interesting example can be found in a widely ignored booklet 
entitled Taschenbuch der Vorzeit (Pocketbook of Antiquity) published in 1805 by the German 
mathematician, historian and architect Jacob Friedrich von Rösch (1743-1841). The booklet 
was conceived as an extract of a future publication.210 Within a discussion on Preadamism 
Rösch, wrote the following, quite remarkable passage on Adam as a kind of wild man (= 
human with animalistic features):  
Adam probably lost sight of humans in his childhood, grew up among animals of the field, has 
been running on all fours, and did not know from whom he received his existence. During a 
great inundation or deluge which took place in his time, his skill in running and climbing 
helped him to escape the rising water211. (Rösch 1805, 4-5, my translation) 
The idea of progressive humans evolving “outside of forests” was the most logical 
consequence of early attempts to envisage human evolution. Although the terms “open 
plains”, “savannah” or “open glades” in connection with human evolution was only 
sporadically used in the 19th century (Wallace 1889, 459) and early 20th century (Keith 1923; 
Weinert 1932, 209; Wells et al. 1931, 536), the primary early human adaptation to open plains 
or forest margins was usually regarded as a fact. This idea was not only implied, but was also 
sporadically explicitly stated, as for instance by the British naturalist and evolutionist Alfred 
Russel Wallace. In following statement he touched not only the dichotomy “forest / open 
plains”, but used this idea to created a more specific dichotomy, which is based on the 
polarization “tropic environment = forests = place of stagnation” / “subtropical zone = open 
                                                          
210 This was published in 1819 under the title Beiträge zur Geographie und Geschichte der Vorzeit. Rösch 
discussed also Ballensted’s work Die Urwelt oder Beweis von dem Daseyn und Untergang von mehr als einer 
Vorwelt (Rösch 1819, 441-456). As mentioned in Appendix B, chapter B.3, Ballensted wrote about gradual 
evolutionary changes in living organisms and knew and Telliamed from the secondary literature. Rösch’s and 
Ballensted’s works are impressive examples of theological discourse leading to ideas evoking evolutionary 
phenomena as soon as speculations were not restricted by the time frame and narrative imposed by the Bible. 
In fact, as soon as Adam was not considered the first human, completely new perspectives were open 
regarding what was “before Adam”.  
211 Adam hat sich wahrscheinlich in seiner Kindheit von den Menschen verloffen [„verlaufen“ in modern 
German], ist unter den Thieren des Feldes aufgewachsen, auf allen vieren geloffen [gelaufen], und wusste nicht 
von wem er sein Daseyn erhalten. Bei einer zu seiner Zeit erfolgten grossen Ueberschwemmung oder Sündfluth 
half ihm seine erlangte Fertigkeit im Laufen, Steigen und Klettern dem Anlaufe des Wassers zu entrinnen.  
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plains (or high plateaus) = place of development”. He used this dichotomy to reinforce his 
ideas on humans developing in a more “vigorous” environment outside of the tropics212:   
It has usually been considered that the ancestral form of man originated in the tropics, where 
vegetation is most abundant and the climate most equable. But there are some important 
objections to this view. The anthropoid apes, as well as most of the monkey tribe, are 
essentially arboreal in their structure, whereas the great distinctive character of man is his 
special adaptation to terrestrial locomotion. We can hardly suppose, therefore, that he 
originated in a forest region, where fruits to be obtained by climbing are the chief vegetable 
food. It is more probable that he began his existence on the open plains or high plateaux of the 
temperate or sub-tropical zone [.] (Wallace 1889, 459) 
This popular use of a specific principle of parsimony in the interpretation of early human 
evolution – the only conceivable environment to contextualize primeval man’s evolution was 
“on the ground” and “outside of the forest” – supplied the rationale to formulate several 
concurring hypotheses addressing the exact way in which early hominins interacted with this 
new environment. When focusing on the multiple ideas proposed within the SHs’ framework, 
early scientists did not challenge the general scenario of a primeval man adapting to the open 
plains; they rather accepted the assumption to be a fact. The early roots of the open plains 
ideas became eclipsed when fossil evidence discovered by Raymond Dart became an integral 
part of this discussion; this topic will be discussed in the next section. 
D.4 The role of fossil evidence: Raymond Dart as alleged pioneer of the 
savannah hypotheses  
D.4.1 The discovery of Australopithecus africanus and the formulation of the savannah 
hypothesis 
The Australian palaeoanthropologist Raymond Dart (1893-1988) is sporadically mentioned in 
connection with the SHs, or presented as the first proponent or among the pioneers of these 
ideas (Boesch-Achermann & Boesch 1994; Cerling et al. 2011; Potts 1998b; Reed 1997; 
Roede et al. 1991; Susman 1987; Verhaegen 1991). Implied in these views is the idea that the 
SHs arose through the discovery of crucial empirical data – in this case through the ground-
                                                          
212 This idea sometimes implies the Eurocentric concept of humans in the tropics as inferior to groups living in 
subtropical zones. Wallace’s statement is remarkably similar to the ideas expressed by Moriz Wagner in 1870 
and posthumously reprinted in 1889 (see below, chapter D.5.1). As we will see, views on primeval man’s 
evolution influenced by a harsh environment (e.g., cold or arid climate, presence of predators) are among the 
most characteristic aspects of early open plains ideas. The idea of a humans of tropical countries as inferior to 
humans living in colder regions was criticized by the Brazilian doctor Antônio da Silva Melo in his book A 
superioridade do homem tropical (Melo 1965).  
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breaking discovery of the fossil named “Taung child” (Australopithecus africanus) described 
by Dart in 1925. Dart’s status as pioneer of the SHs is not a mere footnote concerning 
academic authorship. It reveals a fundamental aspect on the role of fossil evidence in the 
formulation or falsification of hypotheses in palaeoanthropology and has therefore to be 
investigated in detail. For good reason, historians of science usually disparage “precursor-
hunting”, – or attempts to identify precursors for current ideas without paying enough 
attention to their specific historical context. However, little attention was given to the 
readiness in accepting the interpretation of fossil evidence as the beginning of a new 
hypothesis, although this model was widespread in palaeoanthropological discussion at the 
time. Since the historical events of the discovery, description and reception of 
Australopithecus africanus belong to the best-described topics in the history of 
palaeoanthropology (Dart & Craig 1959; Delisle 2007, 222-265; Gundling 2005; Kuykendall 
& Štrkalj 2007; Tobias 1984a; Tobias 1998; Wheelhouse & Smithford 2001), the present 
chapter analyses only some specific aspects of Dart’s palaeoanthropological work and his 
alleged status as pioneer of the SHs.  
Dart was born in Australia, where he received his medical training. After working under the 
anatomist Grafton Elliot Smith (1871-1937) at the University College London, he arrived in 
South Africa in 1923 to assume the position of Professor of Anatomy at the University of the 
Witwatersrand Medical School. In 1924 Dart received two crates of fossil-bearing rocks 
(“breccia”) recovered at a site known as Taung (then mistakenly considered to lie in 
Bechuanaland), in South Africa. One crate contained the facial skeleton and the fossilized 
endocranial cast of a juvenile primate specimen, which came to be known as the “Taung 
child”. Soon after he removed the matrix from the face of the Taung child,213 Dart prepared a 
report for the journal Nature. This appeared on February 7, 1925, with the title 
“Australopithecus africanus: the man-ape of South Africa” (Dart 1925). Dart named this fossil 
form Australopithecus africanus (the “southern ape of Africa”), regarding it as basically an 
ape with some human-like features.  
In his classic paper on the Taung child published in 1925, Dart expressed the first hypotheses 
on the evolutionary significance of several features of A. africanus and outlined a scenario to 
contextualize the emergence of this species (Dart 1925). He believed that through bipedalism 
the hands of the first hominins were freed from their more primitive function of accessory 
                                                          
213 Though Dart separated the upper and lower jaws only four years later, on July 10, 1929; see (Dart & Craig 
1959, 59). 
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organs of locomotion. The hands, he observed, were assuming a “higher evolutionary rôle” as 
instruments of the growing intelligence and as organs of offence and defence, allowing the 
absence of “massive canines and hideous features” in our ancestors (Dart 1925, 197).  
Dart was evidently inspired by Darwin in connection with the formulation of his arguments 
on the role of the open plains in hominin evolution. As shown above, Darwin’s views on the 
role of an open environment in the emergence of primeval man were expressed in succinct 
passages in which he speculated about the theoretical advantage of human bipedalism 
(Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 140-141). In the same chapter of Descent Darwin wrote: “No country in 
the world abounds in a greater degree with dangerous beasts than Southern Africa”(Darwin 
1871, vol. 1, 157). Dart quoted this passage to underline his own ideas about the role of open 
plains as a harsh environment in hominin evolution in his Nature paper of 1925:  
[…] in my opinion, Southern Africa, by providing a vast open country with occasional 
wooded belts and a relative scarcity of water, together with a fierce and bitter mammalian 
competition, furnished a laboratory such as was essential to this penultimate phase of human 
evolution. (Dart 1925, 199) 
Dart believed that the enhanced cerebral power of early hominins made their existence 
possible in an “untoward environment”, described as “more vast open veldt country where 
competition was keener between swiftness and stealth, and where adroitness of thinking and 
movement played a preponderating role in the preservation of this species ” (Dart 1925, 199). 
He emphasised the desert or semi-desert ecology of the Taung area as supporting his 
interpretation of the status of the Taung child:    
It will appear to many a remarkable fact that an ultra-simian and pre-human stock should be 
discovered, in the first place, at this extreme southern point in Africa, and, secondly, in 
Bechuanaland, for one does not associate with the present climatic conditions obtaining on the 
eastern fringe of the Kalahari desert an environment favourable to higher primate life. (Dart 
1925, 198) 
The idea of a harsh environment as influential in the origin of primeval man became one of 
the most important factors in the SHs. However, Dart did not play any crucial role in the early 
development of this idea: on the one hand, as already mentioned in connection to Wallace’s 
ideas and as it will be shown below, the connection “harsh-environment / human evolution” 
was already defended by influential authors before 1925; on the other hand, as we will see, 
this idea became popular in a time in which Dart’s views on the hominin status of 
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Australopithecus africanus were rejected by most specialists in the years following the first 
description of the child Taung. I suspect that the most important aspect of Dart’s stressing a 
semi-arid environment for A. africanus might not primary has been an attempt to stress the 
harsh conditions of the place. Aware that other specialists would not agree with his views of 
the hominin status of the Taung of child (see below, chapter D.4.2), Dart was probably trying 
to prevent the attack of these specialists by presenting the species as evolving in an 
environment considered as completely untypical for an ape but feasible for an ancestor of 
humans; this is the topic of the next section. 
D.4.2 The hominin status of Australopithecus africanus: Keith’s analogy with an Artic 
species and issues concerning big brains 
Most scientists at this time did not accept the Taung discovery as relevant for the 
reconstruction of hominin phylogeny. In spite of Charles Darwin’s prediction that Africa 
would prove to be the cradle of humankind (Darwin 1922, 240), most scholars opined that the 
emergence of the first hominins occurred in Asia. The scarce fossil evidence at this time 
included several Neandertal remains, the Cro-Magnon man discovered in 1868 in southwest 
France, the fraudulent “Piltdown Man” with a deliberately contrived combination of ape-like 
and human-like features (see below), the remains of Pithecanthropus erectus (first named 
Anthropopithecus, now Homo erectus) found in the 1890s in Eastern Java and “Boskop Man” 
found at Boskop in the South African Transvaal.214 Dart was not unaware of the possible 
controversy of his Taung find in Africa: “Up to the year 1924”, he later wrote in his 
autobiography, “South Africa was virtually unknown anthropological territory” (Dart & Craig 
1959, 20).  
One of the arguments against the hominin status of A. africanus was based on the 
morphological similarities that juvenile apes and modern humans share (Keith et al. 1925; 
Keith 1931, 115f). It was difficult to refute this argument, since one popular idea proposed 
during this time by the Dutch anatomist Louis Bolk (1866-1930) suggested that modern 
humans are sexually mature ape foetuses (Bolk 1926), a hypothesis further developed by 
some other scholars.215 A typical comment on the discovery of A. africanus was expressed by 
                                                          
214 This fossil was described in Nature by Dart (1923) and had been named Homo capensis by Broom (1918); for 
many years it was regarded as Homo sapiens. 
215 See, e.g., Schindewolf (1936, 46pp., 56pp.) and Eiseley (1947). Dobzhansky, (1962, 196), pointed out the 
hypotheses defending man’s similarity to simian foetus: “That this pattern suggests a fetalization is an 
interesting fact, but by itself it throws little light on the natural selective processes that must have operated in 
human evolution.” This statement probably still reflects the opinion of most palaeoanthropologists. For a 
critical discussion, see e.g., McKinney and McNamara, (1991, 291); Menke, (2007).  
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the Swiss zoologist and palaeontologist Adolf Naef (1883-1949). The title of his article - Der 
neue Menschenaffe (The new ape) (Naef 1925) - makes clear his opinion that he did not 
accept the hominin status of this fossil species. For him the Taung child was just a new ape 
species, and although he thought that the brain of Taung child was remarkably big for an ape, 
he saw this as evidence that among early primates some were more intelligent than today’s 
apes. Moreover, as we will see below, he used this fossil to corroborate his idea that the early 
ancestors of man were less specialised than today’s apes and that hominin phylogeny is much 
older than was commonly assumed.  
The age of this fossil was also an important aspect of this debate. Dart wrote in his 
autobiography: “The final answer about the age of Australopithecus still eludes us” (Dart & 
Craig 1959, 50). He claimed a Pliocene age for the Taung skull (Dart 1929), but many 
authorities were of course dissatisfied that he was not able to supply geological evidence of 
age, regarding it as early Pleistocene – which was too late for most scientists to consider it as 
relevant to the discussion of the early evolution of our own species. In fact, some early 
evolutionists had already expressed the notion that a large time span should be calculated to 
allow for hominins to develop gradually from an arboreal ancestor. Some authors, such as 
Samuel Laing (1812-1897), were convinced that primeval man originated so long ago that 
researchers were rather pessimistic about the possibility of finding any fossil evidence. Laing 
wrote that the evolution of man is “to be sought as far back as the Miocene”, therefore, “we 
can hardly expect to find many specimens of the missing link” (Laing 1889, 97 ). And 
although Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895) was less pessimistic than Laing, he also saw 
primeval man as a creature living rather far back in the past:  
Where, then, must we look for primeval Man? Was the oldest Homo sapiens pliocene or 
miocene, or yet more ancient? In still older strata do the fossilized bones of an Ape more 
anthropoid, or a Man more pithecoid, than any yet known, await the researches of some 
unborn paleontologist? Time will show. But, in the meanwhile, if any form of the doctrine of 
progressive development is correct, we must extend by long epochs the most liberal estimate 
that has yet been made of the antiquity of Man. (1864, 159) 
The Scottish anatomist Sir Arthur Keith (1866-1955) was an influential opponent of Dart’s 
views concerning the hominin status of A. africanus. Keith’s criticism was addressed not only 
to the anatomy of A. africanus, but also focused on what he thought would be the most 
probable environment of Taung. In 1931 he wrote: 
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If we suppose that the forest belt of tropical Africa, now inhabited by the gorilla and 
chimpanzee, had extended a thousand miles farther towards Cape Colony than it now does and 
that the great Kalahari desert was at one time green with vegetation and covered with forest, 
then there would be no difficulty in explaining how anthropoid apes, practising the gait of the 
gorilla or of the chimpanzee, came to occupy the district which is now British Bechuanaland. 
(Keith 1931, 114) 
Keith’s logic was based on the following tautological argumentation: if apes live in forests, 
and if A. africanus is an ape, then “[…] it would be legitimate to cite the discovery of the 
Taungs skull as evidence that South Africa had at one time been covered with jungle” (Keith 
1931, 114). He illustrated his views with an analogy: “We accept the fossil remains of Arctic 
species as evidence of a former severity of climate. On the same grounds we should accept the 
fossil remains of an anthropoid ape as evidence of a vegetation in South Africa which suits 
anthropoid needs” (Keith 1931, 114). Dart’s key supporter Robert Broom refuted Keith’s 
assertion that Australopithecus lived in a forest environment. In his monograph The South 
African Fossil Ape-Men: The Australopithecinae (Broom & Schepers 1946) - probably the 
most influential earlier work supporting Dart’s views on the systematics of A. africanus -, he 
wrote:  
When Keith argued in favour of the Kalahari having once been a forest land we knew 
practically nothing of the fossil animals associated with the Taungs ape. These fossils prove I 
think quite conclusively that when Australopithecus lived Bechuanaland was practically 
desert. (Broom & Schepers 1946, 30) 
The debate between Dart, Broom and Keith on the ecology of the Taung area shows how 
anthropologists’ views on systematics – in this case, the different opinions about the hominin 
status of A. africanus – can strongly influence their views on the palaeoenvironment of a 
certain species. It would be conceivable for Dart to assume that climatic changes restricted 
and thinned forest areas and caused the appearance and extension of open plains in Taung, 
and that A. africanus emerged when it was forced to adapt itself to the new conditions of life. 
In fact, hypotheses stressing the relationship between climatic changes and the evolution of 
organisms were already popular at this time. For instance, several authors used climatic 
changes as a crucial factor to contextualize the evolution of horses (see, e.g., Matthew 1913) 
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and humans.216 Such climatic determinism would be compatible with Keith’s idea that the 
Taung area was once forested. 
However, as already stated above, even before his first publication on the Taung child, Dart 
was aware that every attempt to present A. africanus as ancestral to humans or closely related 
to our ancestors would meet with criticism.217 With his “Taung was already semi-arid” 
scenario, he had at least two advantages. For one, he was able to present early hominin 
evolution in connection with a “harsh environment”, one of the most characteristic elements 
of early open plains hypotheses at this time. Secondly, he was able to corroborate his ideas 
with geologic research on climate fluctuations carried out by Arthur William Rogers (1872-
1946), at that time director of the South African Geological Survey.218  
In a letter published in Nature in 1947, Keith finally recognised that Dart was right 
concerning the hominin status of A. africanus: “[…] I am now convinced on the evidence 
submitted by Dr. Robert Broom that Professor Dart was right and I was wrong” (Keith 1947, 
377). It is ironic to note that modern palaeoenvironmental research219 shows that Keith was 
probably right in his assumption about the palaeoecology of South African sites, although his 
opinion was based on an erroneous interpretation of the systematics of A. africanus.  
More important than the early criticism connected to the initial palaeoenvironmental 
discussion was the anatomical evidence. In fact, many scientists had problems accepting a 
species with such a small brain as the Taung child possessed as an ancestor of modern 
humans.220 The popular expectation at this time was that the emergence of bipedalism was 
related to an early development of a big brain. This idea was supported by the “Piltdown 
Man”, a supposed fossil human ancestor found between 1911 (or 1908) and 1915 in a gravel 
pit at Piltdown, Sussex, England (see references below). The Piltdown fossil showed a 
peculiar combination of modern human and ape-like features – part of a modern-human-
                                                          
216 (Arldt 1907a, 606; 1907b; Eickstedt 1925; Hilzheimer 1921; Matthew 1950 [1st ed. 1915], 7, 41-44; 
Reinhardt 1906,  6-9; Steinmann 1908, 266).  
217 Dart [in (Dart & Craig 1959, pp. 15-16)], wrote: “I prepared a report based on my conclusions for Nature, the 
British scientific journal, half anticipating the skepticism with which it would be greeted [.]” 
218 (Dart 1925, 198), wrote: “It is generally believed by geologists (Rogers 1922) that the climate has fluctuated 
within exceedingly narrow limits in this country since Cretaceous times.” Dart still defended this view in his 
autobiography published 34 years later (Dart & Craig 1959, 7). 
219 See, e.g., Bamford (1999). Her research implies that rainfall was higher during the Pliocene, suggesting that 
gallery forests in Sterkfontein were widespread at that time instead of the grassland of today. She even found 
fossil woods that have been identified as liana in Australopithecus deposits, dated 2.6-2.8 Ma. See also Cadman 
and Rayner (1989).   
220 See however above on Naef. Although he did not accept A. africanus as a primeval man, he seemed to 
regard its brain as larger than that of a modern ape. 
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looking calvaria and the broken right half of a very apelike mandible. This primitive jaw 
seemed to reveal the sequence of evolutionary change in human phylogeny: that the large 
brain seemed to have been already developed in early ancestors of modern humans. From the 
end of the 1930s scientists’ attitudes about the hominin status of australopithecines began to 
change gradually. The “juvenile-argument” was invalidated by Dart’s closest ally Robert 
Broom (1866-1951), one of the first scientists who accepted the hominin status of the Taung 
child. After 1936 Broom discovered many adult specimens of A. africanus, showing that the 
hominin features are also present in the adult forms. In 1941 he summarized his views in a 
Nature paper: “The South African caves have shown us that there lived in Pleistocene times 
various anthropoids which in many characters were much nearer to man than to the living 
anthropoids. They had larger brains, and almost the human type of teeth, and there is 
considerable reason to believe they were mainly bipedal” (Broom 1941, 13). Most of this 
interpretation is still valid today. From 1953 to 1955 Joseph Weiner, Kenneth Oakley and W. 
E. Le Gros Clark exposed the Piltdown fossil as a hoax.221 After this exposure the “small 
brain” and other anatomical characteristics of A. africanus were definitively accepted as 
compatible with hominin features. In the 1940s and 1950s the majority of researchers 
gradually accepted the hominin status of australopithecines (Delisle 2007, 225-255; Gundling 
2005, 101-140; Kuykendall & Štrkalj 2007).  
Once the Taung child was definitively accepted as hominin - a quarter of a century after its 
discovery - scientists recognized that the fossil was the oldest recovered evidence for hominin 
evolution at the time, and was the first small-brained hominin ever described. This discovery 
brought about a paradigm shift in the discussion of human origins and prehistory (Kuykendall 
& Štrkalj 2007). 
D.4.3 The hunting hypothesis  
Today’s perception of Dart’s role in palaeoanthropological research is strongly related to his 
ideas that primeval man developed a taste for flesh and became hunters and cannibals, 
characterised by a high degree of interspecific aggression (Dart 1953; 1957; Dart & Craig 
1959, 157-210). 
                                                          
221 Although the Piltdown hoax was the subject of several investigations (Langdon 1992; Tobias 1992; 1993; 
Weiner 1955), there is, to our knowledge, no conclusive answer about the perpetrator (or perpetrators). There 
are different views among the historians of palaeoanthropology about the impact of Piltdown on the field. I 
agree with Delisle, (2000), when he concludes that during the first three decades of the 20th century Piltdown 
and other discoveries were easily integrated in different interpretative frameworks. 
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Probably the most quoted passages from Dart’s texts on early hominin evolution concern his 
analogy between human beings and carnivores. Dart’s colorful descriptions of A. africanus as 
crude, hunting, cannibalistic apes made such an impression on the contemporary scientific 
community that many modern authors still believe that the idea of early man as predator and 
killer ape was originally proposed by Dart and Robert Ardrey in the middle of the 20th 
century. However, such ideas had been discussed earlier by several scholars like the Scottish 
judge, James Burnett or Lord Monboddo (1714-1799) (Barnard 1995), the English physician 
Harry Campbell (†1938) and the American author and publisher Charles Morris (Cartmill 
1997, 509; Stoczkowski 2002, 71-72). In 1880, with same sense of the dramatic as Dart, one 
author had already described primeval man as a crude creature smeared with blood when 
sucking bone marrow and eating raw meat and the brain of a prey (Oliveira Martins 1880). 
Especially detailed and still widely ignored in the palaeoanthropological literature are the 
ideas of Josef Müller (1894) and Carveth Read (1920). With his analogy, Dart did not start a 
new trend in palaeoanthropology, but followed a tradition rather popular in the early 20th 
century.  
The American playwright and scientific writer Robert Ardrey (1908-1980) became fascinated 
by Dart’s hunting hypothesis. He met Dart in 1955, inspected his evidence at the 
Johannesburg Medical School (Ardrey 1961, 28) and developed his own hypotheses on the 
subject in several books. With detailed accounts of Dart’s palaeoanthropological ideas, 
Ardrey depicted early humans as social primates hunting in African open plains, stressing the 
role of climatic factors in the shrinking of the forests and the expansion of savannah (Ardrey 
1961; 1966; 1970). Ardrey’s books African Genesis (1961), The Territorial Imperative 
(1966), The Social Contract (1970) and The Hunting Hypothesis (1976) became worldwide 
best sellers and strongly influenced popular and scientific discourse on the role of hunting, 
climatic and environmental changes and open plains habitats in early hominin evolution. 
From 1972, however, Dart’s and Ardrey’s hunting hypotheses became the object of criticism, 
mainly in popular literature. This had a sensible influence in the incipient doubts on the 
validity of the SHs (see chapter D.6.3).   
To sum up, although Dart definitely defended a SH, he cannot be regarded as the first author 
of this idea, as sporadically stated in historical introductions of palaeoanthropological 
publications. Evolutionary scenarios containing elementary arguments of modern SHs were 
regularly mentioned before 1925; therefore, fossil evidence found from 1924 onwards was 
interpreted in the light of savannah ideas already known at the time. When discussing the 
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alleged role of A. africanus in the crystallization of SH’s, it is important to be aware that 
Dart’s ideas did not have much impact in palaeoanthropological discussion immediately after 
the first description of A. africanus. This is relevant for the interpretation of the following 
statement by Franz Weidenreich (1873-1948) by the end of the 1930s. He, who himself 
vehemently rejected some aspects of the SHs, described these ideas as an already “widely 
spread belief” (see also Beurlen 1950, 417; Weidenreich 1939, 87-88). This popularity of the 
SHs was not influenced by Dart’s publications on human evolution, since the acceptance of 
hominin status for A. africanus had just begun to figure in palaeoanthropology in this time, 
and consensus on this point was reached only many years later (see, e.g., Delisle 2007, 222-
265). I regard the statement of Dart as pioneer of the SH as an insightful aspect of 
palaeoanthropological research – the unconsciously tendency to distort historical aspects in 
order to localize what is regarded as a mark stone in the history of this field – the SHs as the 
product of another mark stone – the discovery of the first relevant fossil evidence of early 
hominins in Africa. This distortion of historical facts is even more interesting when we 
consider the bulk of early attempts to contextualize the evolution of primeval man in open 
plains in the time where the Dartian ideas were or not published or not influential. Following 
sections will discuss different aspects of a representative choice of these ideas: the climatic 
determinism and interplay between analogies and climatic determinism in early open plains 
ideas and in alternative hypotheses. 
D.5 Climatic determinism in palaeoanthropological hypotheses before the 
synthetic evolution 
An important aspect of modern palaeoanthropological research is the use of 
palaeoenvironmental data to contextualize early hominin evolution. However, although some 
studies on the modern development of palaeoecological research in palaeoanthropology were 
published in the last decades (Potts 1998a; Potts 1998b; Reed 1997), the relationship between 
early and modern views on the influence of climatic and environmental changes in early 
hominin evolution are still widely ignored. It will be argued in this study that understanding 
this relationship is crucial for several reasons. Firstly, although early and modern 
palaeoecological hypotheses diverged dramatically in methodology and scientific accuracy, 
the arguments on the role of climatic changes in the development of key hominin features are 
very similar. Secondly, it will be shown that several early views proposed from the first third 
of the 20th century onwards on the environmental context of early hominin evolution were 
mostly proposed in connection with the belief that early hominins evolved in open plains. 
120 
 
In the last years the doubts on the origin of early hominins on savannah is regarded as the 
result of new palaeoenvironmental and fossil evidence. It will be shown that this view has to 
be put in a relative perspective.  
D.5.1 Cradles of mankind: climatic and environmental changes in different continents and 
time periods 
The idea that climate has a strong influence on living organisms was already widespread in 
pre-Darwinian times. The scientific requirement for a systematic research on the influence of 
climate on humans led to the foundation of anthropogeography or human geography. The 
origin of this field strong relates to the work of the German naturalists Alexander von 
Humboldt (1869) and Friedrich Ratzel (1882); see also Scherer (1830, 57) and Baer (1874, 
519). And although at the end of the 19th century Ratzel sounded a note of caution concerning 
the widespread speculations being made of a strong climatic influence on human evolution 
(Ratzel 1882, 298) (see also Hesse (1924, 105)), this was out of step with the zeitgeist which 
stressed the role of environment in the evolution of organisms connected to a simple scenario 
for hominin evolution - a view compatible both with neo-Lamarckian and Darwinian 
concepts. 
Darwin expressed many thoughts on the relationship between climate and natural selection in 
his book Origin of Species (1859) and the possible effect of climatic changes on human races 
in a chapter in the The Descent of Man (1871, see, e.g., vol. 1, chapter 4), but devoted just a 
few words on the possible role of environmental change on the origin of a bipedal primeval 
man. Beside the passage (quoted above, chapter D.3.1) of a progenitor of man becoming less 
arboreal and bipedal “owing to a change in its manner of procuring subsistence, or to some 
change in the surrounding conditions” (Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 140, italics added), he wrote in 
the same work:  
If then the ape-like progenitors of man which inhabited any district, especially one undergoing 
some change in its conditions, were divided into two equal bodies, the one half which 
included all the individuals best adapted by their powers of movement for gaining subsistence 
or for defending themselves, would on an average survive in greater number and procreate 
more offspring than the other and less well endowed half. (Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 136, italics 
added) 
Here, Darwin is conservative in the use of global climatic changes to contextualize primeval 
man. However, this precaution changed radically in the decades following the Descent of 
Man. In the 11th edition of his Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte Ernst Haeckel wrote about 
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the cooling process in the Tertiary age and the theoretical influence on living organisms, 
which were obliged to adapt to or to escape from the cold (Haeckel 1909b, vol. 1, 330). He 
also speculated about the role of cooling conditions on the biological diversity in the Ice Ages 
(Haeckel 1909b, vol. 1, 331). At the time, the climatic changes in the Ice Ages became one of 
the most important topics in geology and climatology. And although these events occurred too 
late to be included in the discussion on the emergence of early hominins, many authors were 
not able to overcome the temptation to see the Ice Ages as crucial in early hominin evolution. 
In late 19th and early 20th centuries, students of human evolution began to envision 
evolutionary scenarios in which primeval man was strongly influenced by climatic and 
environmental changes. Primeval man began to be depicted as a miniature piece on a giant 
chess board, subordinate to the inexorable forces exerted by geological and climatic events. 
Climatic and environmental changes are obviously not restricted to single regions of the 
planet. Consequently, there were few places on earth that were not considered suitable for the 
emergence of primeval man.222 In the early 20th century, contrary to the above mentioned 
Darwin’s views suggesting Africa as the most probable cradle of mankind (Darwin 1871, vol. 
1, 199), East and Central Asia with the impressive Tibetan highlands and vast open plains 
became a popular place to contextualise primeval man’s evolution (Bowler 1986, 173-185; 
Dennell 2001).  
It is difficult to assess to what extent various factors influenced the views on Asia as the 
location of human evolution in the first half of the 20th century. From today’s point of view it 
is tempting to regard fossil discoveries as the main factor in establishing this idea.223 
However, this view is problematic when confronted with historical facts. Above all, it ignores 
the wide spectrum of influential discussions in the 18th and early 19th century in which Asia 
was seen as the place where certain races (Banton 1987; Graves Jr 2008; Poliakov 1977, 
                                                          
222 To cite a few examples: in Europe and North Asia (Müller 1894; Wagner 1889, 162-174); in the northwestern 
part of Europe (Wilser 1910, 55); in northern or central Europe (Koch 1929, 63); in Australia (or in a sunken land 
close to Australia) (Klaatsch 1922, 91-92; Knauer 1916; Müller de la Fuente 1906; Schoetensack 1901) ; in Africa 
(Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 199) or in a “warm continent or large island, such as Australia or New Guinea, or Borneo” 
(Darwin 1871, vol. 1, 157); in the North Pole (Biedenkapp 1906); in South America by Florentino Ammegnio 
(see Podgorny 2005); different human origins in different parts of the world, implied in the views of Giuseppe 
Sergi (1913, 150-152), Carl Vogt (1863, vol. I, 285) and  Maurus Horst (1913, 21-22); somewhere in the northern 
part of an early EuroAfrican continent (Brinton 1886); in South Asia, or in Africa, or in the hypothetical sunken 
continent Lemuria (Haeckel 1909a, vol. 2, 755-757); in South Asia, but for other reasons as then proposed by 
Haeckel (Zimmermann 1903). Several other proponents of Asia as the cradle of mankind are mentioned in 
chapter D.6.1. 
223 The most relevant of these discoveries was Pithecanthropus erectus (today Homo erectus) by the 
palaeoanthropologist Eugène Dubois (1858-1940) in 1891 and 1892  at Trinil, in central Java and the 
subsequent research by the palaeontologist and geologist Gustav H. R. von Koenigswald (1902-1982) from 1931 
to 1941 (see Tobias 1984b).   
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205ff), certain languages (Borst 1995b) or the whole of mankind originated.224 These 
discussions were, of course, carried out in the complete absence of hominin fossil material. In 
German-speaking countries, Immanuel Kant (1982 [1775], 23) and especially Johann 
Gottfried von Herder (1852 [1784-1791), vo. 28, 393-414) eloquently defended a positioning 
of mankind’s childhood in Asia. Early concepts of Tibet as the cradle of mankind were also 
influential in the development of racist “evolutionary” ideas from theosophists, which were 
adopted among others by sympathisers of Nazi ideology and are still present in neo-Nazi 
discourses today (Brauen 2000, 36-93).  
In early 20th century, scientists increasingly used arguments on climatic and environmental 
changes to corroborate their views on Asia as the location of human evolution (see also 
chapter D.6.1). For instance, the palaeogeographer Theodor Arldt (1878-1960) provided 
explanations based on geological causes for the cooling of climates in the Pliocene (Arldt 
1907a; Arldt 1907b). Arldt stressed the harsh-conditions of an isolated Tibetan territory with 
sparse vegetation and “a deteriorating climate” in the Pliocene as crucial factors in the 
transition from ape-man to man (Arldt 1907a, 606). In another work he explained that Africa 
or other tropical areas are not acceptable places for the cradle of mankind, since we should 
expect a certain state of emergency for the evolution of primeval man (Arldt 1907b, 211). He 
provided explanations about the geological causes for the cooling of climates in this time – a 
massive rise of Tibetan highlands (Arldt 1907b, 212).  
Very similar views were expressed in 1944 by the German-American palaeontologist 
Amadeus W. Grabau (1870-1946) in a manuscript published posthumously in 1961. He also 
regarded Tibet as the cradle of mankind and the emergence of primeval man as strongly 
influenced by geological events with subsequent environmental changes. Especially 
interesting for the present discussion is his opinion on the causes of the split between apes and 
primeval man:  
The only conceivable change that would bring about this new condition is the disappearance 
of the forests themselves. Instead of the apes leaving the trees, the trees left the apes. Then, 
when the trees were gone and no escape from the tree-less area was possible, it became a 
struggle to continue under such new conditions, a struggle for existence, where survivors 
would be few, while those that were doomed to extinction, because they were incapable of 
adaptation, formed the majority. (Grabau 1961, 158) 
                                                          
224 The German prefix “Ur-” reflects this early vivid interest in the origin (Ursprung) of language (Ursprache), 
primordial people (Urvolk), primeval man (Urmensch) or an early form of civilization (Urzivilisation). 
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By depicting primeval man as a passive participant in climatic and environmental changes, 
the picture of “trees leaving the apes instead of apes leaving the trees” became the most 
important element of the modern SHs. The same basic picture was used by other authors, 
especially by Hans Weinert (see chapter D.5.2).  
An early and influential view of climatic determinism in palaeoanthropology was defended by 
the German naturalist Moriz (or Moritz) Wagner (1813-1887), who is today known for his 
ideas on the role of migration and isolation on the origin of species (Wagner 1889). In a 
posthumously published work225, Wagner criticised Darwin’s views on the cradle of mankind 
in Africa in a chapter entitled Ursprung und Heimat des Urmenschen (origin and home of 
primeval man) (Wagner 1889, 162-174). He argued that Europe, during the middle of the 
Miocene, was too warm and the environment too opulent and paradisiacal to give the initial 
impulse to the evolution of primeval man (1889, 169-170). Such an environment, wrote 
Wagner, would not promote the development of  “stupid simian quadruped” (dummer 
affenartiger Vierhänder) (Wagner 1889, 166) . For similar reasons he did not believe in 
Africa as cradle of mankind. He wrote:  
The African climate never lost its warm character; the African soil never lost the evergreen 
fruit-trees. Cold, privation and hunger never happen in the home of chimpanzee and gorilla, 
and never forced pithecoid creatures to come down from their trees, to modify their 
movements, posture and locomotion, to enable them to sharp the edges of stones and so be 
able to kill other creatures. (1889, 166, my translation) 
Why, continued Wagner (1889, 170), should the apes voluntarily leave paradisiacal Africa 
and migrate to the cold Europe, where the environment was much harsher and the struggle for 
life was much harsher? Additionally, neither fossil anthropoids from the Tertiary nor 
rudimentary stone tools from African sediments or caves from the Pleistocene were found; 
instead, this evidence was discovered in Asia and Europe. Wagner assumed therefore, that the 
origin of man occurred in the northern part of the Old World (Europe or North Asia) in a time 
of strong climatic changes, i.e., in the Pleistocene. He saw a clear connection between the 
cooling of temperature in the Ice Age and the reduction of vegetarian food in the place where 
quadrumane Dryopithecus lived. These in Wagner’s view pre-human primates were forced to 
live in the treeless rocky landscapes in the Palaearctic region and had to give up their fruit diet 
                                                          
225 According to Wagner (1889, 117), this essay was first published in the journal “Das Ausland“ in 1871 (issues 
13-15, 23 and 24, 37-40, 45 and 46); I did not consult this edition. The same work was posthumously published 
under the title Die Entstehung der Arten durch räumliche Sonderung (Wagner 1889); I am quoting from this 
work.  
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and climbing technique to gradually adopt an upright posture. In their struggle against 
starvation, this species was transformed from “stupid anthropoids” (stupiden Anthropoiden)  
into a permanent biped, intelligent and carnivorous “Anthropos”, able to use stones as tools to 
hunt (1889, 166-174).  
In many senses, Wagner’s Palaeartic hypothesis represents the beginning of a new era in the 
history of palaeoanthropology. As far as can be assessed, he was the first author to depict 
early human evolution as the result of climatic and environmental changes. Additionally, he 
was the first author to discuss extensively the role of geographic isolation and migration in 
speciation process, using this approach to formulate scenarios on early human evolution. 
Wagner’s views on the origin of man were influential on German-speaking authors. Although 
some authors around 1900 explicitly mentioned him (Hoernes 1909, vol. 1, 212; Müller 1894; 
Zimmermann 1903), later authors often preferred to borrow his views without acknowledging 
Wagner’s work (see, e.g., Weinert’s ideas on chapter D.5.2).  
Among the works which acknowledged Wagner, the most interesting is an essay entitled Über 
Ursprung und Heimat des Urmenschen (On the origin and home of primeval man) published 
by Josef Müller in 1894. The great similarity to the title of Wagner’s chapter on human 
evolution was intentional: Müller took up most of Wagner’s Palaeartic hypothesis and 
complemented it with own views (Müller 1894). Fascinated by Wagner’s arguments of human 
beings formed through harsh climatic and environmental conditions, Müller was convinced 
that Wagner’s work on human evolution belonged to the “most important and interesting 
publications in Darwinian literature” (Müller 1894, 3, my translation). However, according to 
Müller, Wagner’s short chapter remained almost unnoticed, as it was published in the same 
work where Wagner presented his influential essays on migration and speciation (Müller 
1894, 3). Like Wagner, Müller saw the Ice Age (Eiszeit) as crucial for the origin of primeval 
man, and like Wagner he placed this development in the “northern slope of the great Asiatic 
or European mountains” (1894, 31). Again under a strong consideration of Wagner’s ideas, 
Müller regarded primeval man as a predator and carnivore creature, explaining this 
evolutionary novelty as a response to a harsh environment. He was concerned with the fact 
that primeval man, as a highly specialised arboreal species, would be very inferior in his 
incipient terrestrial locomotion. Differently to the view expressed by other authors at this time 
that depicted the passage from trees to open plains as self-evident and unproblematic,226 
                                                          
226This was for instance the case in Lamarck’s and in (one of) Darwin’s open plains scenario. Later authors often 
depicted early humans’ interaction with predators as salutary. For instance, the German psychiatrist and 
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Müller believed that these arboreal adaptations would be an enormous handicap in primeval 
man’s attempts to hunt other animals or to defend against predators. He saw the solution for 
this problem in the incipient use of tools by primeval man; on this topic Müller added several 
details to Wagner’s hypothesis. For instance, he argued that an intelligent progenitor of man 
would be able to use stones as long-range weapons (Fernwaffen) for hunting and for defence 
(1894, 23-29). He related this behaviour to the origin of bipedalism (1894, 37-44). Müller 
believed that the first humans were “cliff-apes” (Felsenaffen): a such a rocky environment 
was, in his opinion, crucial for human evolution, as primeval man would have the possibility 
to escape from predators and have a great supply of rocks to use as weapons (1894, 32). He 
envisaged a “didactic scenario” to explain the use of weapons: cliff-apes pursued by a 
predator witnessed how stones rolling from the slopes accidentally killed or hurt the predator. 
This accident exchanged the roles, and the predator becomes a prey. This often repeated 
experience led to a regular use of stones as weapons (e.g., rolling stones from the slopes to 
kill other animals) which, after a long period of time, led to a skilled use of stones as long-
range weapons (1894, 35). He mentioned “today baboon and other monkeys” [der heutige 
Pavian und andere Affen] as analogous creatures, exploring a cliff-environment (1894, 32). 
In the first third of the 20th century very similar views were suggested by two other authors: 
Suschkin and Abel. In a posthumous paper published 1933227, the Russian ornithologist Peter 
Petrowitsch Suschkin (1868-1928) complained that the ecological aspects of the evolution of 
human beings were pretty neglected. After a lengthy analysis of the distribution of the fauna 
in highlands of the earth he concluded that the ancestors of humans lived in Central Asia – 
and he mentioned Matthew and Osborn as the main propagators of this idea. Similarly to 
Wagner and Müller, he regarded the bipedalism of primeval man as an adaptation to a life in a 
landscape with rocks and open plains; a similar environment as explored today by baboons 
(Suschkin 1933, 300). In his scenario, primeval man evolved under the influence of rough 
climates (Suschkin 1933, 304). He defended a version of Lamarck’s tower-hypothesis to 
explain the reason for the development of bipedalism: by an erect posture primeval man 
would be able to identify friends and enemies from the distance (Suschkin 1933, 300). The 
helplessness of primeval man was essential to the development of his intellect (Suschkin 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sociologist Franz Müller-Lyer (1857-1916) wrote in 1911 (here quoted from an edition from 1948) that human 
arboreal ancestors lived in a kind of refuge (Asyl), where the food grew practically in their mouths, and turned 
into “warriors and hunters” (Krieger und Jäger) when they began to adapt to a terrestrial life. He described the 
big predators of primeval man as “prehistoric educators” (Erzieher der Urzeit)  (Müller-Lyer 1948, 48-49). 
227 Suschkin noted that his ideas on human evolution were already published before ( see also Stresemann 
1929; Suschkin 1933). 
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1933, 301-302). He saw Australopithecus africanus as a failed attempt at hominisation 
(Suschkin 1933, 296). Perhaps, according to Suschkin, the climates in South Africa were not 
rough enough, or perhaps the massif was not high enough (Suschkin 1933, 304). In his first 
hypotheses on human evolution, the Austrian palaeontologist Othenio Abel (1875-1946) also 
defended a classical view of the SH in connection with climatic changes. Innitially he 
regarded Central Asia as the cradle of mankind (Abel 1919). Later (1931, 379-380), he 
considered the possibility that the bipedalism of the first hominins evolved in a phase when 
they lived as cliff-dwelling climbers (see also Ehrenberg 1949).  
D.5.2 Climatic determinism in early savannah hypotheses: Ludwig Reinhardt, Gustav 
Steinmann and Hans Weinert 
Especially impressive for an emphasis of climatic determinism are the hypotheses proposed 
by the Swiss author Ludwig Reinhardt. He saw as possible that the first steps in human 
evolution occurred in the Oligocene, perhaps on a continental island228, in a scenario with 
sparse vegetation (Reinhardt 1906, 6-7). He regarded it as crucial that the origin of primeval 
man did not take place in a paradise environment, but in an area with less favorable 
conditions. In this harsh environment the struggle of life was stronger, selecting the best of 
our ancestors (Reinhardt 1906, 6). Reinhardt saw the climate as the driving force of human 
evolution, by explaining the origin of bipedalism in connection with climatic change and the 
dwindling of forest areas when the ancestor of man was forced to walk from one tree to other 
(Reinhardt 1906, 7-8). He used Lamarck’s tower hypothesis to explain the origin of 
bipedalism: the upright posture allowed primeval man to see further over the plains to search 
for prey or enemies (Reinhardt 1906, 8), and to have free hands to carry weapons or tools 
(Reinhardt 1906, 8-9). Reinhardt was one of the first authors in the 20th century to develop 
Wagner’s and Müller’s concept of a climatic determinism responsible for the emergence of 
primeval man, and he was also a pioneer in stressing climatic factors in connection with the 
emergence of open plains.  
Some interesting thoughts on climatic determinism in the evolution of primeval man had 
already been expressed by the German geologist and palaeontologist Gustav Steinmann 
(1856-1929) in his book Die geologischen Grundlagen der Abstammungslehre (Steinmann 
1908). Steinmann wrote about the causes driving human ancestors to abandon the primordial 
quadrupedal locomotion, using climatic determinist arguments in connection with modern 
sounding open plains ideas. He envisaged a pithecoid creature, with a similar quadruped 
                                                          
228 See chapter D.3.1 above on the island hypothesis by Herschel and Darwin. 
127 
 
locomotion as today’s apes living in forests; climatic changes had gradually thinned the 
forests and transformed them into savannah regions. According to him, the arboreal ancestors 
of humans were then forced to adapt to the modified conditions and occasionally adopt an 
upright or semi-upright posture, similar to today’s apes. Only few modifications of these 
intermediate stages, affirmed Steinmann, would be necessary for the adoption of a permanent 
bipedalism (Steinmann 1908, 266). With some irrelevant adaptations in the vocabulary, 
Steinmann’s open plains ideas would fit perfectly into a palaeoanthropological work of the 
late 1990s.  
Steinmann saw all further modifications as a consequence of this crucial phase in early human 
evolution, especially the increased development of the senses, the evolution of hands to a 
versatile organ and (as a result of both modifications) the increased mental faculties and brain 
mass. He also had an explanation for the alleged fact that a decrease in forest area was 
beneficial for the evolution of human beings, but not for apes:  
We can imagine the geographic area of such pithecoids being occupied by different closely 
related species, which we might fuse in a systematic sense into a “genus”, and that this area 
would be affected by a climatic change in the sense described above. In that case, some 
species living close to river plains or in very humid areas would retreat into their original 
environment, keeping their previous habits; in contrast, other species living close to the timber 
line would adopt a bipedal locomotion and so gradually be able to occupy the newly formed 
and already present savannah and brushwood areas. (Steinmann 1908, 266, my translation)  
Despite the inclusion of climatic and environmental changes as crucial factors in early human 
evolution, several arguments proposed by Steinmann are quite similar to Lamarck’s ideas, 
especially Steinmann’s general scenario of primeval man abandoning the forest and adapting 
to open plains which is basically the same as proposed by Lamarck. Furthermore, 
Steinmann’s explicit statement on other primate species being forced to retreat into their 
original environment, and keeping their previous habits (Steinmann 1908, 266) is coincident 
with Lamarck’s view of a primeval man banishing other primates “into forests or other desert 
places” (Lamarck 2006, 170). Perhaps more revealing than mere coincidence in primeval man 
evolutionary scenarios, are Steinmann’s speculations on vertebrates’ evolution. He argued 
that giraffes are descendant from aquatic dinosaurs and dolphins are descendant from 
Ichthyosaurus (Steinmann 1908, 278-279). Although Steinmann was not the only scholar in 
the early 20th century who went beyond reasonable boundaries with speculations on 
evolution, his interpretation of vertebrate phylogeny was an incredible faux pas for a 
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professional palaeontologist in this time.229 However, if one considers that Steinmann’s ideas 
were the product of an uncritical assimilation of Lamarck’s views, perhaps his error is 
understandable. In his Philosophie zoologique, Lamarck erroneously suggested that birds 
descended from turtles, amphibian mammals from crocodiles, monotremes from penguins, 
and ruminants and pachyderms from animals living close to the shore (like walruses and 
manatees) (Lamarck 1994, 646-647). All indications are that Steinmann could not resist 
attempting to enlarge Lamarck’s original list with further aquatic counterparts to terrestrial 
vertebrates. He did it without considering the accumulated evidence showing that several 
aquatic animals are not primarily aquatic, but descend from terrestrial animals and therefore 
are secondarily aquatic. The strong similarities between Steinmann’s and Lamarck’s views 
can hardly be regarded as coincident, since Steinmann was an ardent proponent of Neo-
Lamarckism, often quoted Lamarck and even dedicated his Grundlagen to him.  
Curiously, in their general statements on the evolutionary path of living organisms, Lamarck 
and Steinmann were much closer to the views proposed by the French diplomat Benoît De 
Maillet (1656-1738) in the manuscript Telliamed. As shown in Appendix B, although the idea 
of aquatic counterparts was sometimes expressed by 18th century naturalists, De Maillet was 
the first author who tried to identify such counterparts in the framework of a detailed 
evolutionary concept.  
In the first half of 20th century, in the attempts to justify why the occupation of open plains 
should promote primeval man’s evolution, some authors began to defend two very peculiar 
views of the role of environment on the emergence of the first upright ancestors of humans: 
on one hand, as already explained, the contrasting representation of forests as a place of 
stagnation and open plains as a place of development, on the other hand, the idea of “trees 
leaving the apes” instead of “the apes leaving the trees”. As naïve as they perhaps sound 
today, these views became an essential part of the SHs defended in the last 100 years. This 
idea was repeatedly propagated by the influential German anthropologist Hans Weinert 
(1887-1967) in several scientific and popular works in the 1930s and 1940s: the ancestor of 
primeval man, according to Weinert, did not come down from the trees; instead, “the trees 
went out from under the ape, thus putting him on the ground whether he wanted it or not” 
(Weinert 1932, 339, my translation). Weinert frequently stressed the alleged difference 
between a paradisiacal life in the forest and the hard conditions on the open plains, for 
                                                          
229 The negative remarks should not be used to denounce Steinmann’s whole scientific career; he was seen at 
that time as a hardworking and competent geologist (Pfannenstiel 1957). See also the ideas expressed by 
Dieterici in Appendix A, chapter A.4). 
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instance in 1940: “[…] the dolce far niente of a tropic or subtropic forest life with abundant 
food did not exist anymore” (Weinert 1940, 72, my translation). One year later, he stated that 
“The forest was in any case not a place appropriate for the emergence of man. Then man 
emerged not in a paradise; he appeared because the paradise disappeared” (Weinert 1941, 48, 
my translation).  
Several of Weinert’s statements on the origin of primeval man strongly recall Moriz Wagner’s 
and Josef Müller’s ideas on the influence of the cooling in the Ice Age (see above, chapter 
D.5.1). Similarly, Weinert’s repeated allusions to the paradisiacal and delightful life of pre-
humans and an awkward primeval man’s incipient attempts to walk on the ground are almost 
identical to Wagner’s and Müller’s formulations. Although Weinert did not acknowledge 
Wagner’s or Müller’s works as sources for his specific open plains ideas, at least one sentence 
clearly links Weinert to these authors in one of his books. Weinert wrote: “It was once said: 
‘Without an Ice Age, no man’ [Ohne Eiszeit kein Mensch], today we say even more clearly: 
‘Through the Ice Age, the man’ [Durch die Eiszeit der Mensch] (Weinert 1932, 352, my 
translation). The first sentence is attributed to Moriz Wagner230; Joseph Müller used it as an 
epigram for his work on human evolution (Müller 1894, 3).  
D.6 Interplay between analogies and climatic forcing models  
In palaeoanthropology, several models of early hominin evolution are based on analogical 
reasoning. In these hypotheses, alleged convergences between hominins and other organisms 
are identified and used to infer early hominin adaptations to a certain environment. The 
rationale for certain comparisons formulated within traditional hypotheses can be described as 
follows: taking into consideration that environmental changes are a crucial factor in the 
evolution of terrestrial organisms, it is reasonable to assume that human ancestors are not the 
only organisms that were forced (by climatic and subsequent environmental changes) to 
abandon a particular environment A and to adapt to a different environment B. Therefore, it 
should be possible to identify such organisms, understand the circumstances in which they 
evolved and use this information to explain critical phases in primeval man’s evolution.  
                                                          
230 I did not find this information in Wagner’s works that I consulted. However, in his biographical sketch of 
Moriz Wagner, Karl von Scherzer wrote: „Ohne Eiszeit kein Mensch! Das war sein naturphilosophisches Dogma“ 
(Without an Ice Age, no man! This was his natural-philosophical dogma) (Scherzer in Wagner 1889, 27). Maurus 
Horst also attributed this sentence to Wagner. He regarded him as the first scientist who recognised the 
importance of climatic change in the northern hemisphere as a factor of progress [Fortbildungsursache] in early 
human evolution; furthermore, he mentioned, among others, the works of Josef Müller, Theodor Arldt and 
Ludwig Reinhard in this context (Horst 1913, 17). Usually, this sentence is attributed to Weinert (see, e.g., 
Overhage 1959b, 14, and Boné quoted by Overhage). 
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Although single analogies played a crucial role in palaeoanthropology, it is surprising that 
these comparisons were not investigated in detail. Such an analysis is important for different 
reasons. On one hand, since analogies are often used in the reconstruction of the evolutionary 
past of other organisms, it is possible to compare analogical reasoning in other biological 
fields with the analogies used in palaeoanthropology. On the other hand, several analogies are 
very persistent, and in slightly modified form they are still defended in modern 
palaeoanthropological discussions. Even such topics which are usually regarded as 
intrinsically related to modern investigations (like the use of baboons as referential models or 
the use of global climatic changes in connection with models based on analogy) were often 
formulated and extensively discussed in the early literature. Several of these ideas are 
unknown to modern palaeoanthropologists or historians of palaeoanthropology, as they were 
often propagated by German-speaking scientists, who, despite the fundamental role that they 
played in the formulation of evolutionary and palaeoanthropological hypotheses in late 19th 
and early 20th century, are nevertheless under-represented in most231 investigations of the 
history of this field. The exceptions concern those authors who participated in the early 
discovery and interpretation of fossil evidence of Neanderthals, as for instance by Gustav 
Schwalbe and Hermann Klaatsch, or the ideas on human origin proposed by the German 
Darwinian Ernst Haeckel. However, even the earlier analogies proposed by known English 
speaking scientists (as for instance Henry F. Osborn, William D. Matthew and Joseph Barrell) 
are often overlooked in historical investigations. For a discussion on other analogies in 
palaeoanthropological hypotheses see chapter 6 in the main thesis. 
D.6.1 Kangaroos, horses, first terrestrial vertebrates: analogies in early and modern 
savannah hypotheses 
One of the most impressive examples of the use of analogies in an early hypotheses232 on the 
origin of primeval man is supplied by the German zoologist Max Hilzheimer (1877-1946) in a 
paper entitled Aphoristische Gedanken über einen Zusammenhang zwischen Erdgeschichte, 
Biologie, Menschheitsgeschichte und Kulturgeschichte (Hilzheimer 1921). Hilzheimer 
explicitly considered forests as “place of stagnation” and open plains as “place of 
development” in the evolution of man233 and other organisms. He was convinced that the 
                                                          
231 The Jesuit, anthropologist and biologist Paul Overhage is one of the few authors who included several 
German-speaking authors in his historical investigations (see, e.g., Overhage 1959a). See also Bender (1999a) 
232 The baboons-analogies proposed by Josef Müller, Peter Suschkin and Othenio Abel  were treated in 
connection with incipient ideas on climatic determinism (see chapter D.5). Some thoughts on climatic changes 
in connection with concept of race in the Third Reich were expressed by Hutton (2005). 
233 Hilzheimer did not focus only on the possible causes of the split between humans from pithecoid ancestors, 
but did not hesitate to use this formula to justify farfetched ideas on the role of landscape in the divergence 
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evolution of most terrestrial animals was mainly influenced by the expansion or reduction of 
wooded areas. His belief in arboreal apes as a “failure of natural experiments” was the starting 
point of a highly anthropocentric categorisation of “stagnated forest fauna” and “progressive 
open plains fauna”. He discussed in detail how forest reptiles and mammals are “less 
developed” than their counterparts living on open plains, without offering any reasonable 
criteria for this discrimination. Very similar to Lamarck, he saw the emergence of bipedalism 
in connection with the ability to scrutinise the open plains. He regarded kangaroos (because 
they are, like humans, adapted to open plains and able to move on their hind legs) as “the 
most developed marsupials” (die höchststehendsten Beuteltiere) and used them in an analogy 
with humans (Hilzheimer 1921, 187). Like other early authors, he saw the forest as a 
comfortable place, radically different from the open plains, which he regarded as a rough 
environment, characterised by strong contrasts and hard interspecific competition (Hilzheimer 
1921, 189-190). But why should primeval man abandon the forest paradise? He did not. Like 
Hans Weinert some years later, Hilzheimer viewed it as probable that the human ancestors did 
not leave the forest, but the forest landscape transformed gradually and imperceptibly into 
open plains (Hilzheimer 1921, 194). Hilzheimer’s ideas exemplify the degree of 
oversimplification implicit in several early theoretical concepts of early human habitats. This 
oversimplification reflects the need to conceive a landscape where hypothetical human 
ancestors could exist and behave according to the premises of the specific hypotheses; on 
idealistic zonation see chapter 3.4 in the main thesis.  
Analogies using other organisms to illuminate still obscure phases in primeval man’s 
evolution were characterised not only by simplistic and anthropocentric views of the 
evolutionary processes; they also assumed misguided ideas whereby organisms are driven to a 
continuous and linear evolutionary progress towards more complex forms. Such reasoning 
can be recognised in the ideas presented by the geologist Joseph Barrell (1869-1919), when he 
proposed an analogy between alleged similar evolutionary processes relevant for the 
emergence of primeval man and the emergence of the first land vertebrates (Barrell 1916; 
1917). Strongly influenced by William Diller Matthew’s234 ideas, Barrell was convinced that 
the evolution of human beings took place in Central Asia and was directly connected to 
climatic changes in the past. He believed that recurrent epochs of semi-aridity brought 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
between human races or nations. He believed for instance that the effect of climatic and environmental 
changes could explain why anti-Semitic tendencies are present only in Germany but not in other European 
countries (Hilzheimer 1921, 205). For more details see please the original. 
234 See references to Matthew’s Climate and Evolution, (Matthew 1950) [first published 1915] in Barrell (1917, 
17, 20). 
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conditions that severely suppressed river fish habitats (Barrell 1916, 502; 1917, 17). With 
increasing aridity, the rivers were reduced in flow, the content of oxygen decreased and fish 
were isolated in pools, stagnant and foul from the decomposition of animal and plant remains. 
From primitive fish (under the constraints of severe semi-aridity of the Devonian period) 
emerged the amphibians, able to carry forward their activities as terrestrial animals (Barrell 
1916). Barrell stressed the key role of environmental changes and natural selection in 
evolutionary events: “Natural selection, although discredited as a cause determining specific 
variations, appears nevertheless to be a major factor in evolution, the driving cause in 
association with changes in environment, which has forced the great advances in organic 
progress” (Barrell 1916, 504). These ideas, as he stated, gave him the inspiration for a new 
scenario on the evolution of primeval man (Barrell 1916, 502-503; 1917, 17). In the paper 
Probable relations of climatic change to the origin of the tertiary ape-man, after summarising 
his hypotheses on the rise of air-breathing, he defended the idea that an analogous process of 
climatic events and natural selection was responsible for the emergence of the first upright 
human ancestors:  
Did a similar climatic change in the Tertiary period acting on a species of large-brained and 
progressive anthropoid apes isolated from the regions of continued forest compel them to 
adapt themselves to a terrestrial life or die? Did the gradual dwindling, leading even to the 
extermination of forests, in a region from which the forest fauna could not escape, produce a 
rigorous natural selection which transformed an ape, largely arboreal and frugivorous in 
habits, into a powerful, terrestrial, bipedal primate, largely carnivorous in habit, banding 
together in the struggle for existence and by that means achieving success in chase and war? 
(Barrell 1917,17) 
 He was convinced that many of the specific elements that contributed to the evolution of 
early land vertebrates were also crucial in the evolution of man. He mentioned the alleged 
influence of a semi-arid climate as the most important factor in this evolutionary scenario: 
The gradual elimination, first of food of the forests, lastly of the refuge of the trees, through 
increasing semi-aridity, would have been a compelling cause as compelled as mandatory as 
the semi-aridity which compelled the emergence of vertebrates from the waters, transforming 
fishes into amphibians; the first of the vertebrate rulers of the land. It is the purpose of the 
present article to assemble the evidence which suggests this climatic cause acting upon our 
simian ancestors as a controlling factor in this latest of the major stages in human evolution. 
(Barrell 1917, 17)   
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According to Barrell, the primary cause for the differentiation of ape-men from the apes was 
"the compulsion of increasing aridity in Miocene times, by isolating anthropoids north of the 
Asiatic mountain systems and reducing the forests there to savannahs and open plains” 
(Barrell 1917,  19). He speculated about the predatory activities of early man living in open 
plains: “With the use of crude weapons for the killing of animals the modifications in teeth 
and jaws represent a carnivorous-omnivorous adaptation fully worked out in a terrestrial and 
predatory primate” (Barrell 1917,  22). Barrell asked why a species of ape would choose a 
more hazardous life voluntarily. The answer to this question has strong similarities to Arldt’s 
speculations (see chapter D.5.1), published ten years earlier: that human ancestors were 
obliged to leave the trees (Barrell 1917,  23).  
A similar analogy was presented by the American palaeontologist Richard Swan Lull (1867-
1957) in his book Organic Evolution (1917). The similarity is probably not a coincidence, as 
Barrell acknowledged his debt to Matthew and to Lull (Barrell 1917, 17). Lull believed that 
the drying up of central Asia in Miocene and late Pliocene times forced pre-human ancestors 
to descend from the trees, “a step which was absolutely essential to further human 
development” (Lull 1917, 672). Like Barrell, he drew a comparison with the evolution of the 
first terrestrial vertebrates: as the lakes and ponds of the Devonian had gradually dried up with 
the increased aridity, the primitive amphibians were forced to move across dry land. 
Analogous to this scenario, the ancestors of mankind had been forced to migrate from one 
shrinking patch of forest to another, until some groups of survivors were fully adapted to live 
permanently on the open plains (Lull 1917, 672). Of interest in this analogy (already clearly 
formulated by another author (Reinhardt 1906, 7)) is that the tree-to-tree scenario has been 
essential in the hypotheses formulated by many scholars after the modern evolutionary 
synthesis. Ideas similar to Lull’s analogy were later used by influential scientists like 
Ellsworth Huntington235 (1945, 26), Gerhard Heberer (1959, 1131) and Wilfrid E. Le Gros 
Clark (1978, 187). The tree-to-tree scenario belongs to the most influential versions of the 
savannah hypotheses in modern palaeoanthropology.  
                                                          
235 Huntington’s primary concern was the corroboration of his thesis of the intellectual superiority of some 
human races (Huntington 1918, 147-148), and that the climatic factors are the crucial factors for this racial 
superiority (Huntington 1918, 148), see Martin (1973). A detailed exposition of his ideas was published in his 
book Mainsprings of Civilizations (Huntington 1945). As his theories concerned mainly the development of 
recent races of human being, the importance of his work is more related to the role of new methods and work 
programmes in anthropology. Especially his book Civilization and Climate (3rd ed. Huntington 1924) had a 
perceptible influence on many authors, even on German-speaking scientists in the 1920s, such as for instance 
Konrad Olbricht (1923) and Egon Freiherr von Eickstedt (1925). 
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A further popular form to corroborate scenarios of early human evolution was the direct 
comparison between humans and animals living on open plains, as the peculiar analogies 
between the evolution of man and horses. The term “peculiar” is appropriate here, since such 
analogies cannot be corroborated by any anatomical or physiological convergences between 
these organisms, but were mainly motivated by two ideas. On one hand, the fossil record of 
early horses was excellent in the late 19th century, and some scientists viewed it as natural to 
compare this material with the very scarce hominin fossil evidence of this time. For instance, 
the quality of equid fossil material inspired the British science writer Samuel Laing (1812-
1897) to compare the evolution of horses with the evolution of man to help clarify aspects 
related to time of emergence and tempo of evolution of both organism groups: 
The horse, whose ancestral pedigree is the best established of any of the existing mammals, 
was already in existence in the Pliocene period, and the Hipparion, which is the first of the 
links connecting him with the primitive mammal, is first found in the Miocene and not later 
than the Pliocene. Why should the development of man have begun later, and followed a more 
rapid course that that of the horse? (Laing 1893, 160) 
On the other hand, reflecting the admiration of horses as magnificent and noble animals, 
several scholars in the past believed that they must have evolved in a similar way to our own 
species (note the anthropocentric view implicit in this analogy). Finally, the fossil evidence 
allowed a clear picture of the phylogeny of modern horses. The evolutionary history of this 
group became one of the most important examples of a gradual transition in vertebrates in late 
19th century. It is therefore not surprising that horses were used as referential animals in the 
reconstruction of human past, especially by North American palaeontologists who were 
specialised or at least interested in Equidae evolution.  
An early human-horse analogy was proposed by William Diller Matthew (1871-1930), 
probably the most influential scientist in the fields of vertebrate palaeontology and 
zoogeography of his time (Colbert 1992; Rainger 1997, 648-649). Influenced by the ideas of 
Alfred Russel Wallace on zoogeography (Wallace 1876; Wallace 1898) and by the ideas on 
climatic fluctuations proposed by the American geologist Thomas C. Chamberlin236, Matthew 
developed his own views on the dispersal of vertebrates which were summarised in his most 
influential book Climate and Evolution237 (1st ed. 1915, here quoted from Matthew 1950). He 
                                                          
236 Chamberlin’s theories involve an alteration of climates through the course of geological time from extremes 
of warm, moist tropical and uniform, to extremes of cold, arid zonal climates (Chamberlin 1897; 1898; 1899) 
237 According to Matthew (1950, 3), he gave a talk upon “Climate and Evolution” before the Linnaean Society in 
14 January 1902. 
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saw the numerous hypothetical land bridges connecting continents separated by deep oceans 
as unnecessary to explain geographic distribution of vertebrates. Matthew believed that in “in 
a broad way the present distribution of land and shallow water on the one hand, of deep water 
on the other, has been substantially unchanged” (Matthew 1950, 4). He adopted the theory of 
isostasy – a term first proposed by Clarence Dutton (1889) ) which states that continents and 
oceans are held in balance (Matthew 1950, 4). He believed, therefore, that although some 
occasional great changes of level have occurred in the past, they were probably of restricted 
extent and not essential for the general configurations of the continental platforms (Matthew 
1950, 20). On the zoogeographic side he explained the pattern of distribution of vertebrates, 
among others, through “natural rafts”238, through his hypotheses on “centres of dispersal” and 
– similar to other authors before him239 – through an oversimplified thesis on evolutionary 
development shaped by climatic and environmental changes. Using a north polar projection to 
explain the dispersal and distribution of every group of vertebrates, he argued that vertebrates 
had often originated in the climatically more challenging northern zones, the Holarctic, and 
then dispersed in waves to more favourable areas in the Southern Hemisphere. By transferring 
Chamberlin’s theories on the vertebrate palaeontology, Matthew explained that the periods of 
arid and markedly zonal climate “would be unfavorable to abundance of life and the ease with 
which animals could obtain a living” (Matthew 1950, 7). In these periods, stated Matthew, the 
animals must maintain themselves against the harsh conditions of nature such as the scarcity 
of food, variations of temperature, and higher concurrence with other organisms. In the moist 
tropical phase it would be the opposite: abundant food, constant temperature and less 
concurrence (Matthew 1950, 7). “We should expect”, he wrote, “to find in the land life 
adapted to the arid climatic phase a greater activity and higher development of life, special 
adaptations to resist violent changes in temperature and specializations fitting them to the 
open grassy plains and desert life” (Matthew 1950, 7).  
He saw it as evident that human beings emerged on or about the great plateau of central Asia 
(Matthew 1950, 41) and rejected the ideas that the present habitat of primitive races was taken 
to be approximately the primeval home of man (Matthew 1950, 42). He saw the assumption 
that man is primarily adapted to a tropical climate as only partly true (Matthew 1950, 42). For 
                                                          
238 The role of natural rafts like ice-floes and driftwood in the dispersal of plants and animals was already 
discussed by Darwin (1859, chapter 11) and Wallace (1876, e.g., vol. I, 14-15, 333, 402, 407, 416, vol. II, 35, 545, 
548, 549).   
239 However, there are evident differences between his views and the ideas defended by Arldt. While Arldt’s 
work Die Entwicklung... (Arldt 1907a) can be regarded as a culmination in the development of the land-bridge 
theories, Matthew was a persuasive opponent of these ideas.   
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this reason, and contrary to most authors before and after him, he did not consider it rational 
that the loss of body hair in the human species was a logical process for a primeval living in a 
warm climate. He regarded it as possible that the body hair reduced as a result of wearing 
clothes (Matthew 1950, 42-43). Similar vestiary hypotheses were later defended sporadically 
by modern authors (see, e.g., Kushlan 1985). Some years later, Matthew envisioned a scenario 
of a primeval horse deprived of its original forest environment and forced to adapt to open 
plains in his work Evolution of the Horse (Matthew 1913). As curator of fossil vertebrates at 
the American Museum, he had access to the world’s largest collection of fossil horses. In the 
preface of one popular guide he wrote about this collection, and he confessed that “Among all 
the animals of past and present there is none so deserving of our interest and affection as the 
horse” (Matthew 1913, 7). In the same leaflet he speculated about the factors he believed were 
crucial for the emergence of the first horses: 
The evolution of the horse, adapting it to live on the dry plains, probably went hand in hand 
with the evolution of the plains themselves. [...] The coming of a cold, dry climate restricted 
and thinned the forests and caused the appearance and extension of open, grassy plains. The 
ancient forests inhabitants were forced either to retreat and disappear with the forests, or to 
adapt themselves to the new conditions of life. (Matthew 1913, 31; see also Matthew 1926, 
171)   
Matthew did not regard this scenario as a hypothesis. For him the fossil evidence showing a 
four-toed habitant of forests developing into a one-toed habitant of open plains was self-
evident, so the whole scenario could not be regarded as a “theory”, but as “a fact of record” 
(Matthew 1926, 176); see also chapter D.3.2, in which the argument is developed that the 
scenario of primeval man adapting to open plains was also regarded as a fact and not as a 
hypothesis. 
A further interesting horse-man analogy was expressed by Matthew’s early teacher Henry 
Fairfield Osborn (1857-1935), the influential American geologist, palaeontologist and director 
of the American Museum of Natural History in New York (Rainger 1991). Osborn believed in 
a very long and independent evolution of human beings, and he excluded an “ape-man” as a 
human ancestor. The similarities between apes and man, according to Osborn, are due to 
either a very remote common inheritance or to the convergent evolution of the ape towards 
the human type (see also Bender 1999a, 45-48; Bender-Oser 2004a, 64-71; Osborn 1927, 
377). 
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Osborn was the most acclaimed proponent of the idea that central Asia was the birthplace of 
humans. As Matthew had done, he explained that the ideal environment of the ancestor of 
man was not in the warm forested lowlands “but in the relatively high, invigorating uplands of 
a country such as central Asia” (Osborn 1929, 6). He defended ideas on primeval man’s 
evolution determined by climatic and environmental changes, presenting crucial events of his 
phylogeny in an oversimplified scenario. For instance, he stressed the idea of woodland and 
forest as places of stagnation (enough food, congenial life) and open plains as places of 
progression (less food, harsh conditions), both for the emergence of the primeval man and for 
the development of early civilisations (Osborn 1926b; 1927; 1928). He was convinced that 
“the home of primitive man should be looked for in the same kind of country in which the 
primitive horse flourished” (Osborn 1927, 337). This conviction was not based on convergent 
features between horses and humans, but was implicitly related to the idea that both 
organisms are “more developed” than other mammals. Osborn’s conviction of the heuristic 
value of his horse-man analogy even motivated him to make predictions about the discovery 
of fossil remains of primeval man:  
It was my observation of the full-bred horse of Middle Pliocene time, known as Pliohippus 
leidyanus, which led me to predict to the National Academy of Sciences the discovery of a 
full-brained pro-man in Pliocene time; this prediction preceded the recent demonstration that 
Eoanthropus dawsoni of Piltdown is probably of Pliocene age. (Osborn 1927, 379) 
Osborn was never confronted with the embarrassing fact that his prediction was not confirmed 
by any real empirical evidence - Piltdown was exposed as a hoax in the 1950s, many years 
after Osborn’s death. Osborn’s belief of the existence of the Dawn-Man in Asia was only a 
hypothesis, and one of the aims of the five expeditions to central Asia (1922-1930) led by Roy 
Chapman Andrews was to find hard evidence to corroborate Osborn’s views (Andrews 1926). 
However, although these expeditions made important discoveries (Gallenkamp 2001) no 
fossil evidence for the Dawn-Man could be uncovered. Nevertheless, Andrews did not 
hesitate to present data on climates, temperature, botanic and general conditions in 
Pleistocene in clear support of Osborn’s views (Andrews 1926, 248).  
Although the contextualisation of early hominins in open plains had a long tradition in 
palaeoanthropology, a group of hypotheses often ignored the SHs by advocating that humans 
are essentially unspecialised and primitive creatures. Although these hypotheses were always 
considered as a poor alternative to the main hypotheses on human evolution, several 
influential authors belong to their advocates, and some important aspects of modern 
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hypotheses on hominoid/hominin evolution are influenced by these ideas. This is the topic for 
the next section.   
D.6.2 Humans as primitive, unspecialized, deficient, cosmopolitan, “specialised in being 
unspecialised”, auto-domesticated creatures 
The present chapter has dealt with different hypotheses on human evolution which share some 
common elements or which were often discussed in the same theoretical framework. It begins 
with a summary of the primitivity ideas proposed by the German pathologist Maximilian 
Joseph Johann Westenhöfer, short Max Westenhöfer (1871-1957), as he is the author of 
another hypothesis on human evolution (the Aquatile Hypothese, see Appendix F) which is of 
crucial importance for a discussion on water use in early hominin evolution.    
Westenhöfer is today a rather unknown pathologist (see Appendix F) who dedicated many 
years to anthropological research. Beside his professional activity as pathologist, he defended 
controversial views on human evolution which were published mainly in German medical 
periodicals, and in zoological journals;240 he summarised his anthropological ideas in 
different books published between 1934 and 1948, with translations in Spanish and French.241 
By means of several anatomical investigations Westenhöfer tried to demonstrate that primates 
and human beings developed in separate lines, and that a certain mammal or “amphibian 
reptile” was already “human” in a very remote time. In the title page of his book Das Problem 
der Menschwerdung he depicted an upright frill-necked lizard (Chlamydosaurus kingii) to 
illustrate his idea that the first mammals had already occasionally adopted an upright posture 
                                                          
240 Westenhöfer published in periodicals specialised in different medical fields, as for instance urology, 
gynaecology (Frauenkunde), obstetrics, as well as in several clinical journals; some articles were published in 
zoological journals. Several of his articles were translated in Spanish and published in South American 
periodicals. A bibliography of Westenhöfer’s publications on human evolution is given in (Westenhöfer 1942b, 
390-391) as well as in (Bender-Oser 2004a, 154-156) and (Wicke 1958a). 
241 The first is a booklet with 71 pages entitled Das Problem der Menschwerdung. A second extended (106 
pages) and revised edition with the same title was published in the next year (1935). A 52-page condensed and 
annotated French translation of this work was published under the title of Le problem de la genèse de 
l’Homme; the zoologist Serge Frechkop  was responsible for this edition(Westenhöfer 1953). Westenhöfer 
largely extended Das Problem in the following years, but had problems in trying to publish it in Germany; also 
its translation in Italian and French were not approved “by the ruling powers in Germany at that time” 
(damalige Machthabern in Deutschland) (Westenhöfer 1948, 9). Therefore, according to Westenhöfer, the still 
unpublished book was translated by his former student Hector Rodriguez in Spanish and published in 1940 
under the title of El camino propio evolutivo y el origin del Hombre (see Westenhöfer 1942a, 3); a further 
translation by the Chilean physician Edgardo Schirmer Ramos was later published (Westenhöfer 1951). The 
German edition of this work was later published under the title of Der Eigenweg des Menschen, which had two 
almost identical prints – only the subtitle diverged slightly - of 396 pages (Westenhöfer 1942a; Westenhöfer 
1942b). In 1948, Westenhöfer published a 255-page extract of this book entitled Die Grundlagen meiner 
Theorie vom Eigenweg des Menschen (Westenhöfer 1948); see Bender-Oser (2004a) 
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when they evolved from an amphibian reptile [Lurchreptil] (Westenhöfer 1935, 75) (see 
Figure D.1). 
 
Figure D.1: Upright frill-necked lizard (Chlamydosaurus kingii) depicted in the title page of 
Westenhöfer’s book Das Problem der Menschwerdung. This figure illustrates Westenhöfer’s 
conviction that the first mammals were already occasional bipeds. He was certainly criticised for this 
picture, so that in the second edition of the book he emphasised that this illustration was only an 
example of upright posture of a living animal (Westenhöfer 1935, 3).  
 
Westenhöfer, like other early authors242, took pleasure in radically inverting the implied 
sequence of evolutionary events which led to the origin of humans. “We saw”, wrote 
Westenhöfer, “that it is impossible that humans descended from an ape-like ancestor. The 
opposite is more likely” [Das Umgekehrte ist wahrscheinlicher]243 (Westenhöfer 1924, 256). 
Most proponents of what may be called “primitivity hypothesis” implied a naïve view of 
Dollo’s law of irreversibility. The Dollo’s law states that complex characters, once lost, are 
not regained. The naïve interpretation of this principle assumed that the reversal of simple 
                                                          
242 For instance, the Argentinian zoologist Forentino Ameghino wrote: “Ce n’est pas l’Homme qui apparaît 
comme un Singe perfectionné, sinon au contraire les Singes qui apparaissent comme des hommes bestialisés” 
(Man is not an improved ape; on the contrary the apes are men that turned beastly) (Ameghino 1906), English 
translation by Podgorny (2005, 2). 
243 This radical inversion of the usual view of human evolution was often used by other early authors. In some 
few cases, similar statements were formulated by scientists after the modern synthesis, as for instance Björn 
Kurtén, who wrote: “Man did not descend from the apes. It would be more correct to say that apes and 
monkeys descended from early ancestors of man. The distinction is real: in the traits under consideration, man 
is primitive, apes and monkeys are specialized” (Kurtén 1973, vii). 
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features is also not possible. For instance, it was often argued that humans could not descend 
from a specialized ape bearing powerful teeth and long arms. Therefore, it was argued, the 
relative small canines244 and short arms of humans were preserved in a lineage independent of 
other primates. This idea is suggested in the titles of some of Westenhöfer’s works (my 
translation): “Man, the Oldest Mammal” (Westenhöfer 1926), “On the Primitive Place of Man 
Among the Mammals” (Westenhöfer 1930) or  “Man’s Own Way” (Westenhöfer 1942b). 
Instead of analysing Westenhöfer’s specific arguments towards an “own road” in human 
phylogeny  - for non-German speaking researches there are three available sources on these 
views published in different languages245 - this study will proceed here to supply an outline of 
the historical context of this idea, which is important for an understanding of Westenhöfer’s 
Aquatile Hypothese (see Appendix F). 
Speculations about “apes descending from humans”, ancestors of humans having already 
humanoid features in a very remote past or different human races developing from different 
ancient primate species were rather popular in the past. Different versions of these ideas were 
defended for instance by Karl Snell (1887), Albert Gaudry (1896), Hermann Klaatsch (1902; 
1922), Carl Heinrich Stratz (1904), Julius Kollmann (1905), Florentino Amegnino (1906),  
Robert Wiedersheim (1908, 107, 126), Giuseppe Sergi (1913), Ludwig Wilser (1910), Maurus 
Horst (1913), Siegfried Knauer (1916), Henry F. Osborn (1926a; 1926b; 1927; 1928; 1929), 
Charles Hill-Tout (1921), Louis Bolk (1926), Otto Kleinschmidt (1926), Adolf Heilborn 
(1931), Paul Adloff (1907), Vincenzo Giuffrida-Ruggeri (1902; 1921), Francis G. 
Crookshank (1924), Edgar Dacqué (1924), Frederic Wood Jones (1918; 1948; 1929), Adolf  
Naef (1926a; 1926b; 1933), Heinrich Quiring (1930), F. Šamberger (1933a; 1933b), Klaas de 
Snoo (1942), Herbert Frietsche (1947), Friedrich A. Kipp (1948), W. C. Osman Hill (1950), 
Karl Beurlen (1950), Björn Kurtén (1973), to name but a few. This popularity is, at the first 
sight, not comprehensible, since an “independent” origin of humans was evidently 
incompatible with elementary facts. The influential German zoologist Adolf Remane 
criticised the aphoristic character and lack of basic knowledge on phylogenetic methods in 
Westenhöfer’s primitivity arguments (Remane 1926). “Unfortunately”, wrote Remane about 
                                                          
244 Among German-speaking authors, the discussion on the canine-problem (Eckzahproblem) was carried out 
especially by Paul Adloff, a proponent of primitivity ideas, and Adolf Remane, who defended the traditional 
views; see Remane (1928b) and references therein. 
245For a review in English of Westenhöfer’s ideas see Frechkop (1954), also a proponent of primitivity ideas; for 
a condensed French edition of Westenhöfer book Das Problem der Menschwerdung see (Westenhöfer 1953); 
for a summary of Westenhöfer’s anthropological ideas in Spanish see Barrientos (1958) and specially the 
excellent papers by Hugo K. Sievers Wicke (Wicke 1958a; Wicke 1958b). For a lengthy analysis of Westenhöfer’s 
anthropological ideas and a biography (in German) see Bender-Oser (2004a). 
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one of Westenhöfer’s papers, “the work shows that the fantastic period in the phylogenetic 
research is not yet over” (Remane 1926, 235, my translation; see also Remane 1928a). Just as 
devastating (but expressed in a less abrasive tone) was a detailed review written by the 
Austrian zoologist J. Versluys (1929) (see Bender-Oser 2004a, 48-51). In his “Russian 
Manuscript”,246 Konrad Lorenz vehemently criticised the common method of formulating a 
hypothesis and afterwards finding examples to corroborate it, mentioning the primitivity ideas 
expressed by Westenhöfer and Edgar Dacqué (Lorenz 1992, 78). Bernhard Rensch also 
criticised Osborn’s and Westenhöfer’s  primitivity hypotheses, naming them “naive ideas”  
(naïve Vorstellungen) (Rensch 1947, 310). 
There are several reasons for the popularity of the primitivity hypotheses, most of them relate 
to the fact that the majority of the advocates of a primitivity hypotheses were ardent anti-
Darwinians (or at least sceptical about the role of natural selection in evolutionary process) 
and defended essentialist conceptions in the sense of Platonic idealism. As the name suggests, 
essentialists working in biological fields believed that organisms have a permanent and 
unalterable “essence”. Essentialists often draw obscure analogies between this “essence” and 
genetic material, pointing to heterochronic concepts to explain human ‘unspecialised’ 
anatomy. This was opportune at this time as genetics and evolution were regarded as mutually 
exclusive concepts and heterochronic concepts were often used as an alternative to natural 
selection (see below). The primitivity ideas were attractive to scholars who were interested in 
a discussion of ‘human nature’ in the tradition of ancient philosophers, i.e., without the 
restrictions of empirical corroboration required in evolutionary biology. In German speaking 
countries, authors who felt excluded from the discussion on the “unique status of man in 
nature” since the early 19th century and especially after 1859, found a niche in the so-called 
Philosophische Anthropologie, which consolidated to an own discipline in the 1920s through 
the works of Max Scheler (1874-1928), Helmuth Plessner (1892-1985) and Arnold Gehlen 
(1904-1976) (see Rehberg 2008). (Gehlen’s ideas will be discussed below.)  
Furthermore, the primitivity hypotheses were attractive to religious scholars and layperson 
searching for alternative ideas to the views defending a close relationship between humans 
and other primates. By assuming a very ancient human stem developing almost independently 
from other primates, proponents of the primitivity hypotheses created a comfortable distance 
between our own species and other organisms. From among the above list of authors 
                                                          
246 This manuscript was written in Soviet prison camps between 1944 and 1948 and published for the first time 
in 1992. 
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defending primitivity ideas there can be found several scientists with a strong reputation in 
their own field in natural sciences, but who defended highly obscure and mystic ideas on 
human evolution in their attempt to conciliate evolutionary thinking with their religious 
beliefs. For instance, the metaphysical ideas on human evolution expressed by the German 
palaeontologist Edgar Dacqué (1878-1945) have more in common with the speculative ideas 
presented by the natural philosopher Lorenz Oken (see Appendix A, chapter A.4) than with 
the scientific ideas of early 20th century. It is, therefore, not surprising that Snell, Kipp, 
Dacqué, Westenhöfer, Bolk and other proponents of primitivity were often positively quoted 
by “zoological anthroposophists” (Rapp 1987; Schad 1971; Tittmann 1982; Verhulst 1999). 
Pseudo-scientific arguments claiming that humans exist since billions of years are today 
defended by creationists and theosophists.   
Finally, another reason for the success of the primitivity hypotheses is related to two 
connected topics which were very influential in the anthropological discussion in late 19th and 
early 20th century. The first topic concerns the popular idea at this time that humans are 
unique concerning their alleged lack of specialisations when compared with other organisms. 
These views are derived from of the ancient philosophical ideas on “human nature”, a topic 
which has been the subject of numerous studies on ancient ethnological and anthropological 
debate247 and which will not be repeated here. The second topic concerns the view expressed 
by early and modern biologists which states that specialisation (or ‘overspecialisation’, as it is 
often termed) may lead to the extinction of species. This assumption is based on the 
seemingly comprehensible idea that organisms that are too committed to certain aspects of 
their environments will have more problems developing adaptive responses to changes in the 
environment than less specialised organisms. This idea motivated evolutionary biologists to 
supply stereotype explanations in which a causal link between the extinction of organisms and 
its alleged ‘overspecialisation’ was assumed. Through an inflexible interpretation of Dollo’s 
law of irreversibility (see, e.g., Beurlen 1937, 21-48), early authors often identified which 
allegedly overspecialized organisms died out or which of the extant alleged overspecialised 
species would not be able to “develop further” (Schindewolf 1950, 327-328). Such 
predictions and reconstructions were often formulated in connection with orthogenetic ideas, 
coupled with criticism towards the influence of natural selection (Beurlen 1937, 66-73; 
Schindewolf 1950, 314-321, 410-417).  
                                                          
247 See Müller (1997; 1968; 1980; 2003) and Landmann (1962). See also Stoczkowski (1994; 2002), who pointed 
to several similarities between modern and ancient theories. 
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It is therefore not surprising that several authors proposed ways by which living organisms 
may have prevented the danger of this biological sword of Damocles through heterochronic 
processes in the time prior to the consolidation of the modern syntheses – sometimes also 
afterwards. 248 Similarly, most proponents of primitivity hypotheses used the idea of man as a 
creature who “escaped” from the dangers extinction by “keeping specialised”. The German 
geologist Heinrich Quiring (1885-1964), for instance, named an organism’s ability to 
“escape” from the impasses related to specialisation a “negation” (Negation). He argued that 
in Tertiary times, man and monkey were part of the same clade (Stamm). During the climatic 
changes in the Ice Age, a part of these primates went to the south, following a more 
favourable region. Consequently, they adapted further to these conditions and their brain 
degenerated partially. The ancestor of man, however, stood in the cold climate and “negated” 
any adaptation. Quiring believed that a similar process of resistance against adaptation 
occurred in the evolution of other creatures, such as in the emergence of the first terrestrial 
vertebrates (1931; Quiring 1930);  Barrell’s and Lull’s analogies between the emergence of 
humans and first terrestrial vertebrates have been mentioned in chapter D.6.1. 
Similar ideas were proposed by other authors, such as Herman Klaatsch, who believed that 
humans did not evolve because of a struggle of life (Kampf ums Dasein), but because they 
were “spared” from the influence of natural selection (Klaatsch 1922, 47).249 One of the most 
influential philosophical concepts in German-speaking countries relating to the advantages of 
the alleged lack of specialisation in humans was formulated by Arnold Gehlen. In his book 
Der Mensch: Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (first published in 1940) he 
discussed, among other issues, the views expressed by 18th and 19th century philosophers, 
contemporary scientists and proponents of primitivity hypotheses; he also knew 
Westenhöfer’s works. Gehlen was especially interested in the anthropological ideas expressed 
by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), a very influential theologian and cultural 
philosopher in 18th century. Herder himself was inspired by contemporaneous and classical 
authors (Berg 1984; Gipper 1995; Häfner 1995; Lovejoy 1959b; Wenzel 1990). An excellent 
investigation of the Mängelwesen-idea by Gehlen, Herder and antique precursors is supplied 
by Pöhlmann (1970); see also Müller (1968). The idea of humans as anatomically inferior to 
other animals was also expressed by tribal people, as for instance in the poetry of South 
American indigenous Guaraní  (in Theile 1962, 42). For an interesting discussion of the 
                                                          
248 See for example the ideas expressed by Clark (1964, 247), Cloud (1948), Hardy  (1954) and Hilzheimer (Clark 
1964, 247; Cloud 1948; Hardy 1954; 1927). 
249 This is basically the same idea expressed by Herschel and Darwin (see chapter D.3.1). See also Gehlen 
(1986b, 128), who wrote about human ancestors living in a protected environment (a “paradise”). 
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Mängelwesen-idea by an author in the 17th century see the book De la perfection de l'homme 
by Charles Sorel; this author was already mentioned elsewhere (Appendix B) in connection 
with de Maillet’s ideas on aquatic counterparts to terrestrial animals. Sorel dedicated large 
parts of his work to defend the opinion of human as the most perfect organism and rejected 
therefore the ideas on human as inferior and deficient creatures (Sorel 1655). He discussed 
also theological implications of the plurality of worlds; his work was also translated into 
German (Sorel 1660). 
Starting from the pre-conceived and untenable assumption that humans did not descend from 
any animal species (Gehlen 1986b, 14-15), he repeated views often expressed by classic 
philosophers  which stated that humans, when compared with other organisms, are basically 
Mängelwesen (“deficient beings”) and weltoffen (cosmopolitan). Gehlen (1986a, 14-16) 
borrowed the expression Weltoffenheit  from the philosopher Max Scheller (1874-1928), who 
used it in his work Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, (Scheller 2005), first  published in 
1928. The work is based on a talk entitled Die Sonderstellung des Menschen (the uniqueness 
of humankind) from 1927 – an expression very popular by advocates of primitivity ideas. The 
Swiss biologist and natural philosopher Adolf Portmann also used the expression 
(Weltoffenheit des Menschen) (human cosmopolitanism) with similar metaphysical arguments 
as Scheller and Gehlen. He regarded humans as radically divergent from all other 
environmentally-bound (umweltgebunden) creatures (Portmann 1969, 83) and believed that 
“human development is human” (Unser gesamter Werdegang ist human) (Portmann 1973, 64) 
– a similar statement to the idea of “humans descending  from humans” often implicitly 
expressed by proponents of primitivity ideas. Portmann often used terms like Geheimnis 
(secret) or Verborgenheit (hiddenness) in connection with early phases in human evolution 
(Portmann 1973, 68). He regarded the topic human evolution is unsearchable by scientific 
means. Instead of searching for scientific answers to our origins, so Portmann said, we should 
acknowledge “the grandness of the secret reason” (die Grösse des Geheimnisgrundes) 
(Portmann 1969, 164), without explaining what exactly he meant by this statement.  
One of the authors strongly influenced by Portmann was the biologist, anthropologist and 
Jesuit Paul Overhage (1906-1979) who wrote several works on human evolution using an 
impressive number of references (1959a; 1959b; 1959c; 1961; 1969). Exactly as Portmann 
had done, he continuously used phrases like human evolution is “still immersed in a heavy 
darkness of secrecy” (schwere Dunkel des Geheimnisses) (Overhage 1959a, 287). Overhage’s 
and Portmann’s views on human evolution were strongly influenced by the metaphysical 
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ideas expressed by the Jesuit Teilhard de Chardin (1956). According to Gehlen, early humans 
survived by keeping a generalist, primitivist and “deficient” status (Gehlen 1950).250 Konrad 
Lorenz, when discussing Gehlen’s ideas in 1954 (here quoted from a later edition, Lorenz 
1967, 516-516), suggested replacing Gehlens’ Mängelwesen through the similar paradoxical 
expression “spezialisiert auf Nicht-spezialisiert-sein” (“specialised in being unspecialised”), 
stressing with this term the human ability to produce a broad range of locomotory behaviours. 
Interestingly, some later authors used almost identical words, without quoting Lorenz’s work, 
e.g., Haldane (1956) and Niemitz (2002). Consequently, several authors after Haldane believe 
that he was the first author of these ideas; see, e.g.,  Schmidbauer (1974) and Laughlin (1968). 
Views on humans able to carry out a broad spectrum of locomotory behaviours were already 
proposed by pre-Darwinian authors. For instance, the French author Jacques-Henri Bernardin 
de Saint-Pierre (1737-1814) in his book Études de la nature (here quoted from the translated 
edition Studies of Nature) stressed the human ability to swim and to dive (p. 53), and 
concluded anthropocentrically: “There is no animal whose body is susceptible of so many 
different movements; and I am tempted to believe, that he unites in himself all the possible 
varieties of animal motion, on seeing how he bends, kneels, creeps, slides, swims, tumbles 
himself into the form of an arch, rounds himself like a wheel, like a bowl, walks, runs, leaps, 
springs, mounts, descends, climbs; in a word, how his frame is equally adapted to clamber to 
the summit of the rock, and to walk on the surface of the snow; to traverse the river and the 
forest, to pick the moss of the fountain, and the fruit of the palm-tree; to feed the bee, and to 
tame the elephant” (De Saint Pierre 1799, 54-55). The alleged human uniqueness concerning 
locomotory ability is discussed in chapter 6 of the main thesis. 
Additionally, Lorenz (1940; 1959) speculated about the possibility that several human 
features are the result of a process of “self-domestication”. Basically, this idea suggests that 
humans had undergone anatomical or behavioural changes by relaxing forces of natural 
selection, in a process similar to domesticated animals. Similar analogies were formulated by 
early authors, such as  Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1806, 43), Eugen Fischer (1914), Max 
Hilzheimer (1927) and Hans Nachtsheim (1940); the same idea is also implied in Gehlen’s 
Mängelwesen-hypothesis and Bolk’s ideas on human neoteny (Bolk 1926) - to name a few 
                                                          
250 Gehlen’s arguments cannot be regarded as product of a scientific discussion and resemble the early natural 
theological discussions. For instance, the same basic idea of human as “deficient creatures” when compared 
with other animals was formulated in a religious work written by the Austrian theologian and prolific author of 
pedagogic books Jakob Glatz (1776-1831). He discussed the paradoxical situation of man made in the image 
and likeness of God but at the same time being, among all living creatures, the most susceptible to physical and 
psychic problems (Glatz 1814, 14-16).  
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examples. Several other authors pointed out the problems related to these ideas, such as 
specialists in domesticated animals (Herre 1959) and authors who criticised oversimplified 
assumptions on humans as essentially neotenic organisms (Starck 1962). Different versions of 
the self-domestication-hypotheses are still sporadically propagated by modern authors; see 
review and further references in (Brüne 2007). 
As shown above, Herschel and Darwin speculated about the possibility that primeval man 
emerged on an island, protected from the selective pressure of big predators. In the early 20th 
century, different versions of the Herschel/Darwin island hypothesis were published. These 
authors often pointed to Australia or to a hypothetical sunken continent as cradle of mankind. 
Furthermore, they often related to a bodily inferiority and primitive/generalised status of 
humans when compared to other animals to corroborate these ideas. One of the most elaborate 
hypothesis of this type was proposed by the German anthropologist Otto Schoetensack (1850-
1912) in a paper entitled Die Bedeutung Australiens für die Herausbildung des Menschen aus 
seiner niederen Form (1901). Schoetensack agreed with Hermann Klaatsch’s251 view which 
states that humans are unspecialised creatures, which separated from other primates in a far-
distant time, even before the specialised arboreal features of apes developed. Schoetensack 
believed that human bipedalism and naked skin would represent a severe disadvantage in a 
dangerous environment. For this reason, these features did not evolve through a “struggle for 
survival”, but quite the opposite, they could only develop if primeval man lived in a safe 
environment, rather protected from dangerous carnivores. For him, the most favourable place 
would be Australia; a point he shared with Klaatsch. On this continent a primeval man (who 
was already more intelligent than other creatures) would not have difficulties in hunting slow 
and clumsy [langsam und plump] marsupials. Like several palaeoanthropologists after him, he 
tried to envisage the exact environmental conditions crucial in primeval man. According to 
him, the human ancestor would never develop into humans in a forest habitat – rather it had to 
be a mix of forest and vast steppe in Australia that saved primeval man from unilateral 
specialisations typical for today’s living apes (Schoetensack 1901, 131). Schoetensack’s ideas 
did not remain unnoticed. Some years later, Enrique Müller de la Fuente (1906, 92-98) quoted 
Schoetensack and repeated his arguments of Australia as a place safe from big predators and 
                                                          
251 The probably most famous proponent of primitivity ideas in German speaking countries, Klaatsch did not 
believe that humans descend from apes. He hypothesised that human bipedalism developed in connection 
with climbing high and isolated trees of a certain circumference. According to his view, bipedalism evolved long 
before the strong arboreal specialisations of other primates. Primeval man branched up from the main primate 
stock in a sunken continent in the Indian Ocean, close to Australia. The aborigines are isolated remnants of 
these primeval humans (Klaatsch 1922, 91-92). 
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for the development of bipedalism/hunting in a landscape characterised by less vegetation and 
more open plains  (Müller de la Fuente 1906, 94-96).  
Schoetensack’s hypothesis is also interesting for another reason. Darwin did not recognise or 
justify the evident contradiction between his open plains ideas and his island hypothesis. 
Although we cannot say if Schoetensack was indirectly or directly influenced by Darwin, or if 
the German author came to a similar set of ideas independently, his scenario is remarkable in 
the sense that it not only combines the island with the open plains hypothesis, but even 
merges both models with the idea of humans as helpless and primitive creatures. 
It would be wrong to assume that the primitivity hypotheses, being too divergent from the 
common view on human evolution, did not have a relevant influence on latter 
palaeoanthropological hypotheses. Similar views of proto-hominins as not “too specialised” 
are implied in in several influential hypotheses on the emergence of bipedalism, as for 
instance in the “quadrupedal hypotheses”, 252 which were popular until the 1960s (Abel 1931, 
135; Clark 1940, 207; Heberer 1951a, 52; Heberer 1973, 32-34; Schwalbe 1923, 323; Straus 
1949; Straus 1940) (Le Gros Clark later changed his ideas (Clark 1946)). This model posits 
that the hominin ancestor was not arboreal, but a terrestrial and palmigrade or digitigrade 
quadruped on open plains or mosaic landscapes. Their proponents excluded the existence of 
suspensory (and consequently knuckle-walking) adaptations among proto-hominins, as they 
assumed (similar to the advocates of the primitivity hypotheses) that such specialisations are 
not compatible with the prerequisites of a hominin ancestor. They assumed that a quadrupedal 
proto-hominin would better fulfill the prerequisites of a “generalist proto-hominin” than a 
brachiatory proto-hominin.  
Adolf Remane, who was already one of the sharpest critics of the primitivity hypotheses, also 
criticized the early quadrupedal model. He, among others, argued that attempts to see a 
terrestrial quadruped Proconsul253 or the earlier terrestrial primate as human ancestors (which 
                                                          
252 Sarmiento proposed later a modified form of the quadrupedal hypotheses, in which he defended a similar 
idea, with some additional and intricate steps based on an analysis of terrestrial traits of gorillas (Sarmiento 
1994) and contextualising early hominin evolution in open plains (Sarmiento 1998). 
253 Dryopithecus and Proconsul were often regarded as ancestors or closely related to ancestors of humans; see 
for instance Heberer (1951b, 6, 17) who regarded both groups as possible human ancestors. The idea of 
Proconsul as a human ancestor is also implied in several illustrations in biological textbooks, sometimes in 
educational tables; see for instance an educational table entitled “Horde der Prokonsulaffen” (horde of 
proconsul monkeys), depicting several terrestrial (some quadrupedal, some upright) and climbing animals 
searching for food in a savannah environment. It was published by the Akademie der pädagogischen 
Wissenschaften der DDR,  a research institute active from 1970 to 1991, created with the specific purpose of 
promoting knowledge compatible with Marxist-Leninist views  in the GDR (Malycha 2008).    
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automatically excluded a common ancestor between humans and apes) was highly 
improbable. He showed that the structural specialisation of an organ for a certain activity is 
not accompanied by a depletion of secondary functions, but may directly lead to the 
development of new secondary functions (Remane 1956); see also Avis (1962). In fact, a 
comparison between Remane’s criticism of Westenhöfer’s primitivity ideas (quoted above) 
and his criticism of the authors who denied an arboreal phase in hominin phylogeny shows 
that the arguments are basically the same. Certainly, the primitivity hypotheses were 
motivated by orthogenetic, essentialistic and anti-Darwinian views – aspects which were not 
characteristic of most quadrupedal hypotheses – and in Germany, anti-Darwinian and non-
Darwinian concepts were criticised not only through scientific arguments, but also for 
ideological reasons.254 However, the problems related to the corroboration of the primitivity 
hypotheses and the quadrupedal hypotheses are basically the same, since both assume a non-
parsimonious exclusion of arboreal specialisations from hominoid/hominin phylogeny. 
The quadrupedal hypotheses lost much of their popularity (but see255), on one hand because 
molecular findings of the 1960s suggested a much more recent date for the ape-hominin-split 
(Sarich & Wilson 1967), on the other hand because an arboreal proto-hominin was never 
incompatible with the development of hominin bipedalism (Franzen 1972; Franzen 1997; 
Remane 1956). Finally, increasing fossil evidence showed clear arboreal adaptations in early 
hominins (Berger & Tobias 1996). One of the most important discussions in the last decades 
concerning the evolution of bipedalism in early hominins concerned knuckle-walking, a topic 
revised by (Richmond et al. 2001, and references therein) and discussed in chapter 6 in the 
main thesis.  
D.6.3 The aquatic hypothesis: origin, reception and further development 
Most arguments of what today is usually called the “Aquatic Ape Theory” or “Aquatic Ape 
Hypothesis” – here we prefer the term “aquatic hypothesis” (AH), was first formulated by the 
German pathologist Max Westenhöfer in 1923 (see Appendix F). However, as almost the 
entire discussion on this topic was carried out in connection with the ideas proposed by the 
Alister Hardy and Elaine Morgan, the present chapter focuses on these authors. 
                                                          
254 For instance, the influential German anthropologist Gerhard Heberer (1901-1973) and proponent of a 
quadrupedal hypothesis was a member of the NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) and SS. 
He criticised Westenhöfer’s anti-Darwinian ideas as being not compatible with Nazi ideology, calling him one of 
the Dunkelmänner (man of the darkness) (see Bender-Oser 2004a, 45-47 and references therein). 
255 Carsten Niemitz’s statement “it is the most parsimonious derivation to propose that our non-human primate 
ancestors never came down from the trees: They merely stayed where they were anyway – e.g., “on the 
ground” can be considered as one of the rare modern proponents of the old quadrupedal hypotheses (Niemitz 
2010, 26). 
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Hardy’s aquatic hypothesis  
On 5 March 1960 the British marine biologist Alister Hardy (1896-1985) was asked to 
address a conference of the British SubAqua Club at Brighton. There he proposed basically 
the same ideas as defended by Westenhöfer. Since his aquatic hypothesis appeared 
abbreviated in the daily press,256 he accepted the invitation of The New Scientist to give a 
fuller statement of his aquatic hypothesis (AH) (Hardy 1960b, 642). In a paper entitled “Was 
man more aquatic in the past?” he stated that he was toying with the concept of man’s 
evolution in a semi-aquatic environment for many years; he hesitated to present this idea 
because it had seemed too fantastic to him (Hardy 1960b, 642). However, the more he 
reflected upon it, the more he “came to believe it to be possible, or even likely” (Hardy 
1960b, 642). He supplied a short outline of the evolution of vertebrates from aquatic to 
terrestrial animals “only because it forms the background to another story, one that is not 
quite so familiar to those who are not trained as zoologists” (Hardy 1960b, 642): several 
terrestrial vertebrates from different groups went “back” into the water to make a living, 
“because there was not enough food for them on the land”  (Hardy 1960b, 642). As examples 
he mentioned among the reptiles the ichthyosaurs, the plesiosaurs, many marine crocodile-like 
animals, turtles, and water-snakes; among the extant mammals he mentioned the cetaceans, 
the dugongs and manatees, the semi-aquatic seals, polar bears, otters, various aquatic rodents 
(like the water voles and the coypu), insectivores (like the water shrew) and the platypus; 
among the birds the penguins are the supreme examples (Hardy 1960b, 642). 
Hardy admitted that the suggestion he was about to make may at first seemed far-fetched, yet 
he thought that it may best explain the striking physical differences that separate man's 
immediate ancestors from the more ape-like forms. He suggested that a common ancestor of 
both groups “was forced by competition from life in the trees to feed on the sea-shores and to 
hunt for food, shell fish, sea-urchins, etc., in the shallow waters off the coast”. He had rather 
clear ideas about the environmental contextualization of this semi-aquatic phase:  
I suppose that they were forced into the water just as we have seen happen in so many other 
groups of terrestrial animals. I am imagining this happening in the warmer parts of the world, 
in the tropical seas where Man could stand being in the water for relatively long periods, that 
is, several hours at a stretch. I imagine him wading, at first perhaps still crouching, almost on 
all fours, groping about in the water, digging for shell fish, but becoming gradually more adept 
at swimming. Then, in time, I see him becoming more and more of an aquatic animal going 
                                                          
256 According to (Sanderson 1961, 141), it appeared in New York Herald Tribune, of March 7, 1960. 
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farther out from the shore; I see him diving for shell fish, prising out worms, burrowing crabs 
and bivalves from the sands at the bottom of shallow seas, and breaking open sea-urchins, and 
then, with increasing skill, capturing fish with his hands. (Hardy 1960b, 642-643) 
Hardy pointed to some alleged anatomical, physiological and behavioural similarities between 
humans and aquatic mammals, suggesting that reduced body hair, a layer of subcutaneous fat, 
erect posture and underwater swimming abilities evolved when early hominins exploited food 
resources in lakes, rivers or coastal environments.  
The AH was not the first scenario which criticized the open plains ideas. For instance, the 
Austrian palaeontologist and palaeobiologist Othenio Abel (1875-1946) regarded the open 
plains idea as not specially insightful; he proposed that between the arboreal phase and the 
terrestrial phase primeval man lived as a creature adapted to climbing in a mountainous region 
(Abel 1931, 379). Other authors defended the idea that climatic and environmental changes 
did not play a crucial role as driving factors in hominin evolution. Instead, first primeval man 
descended from the trees because they were allegedly too heavy to stay on them (Beurlen 
1950; Rensch 1972, 325; Weidenreich 1939). However, the AH introduced a new component 
in the way that scientists perceived the SHs. For the first time in palaeoanthropological 
discourse, classical ideas were challenged by a scenario which implied hominins interacting 
intensively with water, a view which was often perceived as diametrically opposed to the 
open plains ideas. Hardy never wrote a book on the AH; he published some other articles on 
this topic (Hardy 1960a; Hardy 1960c; Hardy 1977). 
The first reaction to the AH began soon after Hardy’s publication of his paper (on letters 
published in The New Scientist in 1960 see Appendix F). It was no one less than Raymond 
Dart who addressed a criticism to this new scenario in the same magazine. As the title of his 
almost unknown paper suggests, The recency of man’s aquatic past, Dart also considered 
human relation to water as significant. However, in opposition to Hardy, he regarded it not as 
product of an early hominin semi-aquatic phase, but rather as a recent innovation in human 
evolution, “far more drastic and significant” than Hardy suggested (Dart 1960, 1669). Dart 
wrote:   
Man’s interest in water creatures, therefore, goes a moderate way back, but scarcely as far as 
Sir Alister proposes. Taungs and Makapansgat have shown us that the South African man-
apes, the australopithecines, extracted crabs and turtles out of streams. Even when men’s 
brains were no bigger than those of gorillas they recognized food in brooks as well as on dry 
land. But they could not catch fish. So Mr. William F. Fahy (in his letter which The New 
151 
 
Scientist published on April 7 [1960]) was right in saying that it is not necessary to postulate 
an aquatic habitat to explain Man’s origin from apehood. There is no evidence that Man’s 
hairlessness, his erectness or his earliest use of tools were gifts from a type of water-living 
ape. (Dart 1960, 1669) 
Dart’s statement can be considered as the beginning of a long tradition among 
palaeoanthropologists to misinterpret Hardy’s ideas, presenting early hominins as much more 
aquatic as actually exposed in Hardy’s scenario. For instance, a hominin with the ability to 
catch fast swimming fishes with the hands would certainly imply a high level of aquatic 
adaptation, comparable with high specializations of dolphins, seals or otters. Since this is 
obviously unlikely, Dart’s comment on hominin inability to “catch fish” exposed the whole 
aquatic scenario as implausible. However, Dart did not quote precisely Hardy’s ideas. What 
Hardy actually meant was following: “My thesis is that a branch of this primitive ape-stock 
was forced by competition from life in the trees to feed on the sea-shores and to hunt for food, 
shell fish, sea-urchins, etc., in the shallow waters of the coast” (Hardy 1960b, 642), and only 
after increasing skill, early hominins would perhaps be able to capture fish with their hands ” 
(Hardy 1960b, 643). In fact, Dart seemed to ignore that modern humans are able under certain 
conditions to catch fishes with the hands (see chapter 5.4.4 in the main thesis).  
There are several similar misleading emphases of the degree of aquatic adaptation in early 
hominins. For instance, in Valkenburg (Netherlands), a conference, organized by the 
European Sociobiological Society and the Dutch Association of Physical Anthropology, was 
held in August 1987. The participants had the aim to evaluate the pros and cons of the AH. In 
the 24 contributions of the book resulting from the conference, 10 were pro AH, 9 contra, and 
5 suggested a kind of a “less aquatic” or “mild” version of the AH. For instance, Matcheld 
Roede (one of the editors of the book) argued that the AH covers only the relatively brief 
Miocene period 5 to 3.5-4 million years ago, and therefore “there does not seen enough time 
for complete water adaptation to have evolved. The alleged aquatic ape can only been semi-
aquatic – or, more probably, just coastally foraging” (Roede 1991, 287, italics added). 
Vernold Reynolds, another editor of the work, argued in a similar way, when he writes that 
“human ancestors were never truly aquatic” (Reynolds 1991, 331, italics added). Both authors 
follow with their statements a persistent element in the reception of the AH, exposing Hardy’s 
evolutionary scenario as more aquatic than originally assumed. The aim of this caricatured 
view of the AH was manifold: it was sometimes used by authors fascinated by some 
arguments of the AH but afraid of being stigmatised as advocators of a radical idea, and at the 
152 
 
same time supplied a rational for the formulation of an alleged “mild version” of the AH (as 
probably in the case of Roede’s and Reynold’s statements), or to facilitate a falsification of 
the AH (see below), or  in attempts to present a compromise between AH and SH (about 
compromises see below).  
It is therefore not surprising that the aquatic hypothesis was immediately regarded as an 
extremely improbable scenario and as an example of bad science. Even the anthropologist 
Grover S. Krantz, famous through his books on the existence of Bigfoot, considered Hardy’s 
AH as “so contradicted by the facts as not to be worthy of rebuttal here” (Krantz, 1992, 
52).257 Despite the fact that the AH was perceived as highly controversial, not all SHs’ 
proponents were inclined to refuse it a priori. Some authors regarded it as possible to integrate 
the aquatic scenario in the SH’s framework, instead of seeing it as an attempt to replace the 
open plains ideas. For instance, when the British zoologist and popular author Desmond 
Morris presented his own interpretation of the role of hunting on open plains in early hominin 
evolution in his best seller The Naked Ape, he provided a fair summary of Hardy’s aquatic 
hypothesis, characterizing its indirect evidence “appealing” but without “solid support” 
(Morris 1967, 45). Inspired by Hardy’s attempts to envision the aquatic ape as a predecessor 
of a hunting hominin adapted to open plains (Hardy 1960b), Morris decided to assume a 
neutral and conciliatory position: “Even if eventually it does turn out to be true, it will not 
clash seriously with the general picture of the hunting ape’s evolution out of a ground ape. It 
will simply mean that the ground ape went through a rather salutary ‘christening’ ceremony!” 
(Morris 1967, 45). 
In a footnote in his book, The Biology of God, Hardy agreed with Morris’ conciliatory 
comments, but did not accept the hypothetical aquatic phase’s secondary role squeezed 
between an arboreal ancestor and a savannah adapted hominin. Inspired by Morris’ Christian 
metaphor, he argued: “[…] if [the AH is] true, I think it was rather more than a mere 
christening – it was the all-important weaning from the fruits of the trees to flesh by way of 
succulent bivalves and other tender ‘fruits of the sea’” (Hardy 1975, 158).  
Elaine Morgan’s development of Hardy’s Aquatic Hypothesis 
The AH would probably have become a bizarre footnote in the history of palaeoanthropology 
without recognizable impact on the SHs’ reception, if it had not become entangled with 
                                                          
257 However, not all cryptozoologists were so sceptic about the AH, see Sanderson’s statements in Appendix B, 
chapter B.2. 
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developments which initially took place outside of scientific debate. Until the middle 1960s, 
palaeoanthropological discussion was characterized by the idea that man had the active role in 
early hominin evolution, a concept historically connected to the dominant role of male hunters 
as seen in today’s hunter-gatherer societies. As already shown in chapter D.4.3, although Dart 
and Ardrey did not initiate the discussion on the role of hunting in early hominin evolution, 
Ardrey’s skills in depicting early humans as hunters in open plains and the popularity of his 
books contributed to instigate a fundamental discussion on the role of women in hominin 
evolution. On one hand, ethnological and palaeoanthropological publications increasingly 
stressed the female contribution to reproductive success through gathering and preparing 
food, mitigating the role of hunting in early hominin evolution (Tanner 1987; see Zihlman 
1981). However, as these concepts stressed the role of females in food acquisition in savannah 
woodlands and grasslands, they did not challenge the general framework of the savannah 
paradigm.  
A completely different development was initiated by the Welsh writer and journalist Elaine 
Morgan (1920-2013). She felt immediately attracted to the AH – when she read about it she 
felt “as if the whole evolutionary landscape had been transformed by a blinding flash of light” 
(Morgan 1972, 31).) Another factor which rendered this scenario attractive to her was the 
possibility to interpret human evolution without the androcentry implied in classical hunting 
hypotheses. Morgan’s own evolutionary scenario mitigated the relevance of hunting 
technology and male hunters as main meat deliverers, since animal protein could also be 
provided by early hominin females and children when gathering shells in a coastal 
environment. In a book insightfully entitled The Descent of Woman (1972), Morgan pointed 
out several problems related to an incipient hominin adaptation to open plains, addressing 
specifically Ardrey’s, Dart’s and Morris’ ideas (Morgan 1972, 11-17). In later publications 
Morgan reinforced her criticism of the SHs, using a more scientific approach and abandoning 
the feminist discourse (Morgan 1972, 11-17; 1982, 19-20; 1984). She named the open plains 
idea “savannah theory” (Morgan 1982, 19-20), a term used regularly in palaeoanthropological 
publications since the 1990s (Langdon 1997; Roede et al. 1991).  
In her book The Scars of Evolution Morgan wrote ideas concerning water from the point of 
view of evolutionary medicine258. Although hydrotherapy as a long tradition in medicine, this 
                                                          
258 As already stated elsewhere, to my knowledge, the first ideas on the importance of water for human health 
formulated in an evolutionary context were formulated by Benoît de Maillet. The perhaps first treatises 
discussing in details problems related to an upright posture is the booklet Delle corporee differenze essenziali 
che passano fra la struttura de' bruti, e la umana (Moscati 1771a) written by the Italian physician Pietro 
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topic was almost completely ignored in evolutionary medicine, mainly due to the lack of a 
theoretical framework in which this issue could be discussed.   
Adverse attitude toward topics associating early hominin interaction with water 
The AH never gained widespread acceptance, and was mostly rejected (Dart 1960; Gowlett 
1984, 17; Langdon 1997; Pickford 1991; Wheeler 1991) or ignored in palaeoanthropological 
debate. However, it contributed significantly to how the savannah scenario was perceived in 
popular and scientific discourse on human evolution since the 1980s. In opposition to early 
publications, which treated the savannah idea as mere description of facts, the open plains 
scenario became increasingly perceived as a hypothetical construct, subjected to the normal 
process of scientific validation.  
In a paper published in the Journal of Human Evolution the anthropologist John Langdon 
wrote one of the best criticisms towards some specific arguments of the AH. In this paper, he 
tried to define the SH: “The savannah theory is, in fact, the collective discipline of 
palaeoanthropology. It encompasses all the frequently proposed and rejected models, 
discussions, debates, and hypotheses that assume a terrestrial habitat for all stages of human 
evolution” (Langdon 1997, 490). This definition is peculiar, since theories and disciplines 
cannot be used to define each other: scientists working within a discipline formulate, defend 
and reject different hypotheses, and palaeoanthropology is not an exception to this process. 
Even if Langdon intended to explain the savannah theory as the product of the collective 
discipline of palaeoanthropology, this definition still does not hold with evident historical 
facts. Previously mentioned Othenio Abel’s ‘cliff hypothesis’ (Abel 1931) was formulated as 
an alternative to the classical SHs. Another example is the influential model proposed by the 
Swiss primatologists Christophe and Hedwige Boesch, in which early hominin evolution is 
contextualized in a forest environment (Boesch & Boesch 1984a; Boesch & Boesch 1984b).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Moscati (1740-1824). After a comparison between the anatomy of man and “unreasoning animals” (animali 
bruti) he came to the conclusion that one of the most conspicuous divergencies is the upright posture. He 
recognized already the upright posture as the cause for several orthopaedic, cardiovascular, intestinal and 
gynaecological diseases. The German translation of this work (Moscati 1771b) was quoted by Gottfried Herder 
in his Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit (Herder 1853, vol. 28, 154). Moscati’s pioneer work is notable. 
When hundred years later Darwin published his Descent of Man, he did not discuss the implication of his 
evolutionary ideas in human medicine. Today, the beginning of the modern evolutionary medicine is often 
related to works published from the 1950s on; see, e.g., Williams (1957). Evolutionary medicine is usually 
considered as irrelevant in most medical education programs (Nesse et al. 2006; Nesse & Williams 1995), but 
there are indications that this started to change (Nesse et al. 2010). 
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Langdon’s definition implies a clear distinction between SHs as related to research carried out 
within “the collective discipline of palaeoanthropology” and AHs as models defended by 
amateurs, such as science writers working outside of palaeoanthropology. This distinction is 
for several reasons misleading. First, we saw the crucial role of science writer Robert Ardrey 
in the popularization of the SHs in the 1960s and the role of science writer Elaine Morgan in 
the process through which the savannah model was recognized as a hypothetical construct. 
Second, not all proponents of the aquatic model regarded it as completely incompatible with 
the classical views. We saw that Alister Hardy proposed his AH as a phase between forest and 
savannah. On the other hand, not all scientists working within palaeoanthropology or engaged 
in the popularization or development of classical palaeoanthropological ideas saw the SHs 
and AHs as completely incompatible models. We saw above that Hardy’s narrative inspired 
Desmond Morris’ attempt to squeeze the aquatic phase between an arboreal and savannah 
phase. Later, the Dutch evolutionary biologist Sarah B. M. Kraak undertook an attempt to 
fuse the AH and SH in a book chapter insightfully entitled The answer: the Aquatic Ape 
Theory and the Savannah Theory combined ( see also Knight 1991, 235-244; Kraak 1991). 
Furthermore, AHs’ critics give more attention to the ideas proposed by non-academics than to 
publications by specialists who recognize the need for a scientific study of early hominins’ 
interaction with water (Crawford & Marsh 1989; Cunnane et al. 1993; Richards 1987, 193-
204; Schagatay 1996; Tobias 2010; Wrangham 2005; Wrangham et al. 2009). Finally, little 
attention is given to palaeoanthropological scenarios for early hominin evolution that diverged 
considerable from the SHs exposed in textbooks by depicting early hominins exploiting 
coastal environment, wet savannah or marsh communities (Geist 1978, 215-218; Hewes 1972, 
22-23).  
As it is clear in the examples above, and although Langdon’s criticism against some flawed 
arguments of the AH were correct, his definition of SHs is based on an artificial delimitation 
of what belongs to palaeoanthropological discipline. All these problems with the SH’s 
definition can be circumvented by focusing on the common components of these ideas. 
Although there are several deviations among the different savannah scenarios concerning 
geographical and temporal frameworks, specific ecological settings and sequence of 
evolutionary events, all these hypotheses share the evident characteristics of early humans 
evolving several key features in the context of an open or semi-open environment (Bender 
1999a, 35-80).  
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Langdon’s SHs definition reflects an interesting dilemma in palaeoanthropology which is 
present to date. Based on palaeoclimatic and fossil data, several palaeoanthropologists in the 
1990s259 expressed doubts on the SHs. Although this evidence formerly confirmed Elaine 
Morgan’s objections to this model, palaeoanthropologists had difficulties accepting Morgan’s 
criticism of the SHs as useful contribution to palaeoanthropological discussion without 
promoting the AHs. This attitude is clearly recognizable in following statement by Langdon:  
The savannah hypothesis that Morgan criticizes turns out to be a straw man. Anyone who 
dredges up a century of hypotheses can find many to ridicule; but if the field has already 
rejected them, the exercise is pointless. In fact, scholars are now discarding the savannah 
setting for hominin divergence. (Langdon 1997, 490)  
Langdon’s straw-man statement stands in stark contrast to the following sentences by Roger 
Lewin and Robert A. Foley:  
Palaeoanthropology has a reputation for controversies and arguments, with major 
disagreements about who is who, and who is related to whom, among the fossil hominins. 
However, although there is considerable debate about the details, there is nonetheless 
remarkable consensus about the major aspects of human evolution – that our ancestors were 
derived from a population of African apes, adapting in increasingly open and savannah 
environments to the changing conditions. Most features, especially bipedalism, are seen as 
related to this change. (Lewin & Foley 2004, 282, our italics) 
The contradiction between Langdon’s and Lewin/Foley’s statements reflects the divergence in 
their basic attitudes: Langdon attempted to exclude the AHs from palaeoanthropological 
discussion, while Lewin and Foley, as we will see later, mentioned the AHs when asking 
basic questions on the process of evaluation of alternative hypotheses in palaeoanthropology.  
Lewin and Foley are correct in emphasizing the SHs’ influence in modern 
palaeoanthropology. Although the SHs as a general model to contextualize early hominin 
evolution have been increasingly criticized in the last two decades, this model is still 
influential in different hypotheses using the same arguments and narrative expressed in 
classical savannah scenarios. For example, in the Journal of Human Evolution  (the same 
                                                          
259 This topic will be reviewed elsewhere. Briefly, criticisms of certain aspects of the SHs were punctually 
expressed by palaeoanthropologists in the 1980s and more emphatically from the 1990s onwards  (see, e.g., 
Tobias 1995). Specialists today are more and more convinced that earliest bipedalism occurred in a forest 
context and a shift to more open country occurred two million years after the appearance of first bipedal 
hominins. In opposition to the classical SHs, to date there are no clear concepts about the factors influencing 
the emergence of bipedalism (see chapter 6 in the main thesis).   
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journal where Langdon published his paper), the zoologist Peter Wheeler published a series of 
papers between 1984 and 1996 defending his ideas on the thermoregulatory advantages of 
hominin bipedalism, naked skin and larger body size in the context of open plains or mosaic 
landscapes (see Wheeler 1994 and references therein). Wheeler’s specific SHs belong to the 
most-quoted models on human bipedalism in contemporary palaeoanthropology. It is 
paradoxical that this remains true even after researchers are increasingly reaching consensus 
that the evolution of bipedalism cannot be contextualized in open plains (see chapter 6 in the 
main thesis). 
An interesting example of the complexity of processes involved in the evaluation of ideas in 
palaeoanthropology is supplied by publications which positively mentioned Wheeler’s 
hypotheses and at the same time deliberately pointed out that there is little evidence for a 
sudden shift from more forested to more grassland habitats during an early phase of hominin 
evolution (e.g., Conroy 2005, 51-54, 337-341)260. Additional evidence for the complex 
hypotheses evaluation is supplied by the specific views on early hominins defended by AHs’ 
critics. For instance, Wheeler challenged the aquatic hypotheses on thermoregulatory grounds 
alone, emphasizing his own ideas on this topic (Wheeler 1991); see also Preuschoft and 
Preuschoft (1991), who similarly quoted Wheeler's view in their criticism towards the AHs. 
However, Langdon coined Wheeler’s hypothesis as “entirely speculative”, since this scenario 
“is also rooted in the assumption that a savannah environment had a key role in hominin 
origins”, a concept that he regards as wrong (Langdon 2005, 125). This is only one of many 
examples demonstrating that defending palaeoanthropology from the intrusion of alternative 
ideas does not necessarily imply a consensus on classical views.  
Coming back to the question formulated in the introduction of the present chapter: Which 
factors are influential in the process leading to consensus in palaeoanthropology? In their 
book Principles of Human Evolution (2004) Lewin and Foley touch this question by referring 
specifically to the savannah and aquatic hypotheses.261 These statements deserve a full 
quotation, since this is one of few cases in which authors with impeccable reputations in 
palaeoanthropology refer to the AH to formulate fundamental questions on the evaluative 
                                                          
260 It is fair to note that the same author (Conroy 2005, 337, footnote 12) also refers to views challenging 
Wheeler’s ideas. 
261 Lewin and Foley wrote about the AHs in a “Beyond the Facts” section of their textbook, which was 
conceived as a didactic tool to stimulate students to think about how to assess alternative ideas in 
palaeoanthropology. As such, the quoted pieces reflect the state of the debate more than their own personal 
views on this topic (Foley, pers. comm.). 
 
158 
 
process of alternative ideas in this field: ”The issue: the idea that human evolution was 
triggered by an aquatic phase is widely supported and discussed outside the mainstream of 
palaeoanthropology, but is dismissed by most scientists working in the field. How do we 
determine what models are reasonable and plausible, and which ones are worthy of serious 
scientific study?” (Lewin & Foley 2004, 282). After an outline of the AH they continue: 
“Indeed, it is one of Elaine Morgan’s complaints that her ideas have been ignored rather than 
criticized or dismissed, and that this is a case of ‘normal science,’ in the terms of philosophers 
of science Thomas Kuhn, ignoring the radical alternative paradigm rather than engaging with 
it” (Lewin & Foley 2004, 283). After pointing out that the AH is “one among many 
‘alternative theories’ of human origins, and indeed in that light is one of the most cogent and 
best argued” (Lewin & Foley 2004, 283), they continue: 
The existence of such models does raise the question of what it is that distinguishes a plausible 
model from an implausible one. What is it that makes it reasonable to discuss one model and 
to dismiss another out of hand? Is the aquatic ape hypothesis a reasonable explanation for 
many unique features of humanity, and ignored because it is a challenge to scientific 
orthodoxy, or is it a crackpot theory? If it is the latter, then should the scientific community 
spent time and resources refuting it? If it is the former, how can it become accepted as a good 
model? (Lewin & Foley 2004, 283) 
It is impossible to give an objective answer to the above questions without an in-depth 
analysis of the role of water in early hominin evolution. Paradoxically, as long as topics 
related to hominin interaction with water are regarded as a domain of the AHs, 
palaeoanthropologists have little motivation to undertake such analyses. As a result of this 
stalemate situation, a serious imbalance can be detected in early and modern 
palaeoanthropological research: aspects of the reconstruction of human’s past directly related 
to well-established models proposed to contextualize early hominin evolution are much better 
studied than those topics which seem to contradict traditional models.  
D.7 Conclusions 
Few scientists will deny the importance of empirical evidence in palaeoanthropological 
research. Similarly, most palaeoanthropologists would probably agree that in recent decades 
this field has improved immensely, both the degree of interaction with other disciplines as 
well as its empirical basis. However, as promoted in this chapter, the use of empirical data and 
analogical reasoning in the formulation of hypotheses on hominin evolution is much more 
complex than often implied in palaeoanthropological publications. I have assumed here that 
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especially in scenarios proposed to contextualize early hominin evolution, serious 
misconceptions exist about what should be considered as sound scientific method or an 
educated scientific hypothesis, corroborated by strong empirical evidence, and what is a 
flawed method or a hypothesis lacking any empirical foundation. The recognition of these 
misconceptions is fundamental for progress in current palaeoanthropological research. 
Following are the summarised theses promoted in this chapter:  
(a) Contrary to widespread opinion, the savannah hypotheses (SHs) were formulated long 
before empirical evidence was available. This fact has immediate relevance for 
modern palaeoanthropological discussion. First, several issues around alternative 
hypotheses on early hominin evolution (e.g., the factors responsible for the amazingly 
alternative hypotheses, and also how alternative hypotheses were formulated and 
criticized) were severely biased by reliance on what is believed to be a solid empirical 
corroboration of traditional scenarios. Second, theoretical positions strongly related to 
the SHs had a negative influence on how empirical evidence was gathered, analyzed 
and interpreted. I argue that one of the most important factors for improvements in 
palaeoanthropological research is the identification and exclusion of these biases, a 
process which requires a more serious participation of historians of science in the 
palaeoanthropological discussion than we have seen so far. Finally, the modification 
of the savannah scenario in recent years, sometimes regarded as a paradigm change in 
palaeoanthropological research, is basically a rearrangement and recycling of 
traditional SHs, and as such are exposed to similar criticism as the concepts that they 
poised to replace; this argument was developed in chapter 6 in the main thesis.   
(b) A similar situation as described in (a) can be detected in the analogical reasoning used 
to formulate traditional hypotheses on early hominin evolution: in several cases, the 
use of referential models to contextualize early hominin evolution was not the starting 
point of new hypotheses, but was primarily relied on believing in traditional scenarios 
on human evolution. Based on the material analysed, I assume that these referential 
models are characterized by serious methodological flaws; this same problem applies 
to both traditional and alternative scenarios on early hominin evolution. 
(c) Several historians of palaeoanthropology emphasize that the discussion on human 
evolution is characterized by multiple hypotheses. This is basically correct. It is well 
known that several aspects of hominin evolution – e.g., the precise sequence in the 
evolution of different hominin features or the hominin status of fossil primates – were 
controversially debated. However, we show this is not true concerning hypotheses 
presented as “scenarios” of early hominin evolution; these models are characterized by 
a strong tendency to rely on a single and in many sense oversimplified picture on 
hominin evolution, as presented in points (d), (e), (f) and (g). 
(d) Until a few years ago, the strong focus on SHs prevented the formulation of 
concurrent hypotheses that challenged the traditional contextualization of early 
hominins in open plains. Instead of developing a healthy skepticism towards the old 
open plains-ideas, specialists adapted and integrated basic premises of the model into 
modern palaeoanthropological research. The subsequent scientific debate was carried 
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out mainly with the corroboration and falsification of versions of the savannah 
scenario – by discussing early hominin evolution in different spatial and temporal 
frameworks or by promoting different auxiliary hypotheses on the adaptive value of 
different hominin features. I propose that alternative hypotheses to the SHs are crucial, 
taking into consideration that the interpretation of early events is hominin evolution is 
still characterized by a high degree of uncertainty.   
(e) Beside the factors explained in point (d), one crucial aspect for the broad acceptance 
of some of auxiliary SHs is the need to formulate new questions on early hominin 
evolution that can be answered with empirical verification, even if the auxiliary 
hypotheses imply questionable premises. We discussed this point in connection with 
one of the most influential of these ideas – Wheeler’s sun-streamlined-hypothesis; on 
Wheeler’s hypotheses see also chapters 3 and 6 in main thesis. 
(f) Views on climatic and environmental changes as crucial factors in the emergence of 
first primeval man adapted to open plains were already popular long before the 
foundation of modern palaeoecological research. As we saw, research in this field was 
strongly biased by the savannah scenario. It will be important to carry out future 
investigations on the exact role palaeoecological research played in early and modern 
attempts to corroborate ideas on human evolution. The results of these investigations 
can be used to improve an important task in this research: the evaluations of the 
different models proposed to contextualize early hominin evolution, instead uncritical 
corroborations of established scenarios, as often done in late 19th and early 20th 
century.  
(g) The reception of alternative ideas for the savannah scenario can only be understood 
from a historical perspective. I assume that alternative models were often rejected, on 
one hand because of the belief in empirical corroboration of traditional ideas or on the 
other hand because it was simpler to detect flaws in these alternative ideas than to 
apply the same degree of criticism towards traditional scenarios. As shown before, the 
process of falsifying the aquatic hypothesis has strongly influenced how researchers 
approach the topic “role of water in early hominin evolution”, leading to the neglect of 
several fundamental aspects of this discussion.  
 
  
161 
 
APPENDIX E – RABAUD: A PRECURSOR OF COMPARATIVE 
PHYLOGENETIC METHOD? 
E.1 Introduction 
In his succinct review of the history of comparative studies, Mark Ridley wrote: 
The comparative method of 1950 was indistinguishable from the comparative method of 350 
BC. The discovery of natural selection has injected a new interpretative principle, but no 
advance in method. Over the years many an unrigorous practitioner has tried his hand at the 
comparative method, and they have been following, of course, by exaggerating critics. But 
neither will be providing our theme. We shall not be reviewing comparative biology. We shall 
instead be attempting to develop a comparison as a method of studying adaptation. (Ridley 
1983, 6) 
Ridley’s statement on an alleged stagnation of comparative method during 2300 years implies 
a non-negligible oversimplification, taken into consideration the bulk of adaptive 
investigations carried out since 1859 – several of the generalizations presented in this chapter 
are still valid in modern biology. (Ridley’ statement is understandable in the context of this 
time, when the crisis of the adaptationist programme was at a peak. The increasing use of 
cladistics studies and the rigour of statistics where regarded as important enough to justify a 
statement which implied that uncountable investigations carried out before 1950 were merely 
part of a long period of stagnation in the study of adaptation.) On the other hand, some 
philosophers of science expressed doubts concerning the term method in connection with the 
comparative method, as Mahner and Bunge: 
Many biologists claim that there is another very important general method in biology, the so-
called comparative method. However, there is no such thing as the comparative method. 
Indeed, although the comparison between two or more things may be methodical (orderly) 
rather than erratic, it is not ruled by a method by its own. That is, there is no set of general 
rules for comparing things in some respects. (Mahner & Bunge 1997, 77) 
It is interesting to see that Ridley regarded the French zoologist Étienne Rabaud (1868-1956) 
as a precursor of the comparative method. After quoting a sentence by Rabaud (fully quoted 
below, beginning with “Limited to the comparison of organisms”), Ridley wrote: 
Rabaud is a lonely, isolated figure in the history of research of convergence [...] He inspired 
no tradition of research on convergent adaptation. But for the fact that he presented no 
quantitative summary of his conclusions he had the entire comparative method of the early 
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nineteen-sixties. It is this comparative method that, after re-stating in abstract form, we are 
going to develop in the next section. (Ridley 1983, 9)  
I do not agree with his evaluation of Rabaud’s views on adaptation. It seems that Ridley based 
his evaluation on Rabaud by focusing on the apparent similarity between Rabaud’s criticisms 
towards oversimplifications and bias in the evaluation of adaptive features and similar 
statements formulated by modern proponents of phylogenetic approaches to adaptation. We 
will see that this similarity, although apparently striking, is however mainly superficial. As it 
will be argued, the main aspect of Rabaud views on convergence is the use of Cuvier’s 
correlation of parts as a straw man to propagate his own neo-Lamarckian ideas.  
E.2 Rabaud on Cuvier’s correlation of parts 
Étienne Antoine Prosper Jules Rabaud began his career investigating human anatomy and 
physiology and vertebrate teratology (Rabaud 1899; Rabaud 1903). Later in his career he 
published behavioural and anatomical studies using a comparative approach (Rabaud 1911; 
1922; 1925; 1942; 1953). In his publications Rabaud defended neo-Lamarckian views on 
adaptation, stressing the need of considering behavioral traits in functional analyses and 
criticizing different aspects of views expressed by Cuvier and contemporary zoologists who 
adopted a Darwinian perspective (natural selection) in hypotheses on the evolution of traits. 
Rabaud’s work is interesting for different reasons. Firstly, he is one of the few biologists who 
dedicated a whole book on the phenomenon of convergence. Secondly, in his investigation on 
convergence he treated several aspects of Cuvier’s principle of correlation; finally, as stated 
above, Rabaud is occasionally mentioned today as a precursor of modern ideas on adaptation 
as an early critic of what he believed to be anthropocentric and tautological aspects of the 
work of other biologists. 
Although Rabaud recognised Cuvier’s contribution as an improvement compared to the work 
of his predecessors, he criticised Cuvier’s methods based on morphological studies to 
reconstruct  “everything else” (et prétendant tout en tirer) – i.e., the mode of life of the 
organism studied (Rabaud 1925, 11). One of Rabaud’s main arguments was that convergent 
traits are not always identical; he attributed to Cuvier a deliberate choice of single features to 
promote his hypotheses, on the other hand he accused Cuvier of ignoring features which were 
contradictory to them.  
For example, Rabaud criticised Cuvier’s use of the law of correlation concerning the digestive 
tract of ruminant herbivores, which share adaptive features like hoofs, flat molars and 
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multiple stomachs. Rabaud pointed to the fact that these features cannot be found in the same 
combination in other herbivores, and concluded that the error in the method is striking 
(L’erreur de méthode est ici tout à fait frappante) (Rabaud 1925, 123). He pointed to several 
divergencies within convergent species (for instance, several predatory insects capture their 
prey with the forelimbs, while others capture it with the mandibles) to show that what they 
have in common is not the form, but in fact the process of nutrition (Rabaud 1925, 142).  
Rabaud’s criticism is insightful, as he ignored the positive aspects of Cuvier’s principle, 
which are related to the interpretation of the possible function of organismic features through 
the implicit use convergent traits. A basic aspect in the principle of correlation of parts is 
related to the fact that organisms of a certain taxon share common traits (in today’s 
terminology: due to common ancestry), what makes possible to infer from features available 
in a specific fossil evidence on the existence of other features, not available in the fossil 
record. On the other hand, the existence of certain traits pointing to an adaptation to a certain 
environment makes it possible to infer other features in the same organism, even if these 
features are also not available in fossil records. Cuvier’s ability to interpret fossil organisms 
based on this principle showed that it was useful, and this principle is still implied in the way 
how modern paleontologists infer the putative function of characters found in fossil 
organisms. In a certain sense, in his attempts to corroborate his criticism of Cuvier as  
deliberate choosing single features to promote his hypotheses, Rabaud was doing exactly what 
he accused Cuvier of doing – , but by beginning at the other end.  
For instance, returning to Rabaud’s assumption that other herbivores do not develop the same 
traits as ruminants (see above), he listed suids and rodents as “herbivores” (Rabaud 1925, 
123). Quite apart from the fact that Cuvier did not imply that all herbivores have to develop 
the same traits as ruminants (he could not, since he was not an evolutionist), Cuvier, as a 
skilled comparative anatomist, would certainly not have any difficulties in pointing out the 
obvious fallacy of Rabaud’s arguments related to the suids as herbivorous, since they are, in 
fact, omnivorous, an adaptation which is also evident in their teeth. As pointed out by 
Prothero and Schoch when referring to living members of this taxon:   
These animals are mainly omnivorous, eating a wide variety of foods, including fruits, roots 
and tubers, fungi, ferns, grasses, and even insects, earthworms, and occasional carrion and 
small vertebrates (such as frogs and mice, if they can catch them). This generalized, 
omnivorous diet means that their teeth cannot become too specialized for meat slicing or plant 
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grinding. Instead, all of these animals have low, rounded cusps on their teeth, which are 
suitable for many purposes. (Prothero & Schoch 2002, 26) 
A similar criticism could be formulated on the fallacy of Rabaud’s comparison the dentition 
of rodents (specialized for gnawing) with the dentition of grazing animals.  
One clue to understand Rabaud’s criticism can be found in his treatment of a famous example 
of convergence: the non-homologous (or, to be more precise, the deep-homologous) eyes in 
different taxa. He pointed to differences in the morphology of the eyes in different taxa, 
admitting convergence to a certain degree (Rabaud 1925, 156). However, for Rabaud this 
similarity was not an example of convergence, but “the morphological translation of a 
fundamental property of the living substance”262 (Rabaud 1925, 157). This statement is rather 
obscure, and suspiciously similar to non-Darwinian concepts of this time, as typically 
expressed by naturalists defending orthogenetic or vitalistic factors in evolution. Apart from 
the eyes, Rabaud regarded all other cases of convergence as superficial and meaningless for 
the purpose of the analyses of form/function (Rabaud 1925, 158). Using lengthy comparisons 
between plants, predatory insects, aquatic vertebrates and flying animals, Rabaud defended 
the view that morphology alone is inappropriate to reconstruct the way of life of organisms. 
He stated that there is no necessary relationship between form and way of life (Rabaud 1925, 
150) – a highly surprising statement given the innumerable examples of organismic 
adaptation. More precisely, he stated: 
Limited to the comparison of organisms living in analogous conditions, morphological 
convergence seems inevitably link to these conditions; but it is evident enough that the 
conclusion precedes the comparison, instead of following it. The result changes entirely when 
the comparison is carried out in a complete fashion, when similar forms are placed according 
to their manner of life, and when these are contrasted with all forms which coincide with 
them. An objective observer understands well in these cases that the determined conditions of 
environment do not impose a determined form. (Rabaud 1925, 150, my translation) 
Rabaud stated that the emergence of evolutionary ideas did not change the focus on 
morphology by researchers in his time, and he regarded it as irrelevant for his concepts if the 
influences on organisms came directly from the environment or from natural selection 
(Rabaud 1925, 11). However, within evolutionary concepts, there is no opinion that 
convergent features have to be identical and include all parts of convergent species. The very 
                                                          
262 Il ne s’agit donc pas seulement d’une convergence morphologique ou fonctionnelle, mais de la traduction 
morphologique d’une propriété fondamentale de la substance vivante. 
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examples that Rabaud used to show the alleged mismatch between form and function 
(prehensile appendices in predatory insects, fish form of aquatic vertebrates, flying animals) 
belong to the most quoted examples of convergent evolution since decades and are used to 
give a strong indication for adaptive evolution. Rabaud had a point in stressing the necessity 
of considering organisms as a whole, including behaviour and environment when 
reconstructing their way of life, but to make this point it was not necessary to dismiss the 
relevance of morphology.  
Rabaud assumed that it is not possible to “analyze a morphological arrangement [disposition 
morphologique] without studying carefully every detail of it, as well as the whole organism, 
the function of the examined traits and the ethology of the organism of interest” (Rabaud 
1925, 13). He is absolutely correct in this point – this holistic aspect of adaptive analysis was 
also central in the works of Othenio Abel, Hans Böker and other naturalists in this time (see 
Appendix C). However, this critique can barely be directed to Cuvier’s methods: as one of the 
most important pioneers of a scientific palaeontology and comparative anatomy Cuvier was 
obviously aware on the fact that fossils studied by him belonged to organisms once interacting 
with different aspects of their environment.263  
It is Rabaud’s specific focus on Cuvier’s exaggerated statements that explains why he could 
write that “There is no necessary link between aquatic life and fish form [nullement rapport 
nécéssaire], but this is pure coincidence” (Rabaud 1925, 147). This statement sound so wrong 
that the question imposes whether we understood him correctly. However, Rabaud really 
meant it. His attempt to corroborate the above statement on the alleged lack of a relationship 
between form and way of life reveals the real reasons for his attack of Cuvier’s ideas: Rabaud 
stressed the behavioural components acting as initial factors in the organismic evolution. This 
idea was illustrated by rather naïve examples. For instance, according to Rabaud, animals 
conduct a way of life to which they “feel attracted” no matter which form they have or 
sometimes despite of their form. This idea is interesting, since it consider the fact that 
organisms change their way of life, and by doing so, they have to use the physiology, anatomy 
and behavior fine-tuned in connection with other habitats. However, the naivety of his 
concept becomes clear when Rabaud give the example of snakes climbing trees, explaining 
that they do so even if they have no legs to perform the function of climbing (Rabaud 1925, 
149). He claimed that behaviour has to precede form, illustrating his argument with examples 
                                                          
263 It is nearly redundant to emphasize that - to use the example above of Pterodactylus – Cuvier 
was able to infer correctly the flying anatomy of these animals by envisaging them as using the forelimbs as 
wings, which is obviously a behavioral aspect of these creatures. 
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on secondary aquatic adaptations in vertebrates. According to him, these organisms adopted a 
life-style before the evolution of morphological traits related to this life. Again, although this 
statement per se is not wrong, what is erroneous is Rabaud’s insistence in ignoring the simple 
fact that Cuvier did not assume that secondary aquatic organisms’ morphology evolved before 
the invasion of aquatic environments (as already stated several times and probably well 
known by Rabaud, environmental changes and corresponding modifications of anatomy did 
not belong to Cuvier’s paradigm). Rabaud was so involved with his alleged contradiction of 
Cuvier’s idea that he did not recognize the degree of naivety in the following example given 
to illustrate his argument:   
This attraction [to water] cannot be secondary to the acquisition of the fish form. Nowhere can 
we see the morphological preadaptation because it is difficult to imagine an animal acquiring 
the form of a whale out of the water and making a certain way over land before encountering 
the sea. (Rabaud 1925, 147, my translation) 
Instead of this, he envisaged this passage from land to water as follows: 
Among the mammals which, under influences impossible to be precise about, have lost their 
forelimbs and acquired flippers [?], only the ones which were already in water could survive. 
As we saw, the modification was not an advantage to them, but the fact that they already lived 
an aquatic life rendered the modification less detrimental to them. (Rabaud 1925, 147, my 
translation) 
The above statement is in all respects an extremely weak way of reasoning from a modern 
point of view. However, it is important to note that Rabaud was arguing from an anti-
Darwinian perspective common in this time. Although some of Rabaud’s arguments towards 
an integration of ethology and ecology in the morphological analyses264 (Rabaud 1925, 142) 
or his critique towards oversimplified views on the role of natural selection (Rabaud 1922, 18-
30; Rabaud 1953, passim) might sound apparently modern, this impression apply only to an 
isolated view of single statement. On the whole, however, his arguments are based on rather 
simplistic arguments.265  
                                                          
264 Interestingly, Rabaud called this approach the “biological method” (la méthode biologique) (Rabaud 1925, 
13), a similar term as used by Hans Böker “biological anatomy” to designate a method in which the same claims 
of integration were made (see Appendix C); this is not a coincidence, since in this time the expression 
“biological” was often used in the sense of “ecological”. 
265 For instance, in his book Le hasard et la vie des espèces, Rabaud discussed several topics related to 
adaptation (mating, interspecific competition, antipredator adaptation) to reach to the conclusion that natural 
selection is an anthropocentric hypothesis, since it in his opinion based on human views on competition 
(Rabaud 1953, 231). A close look to his views reveals that he misunderstood completely the concept of natural 
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However, as explained above, an analysis of the whole work reveals that this similarity is only 
apparent. Rabaud’s ideas on changes of behaviours affecting the course of evolution were 
already defended by known naturalists, as for example by James Mark Baldwin (1896; 1897), 
Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1896) and Henry F. Osborn (1896). After the modern synthesis, the 
concept – commonly known as “Baldwin effect” or “organic evolution” – was further 
developed by other authors, as for instance Alister Hardy (1965).)Also Rabaud’s calls for an 
interdisciplinary approach in the evaluation of adaptive features was not an isolated 
phenomenon in this time, as it was propagated by several other early naturalists, as for 
instance Carl Bergmann, Rudolf Leuckart, Othenio Abel, Hans Böker, Richard Hesse, Franz 
Doflein and others (see Appendix C).  
To summarize, Cuvier’s principle of the correlation of parts was not an attempt to evaluate 
adaptive traits from an evolutionary perspective (again: he was not evolutionist), but an 
attempt to justify the still valid view that several organismic features are often part of what 
seems to be an organized and functional whole. The basic idea of Cuvier’s principle is valid 
as a general concept in functional-adaptive analyses, but is invalid in Cuvier’s often quoted 
statements in which he exaggerated the heuristic power of this principle. Modern biologists 
are usually aware that Cuvier’s exaggeration of the explanatory power of the principle of 
correlation of parts is among others related to the fact that he was not working with 
evolutionary concepts; but they prefer to ignore this fact and stress the positive aspects of 
Cuvier’s work. We saw that Rabaud not able to do the same, as used Cuvier as a straw man to 
emphasize his own neo-Lamarckian ideas; he followed a similar approach in his attacks of 
Darwin’s natural selection. On the other hand, Rabaud carefully avoided the topic of problems 
of interpreting function from fragmentary data, as typical for fossil organisms, since this is 
exactly one of the most important practical uses of Cuvier’s correlation of parts. The apparent 
similarity between some of Rabaud statements (where he doubt on the validity of hypotheses 
linking organisms with certain environments) and statements expressed by modern biologists, 
although quite amazing, is only superficial, and does not have any support to his arguments 
taken as a whole.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
selection. For him, Darwin’s natural selection means a literal “fight” between two individuals (Rabaud 1953, 
233-235)! And since an individual cannot “fight” against the environment, the whole concept has to be 
replaced by his own system (which means: a neo-Lamarckian view of organisms interacting with its 
environment, in which competition might occur, but is not essential). His ideas on the importance of 
environment were already exposed in previous works, as for example in Le transformisme et l’expérience 
(Rabaud 1911) and L’adaptation et l’évolution (Rabaud 1922).  
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APPENDIX F: WESTENHÖFER’S LIFE AND AQUATILE HYPOTHESE266 
F.1 Biographical sketch 
F.1.1 Professional training 
The German pathologist Max Westenhöfer (short for Maximilian Joseph Johann 
Westenhöfer)267, (1871-1957), was born in Ansbach (Bayern) as one of eight children of the 
grammar school teacher Johann Westenhoffer and his wife Johanna, née Knell. He studied 
medicine at the königlichen medizinisch-chirurgischen Friedrich-Wilhelm-Institut in Berlin 
(later Kaiser-Wilhelm-Akademie für das militärärtzliche Bildungswesen) from October 1890 
until February 1895; afterwards he followed a military career. In 1894 he received his 
doctorate summa cum laude in Berlin for Tabes dorsalis und Syphilis. From February until 
October 1895 he was junior assistant at the Charité in Berlin, in September 1896 he passed his 
state examination and became an assistant doctor. He served in the infantry in Strasbourg and 
at the Ulanes in Strasbourg and Hagenau; in March 1899 he was promoted to a senior 
physician. An important step in his career was a call to the Pathologisches Institut der 
Universität Berlin, where he was engaged as assistant from October 1900 until 1904. Between 
1905 and 1907 Westenhöfer was engaged as prosector (i.e., preparing specimens for 
dissections for teaching purposes) at the hospital Moabit in Berlin; in September 1907 he 
accepted the position of an associate professor.  
F.1.2 The years in Chile: Westenhöfer as pathologist and “pago de Chile” 
An important factor in Westenhöfer’s interest in anthropology was his activities in Chile, 
where he spent several years. He went first to Chile in 1908 to establish a pathological 
institute along German lines. Westenhöfer was a diligent pathologist and a great teacher – 
highly regarded by his students. Today, his work in Chile is considered to have been of great 
importance to the country’s development of healthcare. Nevertheless, this stay was obscured 
by two negative events, which influenced Westenhöfer’s career both as a pathologist and 
anthropologist in Chile.  
                                                          
266 This summarised biography is based on an unpublished MD thesis on Westenhöfer’s anthropological ideas 
(Bender-Oser 2004a). For a biography in Spanish that further analysed Westenhöfer’s activities as pathologist 
in Chile see (Wicke 1958a; Wicke 1958b). 
267 Westenhöfer’s publications until 1913/1914 were signed as “Westenhoeffer” but afterwards as 
“Westenhöfer”. In Chile his name was written in several versions (Máximo, Maximiliano, Westenhofer), see 
(Wicke 1958a)  
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On the one hand, Westenhöfer committed a serious mistake during an autopsy of the burned 
body of a person who was believed to be Guillermo Beckert Frambahuer, the clerk of the 
German legation in Santiago de Chile. In the first autopsy carried out by Chileans it was 
decided that it was not possible to determine if the person was murdered or not, due to the fact 
that the corpse was badly burned. The German legation engaged Westenhöfer to make a 
second autopsy. He saw this as an excellent opportunity to show his competence as a German 
scientist (at the time forensic doctors had to be self-taught as there were no courses of 
instruction). In an attempt to demonstrate his superiority concerning scientific affairs, 
Westenhöfer openly criticised the first autopsy performed by his Chilean colleagues and 
carried out the second autopsy with great care and detail. Unfortunately for him, he did not 
pay enough attention to the identification of the body. It turned out that the dead person was 
Exequiel Tapia, the legation’s servant. With great creativity and criminal energy, Frambahuer 
had manipulated the evidence to make everyone believe that the dead person was himself, 
while he escaped with the legation’s money. A Chilean dentist, Dr. Valenzuela, observed that 
the corpse had a complete set of teeth, different from Frambauer, who had artificial teeth. 
After Valenzuela made this information public, Frambauer was caught and executed. This 
case was an excellent opportunity for Westenhöfer’s enemies (Chilean doctors who were 
criticised by Westenhöfer or who saw him as an uncomfortable concurrent) to present him as 
an incompetent scientist. 
The second case which seriously damaged Westenhöfer’s reputation began in 1911, when 
Westenhöfer made some blunt (but essentially correct) statements about the poor hygienic 
conditions in Chile in a German journal. After one of Westenhöfer’s students translated these 
statements into Spanish, many Chileans felt that their national dignity had been offended, 
giving rise to a huge public controversy about him in which he was characterised as having a 
strong xenophobic attitude. This case was covered by most newspapers (in Westenhöfer’s 
estate papers there are more than 50 articles published in Chilean newspapers about this case), 
where he was denoted with the pejorative term “pago de Chile”268. Demonstrations for and 
against Westenhöfer were organised. In one of these demonstrations (pro Westenhöfer) 
                                                          
268 A „pago de Chile“ is a person behaving in an ungrateful manner towards the Chilean people. In Diccionario 
ejemplificado de chilenismos (Morales Pettorino et al. 1986, p. 3222) the following definition of the term is: 
“Actitud desagredecida de Chile o de aiguna institución chilena para con sus buenos servidores”. This 
expression was repeatedly used in connection to the alleged German author (actually a Swiss national) of the 
defamatory book El ultimo Rincón de Mundo (Malsch 1907). 
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organised by the Federación des Estudiantes and through the Congresso Social Obrero it was 
estimated that about 12’000 students and workers participated. But the pressure against 
Westenhöfer was too strong, and he did not have any alternative but to quit his job and return 
to Germany in August, 1911.  
Between 1911 and 1929 Westenhöfer worked in several hospitals and institutes in different 
functions. In 1917 he received the title of Extraordinary Professor at the University of Berlin, 
where he was given emeritus status in 1929. Interestingly, Westenhöfer was still very popular 
among his Chilean students, and they did not forget him. By the late 1920s, some of these 
early students held influential positions in Chile, and they helped Westenhöfer to return to the 
country. In 1928 he began to negotiate a new contract with the Chilean authorities and in 1930 
he returned to Chile with different aims: to establish pathological institutes in the country, to 
combat several serious illnesses like tuberculosis and syphilis, and to train new pathologists. 
He was very well received by Chilean physicians and his former students – even the 
newspapers wrote about the return of “Don Màximo” – the “pago de Chile” was rehabilitated.    
Unfortunately, Chile had financial problems at the time and was not able to pay Westenhöfer 
and other foreign professors. Therefore, he returned to Germany in 1933 and only finally 
returned to Chile in 1948, following an invitation by the Chilean ministry of public health to 
spend his old age in Santiago de Chile. He died in Santiago de Chile on 25th September 1957 
at the age of 86 years. 
F.2 Westenhöfer’s Aquatile Hypothese 
Besides his ideas on the alleged primitivity of human phylogeny (see Appendix D), 
Westenhöfer developed a further hypothesis on human evolution, that he called “Aquatile 
Hypothese”. Westenhöfer did his first observations leading to this hypothesis in 1909 -1911 in 
Chile while he studied the anatomy of indigenous populations in this country. He observed a 
frequent variation of internal organs, among others what he believed to be an “atavistic” 
appendix and a lobulation of the spleen and kidney. He called these three anomalies 
“prognonische Trias”, and thought that he discovered a new racial feature. However, in his 
further dissections in Germany, he found similar features in European individuals. In 
comparative anatomical researches he saw that lobulated spleens and kidneys are not unique 
human features, but also common in some aquatic mammals. This observation was the 
starting point for his first speculations on a semi-aquatic phase in human evolution. He 
believed that the incomplete unification or consolidation of spleen and kidney in humans is 
only exceeded by cetaceans. He was convinced that concerning the kidney, it is only exceeded 
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by the cow, the pinnipeds, the sea otter and bear, the hippopotamus and the rhino, all animals 
that are semiaquatic or aquatic today or are believed to descend from aquatic animals. 
Interestingly, Westenhöfer did not give any references to corroborate the statement that the 
bear and the rhino are believed to descend from aquatic animals. He regarded it as possible or 
even probable that this strange similarity between very different groups of animals is the 
result of a convergent evolution. Consequently, so Westenhöfer, “the fact that these animals 
all have a similar way of life leads to the conclusion that also in the human line there was a 
mammal adapted to an aquatic way of life” (Westenhöfer 1923, 1252, my translation). 
One year later Westenhöfer published another paper in which he discussed further human 
features that in his opinion are connected to an aquatic past: 
We have to imagine human ancestors living in an environment in which the dentition is 
needed to grasp and triturate the food, but the demand connected to the capture of the prey 
should not be too high. All the functional demands of the dentition have to be very different 
from those of primates living in forests. A mammal living in water would find an environment 
in which a stronger development of the dentition is not needed because of the relative softness 
of the food. (Westenhöfer 1924, 259-260, my translation) 
Westenhöfer does not give details of the specific anatomical modification of the dentition. 
However, he was more precise concerning the reduction of body hair and great amount of 
subcutaneous fat in humans and aquatic mammals. In the same paper as above he wrote: 
The fact that the human body is rather hairless, but once was surely covered by a fur, can be 
seen in analogy to the relative hairlessness in aquatic mammals (whales, seals, rhino, 
hippo)269, especially if considered that there is no other plausible explanation so far. 
Furthermore, the human predisposition to accumulate great amounts of subcutaneous fat (a 
feature which is obviously already present in pre-civilizations – I remember the so called 
Venus of Bassompière [sic, Westenhöfer meant the Venus of Brassempouy] would be 
consistent with the above idea. (Westenhöfer 1924, 260-261, my translation) 
In several other papers and in two books Westenhöfer added further arguments to his aquatic 
hypothesis, like bipedalism connected to swimming and diving, the reduction of olfaction, the 
face-to-face copulation, swimming and diving skills the development of the brain, the form of 
                                                          
269 Although Darwin was not quoted by Westenhöfer in this specific context, it cannot be excluded that the first 
insights on the Aquatile Hypothese were directly or indirectly inspired by Darwin’s ideas. Darwin, when 
discussing the hair reduction in humans in his Descent of Man, noted that a naked skin and a large amount of 
subcutaneous fat are features of a number of aquatic mammals (Darwin 1871, vol. 1,  148). 
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the hand, foot and ear, some specific skin glands, and the hair tract in the lower arm; see 
references in Bender-Oser (2004a, 80-93). Westenhöfer went through the literature of his time 
and quoted any author who wrote something about “aquatic features” in non-human primates 
and humans. He did it without much consideration on the quality of the arguments of the 
quoted works or the lack of internal logic between the different ideas. For instance, 
Westenhöfer quoted G.L. Sera (Westenhöfer 1942b, 311) to corroborate his own aquatic 
hypothesis. However, Sera did not write about a semi-aquatic past of humans, but about 
alleged aquatic features of South American primates; for a detailed analysis of authors quoted 
by Westenhöfer see Bender-Oser (2004a, 93-98).  
Another example of the lack of inner logic in his attempt to corroborate the Aquatile 
Hypothese is supplied by his reference to a paper written by Bruno Henneberg on the anatomy 
and physiology of the ear. In 1909 Henneberg published a paper based on comparative 
anatomy of several terrestrial mammals in which he tried to demonstrate that in these 
mammals the auricula shows rudiments of an early adaptation to an aquatic life, more 
specifically, to close the ear canal during submersion (Hennenberg 1909, quoted in 
Henneberg 1942). More than three decades later he published a paper in which he tried to 
demonstrate that the human ear-anatomy also must have had the same ability in the past, 
without giving precise indication of the time in which such a development may had occurred 
(Henneberg 1942). Motivated by Henneberg’s prompt to find persons with ears provided with 
contractible muscles, Westenhöfer claimed to have searched and found such a person 
(Westenhöfer 1935, 72-73). He was convinced that his Aquatile Hypothese has become less 
speculative through this new evidence  (Westenhöfer 1935, 72-73).  
A last example of Westenhöfer’s lack of care in his argumentation is supplied through his 
statements on hair tract. Westenhöfer was aware that in human beings and other anthropoids – 
as well as in other primates and quadrupeds – the hair tract points towards the elbow on the 
lower forelimb. Since this feature is common in most mammals, he could evidently not use it 
as an argument for his Aquatile Hypothese (he normally used arguments related to unique 
features in humans when compared with apes). However, he simply overlooked this detail and 
stated that “I would see it [the hair tract in the forearm] as not insignificant support for my 
Aquatile Hypothese, since such a direction of the hairs on the lower arm during swimming 
stretching the arms forward would have been useful” (Westenhöfer 1942b, 311). For a 
detailed analysis of Westenhöfers’ Aquatile Hypothese and the works used for its 
corroboration see Bender-Oser (2004a). In following Table (F.1) the arguments of 
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Westenhöfer’s Aquatile Hypothese and Hardy’s aquatic hypothesis (AH) are summarized and 
compared; on Hardy’s AH see Appendix D).  
Westenhöfer encountered great difficulties in the attempt to conciliate his primitivity 
hypothesis and his aquatic hypothesis. This difficulty was based on the conceptual differences 
between the two models. The aquatic hypothesis required the acceptance of convergent 
evolution, i.e. implying a classical view of Darwinian evolution based on variation and natural 
selection. This model was incompatible with the argumentation of the primitivity hypothesis, 
which was strongly interwoven with Westenhöfer’s belief in Platonic idealism. In fact, 
Westenhöfer regarded human beings as “essentially unchangeable” over time. This explains 
why Westenhöfer believed that a bipedal reptile was “already human”. In his mind, just the 
external appearance can be modified (due to the realization of hidden potentialities of the 
“essences”), but not the human essences themselves. As strange as this idea might sound 
today, Platonic idealism was a popular philosophical concept until Karl Popper’s influential 
criticism against it. The incompatibility of Westenhöfer’s ideas was probably the main reason 
why Westenhöfer did not mention the aquatic hypothesis in his last book of 1948.  
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Table F.1 Comparison between Aquatile Hypothese and AH 
Arguments for a semi-aquatic phase in early hominin evolution Westenhöfer Hardy 
Subcutaneous fat is indicated as an important divergent feature and interpreted as an analogy 
between humans and aquatic and semi-aquatic vertebrates, developed to prevent heat loss in 
water 
yes yes 
Subcutaneous fat to improve swimming performance by making human body more 
streamlined  
no yes 
Human ability to swim at the water surface and under water indicates a semi-aquatic phase 
in early hominin evolution 
yes yes 
The strong reduction of body hair in humans is interpreted as analogous feature to aquatic 
and semi-aquatic mammals 
yes yes 
The lobed spleen and kidneys of humans are regarded as important 
distinctions between humans and great apes and interpreted as adaptations to an earlier semi-
aquatic lifestyle in human phylogeny 
yes no 
Great development of the human brain and of some aquatic mammals is associated with an 
aquatic life 
yes yes 
Upright posture is interpreted as an adaptation to a semi-aquatic 
environment 
yes  yes 
The divergence in the hair tract in the body between human and apes is interpreted as an 
adaptation to swimming. Such an arrangement of hair offered less resistance in water and 
may have been a first step in aquatic adaptation before the hair reduction. 
no yes 
The hair tract on the forearms is regarded as an adaptation to swimming (to reduce water 
resistance when stretching the arms forward)  
yes no 
The sensibility of human hands developed in connection with to collect organisms under 
water  
yes yes 
Tool-making began in a semi-aquatic environment yes yes 
Gap in fossil evidence is probably related to the fact that fossil evidence should be searched 
in coastal environments 
no yes 
Humans like to go to the seaside and spend time in water (bathing,  and play in water) no yes 
Great availability of protein-rich foods is regarded as a strong argument for a semi-aquatic 
life in early hominin evolution 
no yes 
The face-to-face copulation is regarded as convergent to the face-to-face copulation in 
aquatic mammals 
yes no 
Regression of olfactory organ (bulbus and lobus olfactorus) is fund in humans and aquatic 
mammals 
yes no 
An early palustrine life (marshes and swamps) of man is regarded as likely yes no 
Webbed-fingers sometimes found in humans yes yes 
Beowulf's struggle with the dragon under water is a hint that humans perhaps did live and 
fight with such dragons in water 
yes  no 
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